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Preface

I WANT TO TALK about something embarrassing: direct address to readers 
or audiences. In narrative contexts it always poses problems, unless the 
speaker is making a joke. Groucho Marx or Woody Allen or a character in a 
Godard film can turn to the camera to "break the frame" with an ironic 
remark and get a laugh, as can the narrators in novels by W. M. Thackeray, 
John Fowles, or John Barth. Direct address in narrative begins to embar­
rass, however, when it is no longer offered in jest—when the speaker who 
assails "you" is in earnest. 
If I may judge by my experience of academic readers—colleagues and 
students—I can safely guess that you dislike serious direct address in texts. 
You find it preachy, or cute, or coy. You think of it as a technical error, a 
lapse of artistry, a cheap effect. It irritates you when you run across it in 
Victorian novels, and it is irritating you at this very moment, as you read. 
Why is that? 
I contend that our prejudice against earnest (as opposed to ironic) 
direct address stems from our culture's aversion to feminine gestures. In 
Victorian novels written by women, earnest direct address evolved as an 
alternative to public speaking "in person," which was forbidden to respect­
able females. Realist novels provided opportunities for women to speak 
through their narrators to "you," in a serious, nonliterary way seldom 
practiced by male Victorian novelists. Those earnest interventions, those 
direct appeals to "y°u>" took on a feminine gender in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. As women's narrators used them to intervene in their 
fictional texts, women novelists used them to intervene in history. Hence, in 
the feminine "gendered intervention," history and text converge while a 
feminine presence is projected, for the moment, into the reading experience. 
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And that feminine presence inspires embarrassment, even now, when wom-
en's literal presence in public is a matter of course. 
Recent criticism focusing on the role ideology has played in forming 
the literary canon has taught us that women's writing has been system­
atically devalued, and for the most part flatly excluded from the Great 
Anglo-American Tradition. Most of that criticism concentrates on what 
narratologists would call the "story" (histoire) in men's and women's novels, 
or, as Seymour Chatman puts it, "the what in a narrative that is depicted" 
(19). Some elements of story that have been receiving attention from ideo­
logically inspired critics include the nature of characters and events repre­
sented in fiction, the reiteration of typical scenes and themes, and the 
"moral" or message transmitted by the text. Until now, no one has scru­
tinized the "discourse" (recit) of mid-nineteenth-century novels, the precise 
ways in which those stories get told. By focusing on interruptions in the 
story—which Gerard Genette calls "narrative interventions," thus avoid­
ing the negative connotations of "intrusions"—I propose to examine a less 
obvious difference between "masculine" and "feminine" Victorian texts. In 
analyses (not readings) of individual novels, I look at the structure, stance, 
content, and evident intention of passages addressed to "you," in order to 
uncover that difference. 
I stress that these are analyses, not readings, because interpretation is 
not the goal of this study. I propose no new way of understanding what 
Victorian novels are trying to communicate. Instead, I am looking at how 
they try, in order to point out that critical prejudice against narrative 
techniques can be as much affected by issues of gender as can critical 
assumptions about the forms and contents of fiction. 
The three parts of this book are themselves interventions in three 
ongoing conversations among critics. Part I enters the debate among femi­
nist theorists over the usefulness of androcentric critical models for feminist 
criticism and offers a model combining feminism with structuralist nar­
ratology. Part II addresses criticism of novels written by male and female 
authors, examining narrative interventions as guides to what kind of novels 
these are. Following the model proposed in Part I, I analyze novels whose 
narrators rely upon feminine, masculine, and cross-gendered modes of 
intervention, looking at their authorial intrusions in the context of the 
novelists' gendered experience and their implied or expressed novelistic 
goals. Part III moves the conversation to the realm of history, both social 
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and literary. It describes the historical circumstances under which men and 
women found themselves making choices among modes of narrative stance 
in novels and it questions the theoretical and critical tradition that has 
suppressed or derided earnest direct address to this day. 
In that it makes narrative interventions in nineteenth-century novels 
its central subject, this study does not seek to (re)do what other books on 
feminist theory or Victorian fiction have done. Because the combination of 
feminism, narratology, and Victorian studies must necessarily frustrate 
some critical expectations, even as it raises new ones, I want to outline what 
the book will not do, before beginning to do what it will. 
First, although speaking of "gendered writing" inevitably raises the 
specter of "difference" in its many contemporary forms, I will not tackle 
more than a few of its manifestations. My primary concern with gender 
differences springs neither from deconstruction's model of differance nor 
from the new French feminisms' psychoanalytic theories of essential sexual 
difference. I am treating gender instead as a social construct, a set of learned 
behaviors that an individual adopts to express or demonstrate his or her 
gender identification. Gender, in this social or anthropological sense, in­
cludes outward signs of one's sexual identity, such as clothing, gestures, 
vocal inflection and—I would suggest—narrative strategies. Just as men 
and women can cross dress to present themselves in the mode associated 
with another gender, novelists, too, can choose (somewhat less self-con-
sciously, no doubt) to use techniques associated with the other sex. Eve 
Sedgwick, Teresa de Lauretis, and Nancy Miller, among others, have 
looked into the ways gender colors the production of story in narrative; to 
complement what they have done, the present study concentrates on gen­
ders influence upon discourse. 
Though narratology's basic distinction between story and discourse 
and its precise language for describing textual phenomena are central to this 
project, I will not be limiting my categories of narrative stance to those 
already proposed by other narratologists. Among them, only Gerald Prince 
has elaborated a theory of the "narratee" (augmented by the work of Mary 
Ann Piwowarczyk) to account for the possible answers to the question, 
Whom does the narrator address? Prince has described the relation between 
narrator and narratee that prevails in many canonical texts, from the be­
ginnings of the novel to the modern period. As I intend to show, however, 
the same relation does not always prevail in British and American novels of 
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the mid-nineteenth century. Like most contemporary narrative theorists, 
Prince takes it for granted that the narratee is always a fictive, created 
figure, standing in roughly the same relation to the actual reader as does the 
narrator to the actual author. In the strictest sense, this assumption is 
certainly valid: when actual readers vary so obviously, from period to pe­
riod, or from person to person, the logical impossibility of "the real 
readers" presence in any text is obvious. And, to be sure, every text must 
inscribe a created "reader" within either what Prince calls its "overjustifica­
tions" or what Wolfgang Iser has called its "gaps" and "indeterminacies." 
But analysis of narrative discourse has not yet accounted for texts in which 
the narrative voice seeks to efface the boundaries between the inscribed 
reader or narratee and the actual reader who holds the book and reads. At 
one extreme, a narrator might do this by speaking to Princes "zero-degree 
narratee," who possesses only the minimal characteristics necessary to be 
competent to decode the text. At the other extreme, however, certain real­
ist novels' narrators encourage the actual reader to identify with a narratee 
liberally endowed with characteristics and frequently addressed as "you." 
Like other narratologists, I do not follow the traditional assumption 
that narrative interventions are, a priori, out of place in realist texts. Under 
the influence of an Anglo-American formalist theory of the most aestheti­
cally pleasing way to render truth in fiction, critics in the first half of the 
twentieth century subscribed, for the most part, to certain prejudices about 
the impressionistic fictional forms best suited to maintaining an "illusion of 
reality." Modern criticism of realist fiction retains many Jamesian attitudes; 
following James, modern critics took it for granted that reminders of an 
authors presence, through narrative interventions and addresses to the 
reader, must necessarily disturb the illusion and thereby undermine the 
goals of realism. More recently, postmodern critics have returned to Dr. 
Johnsons commonsense observation that no one sitting in a London theater 
watching a play ever "really imagines himself at Alexandria" (329). When 
we look at the insistently metafictional frame that Thackeray, for instance, 
places around Vanity Fair, we are no longer surprised to realize that such 
novels are always and inevitably about novels, and that narrative interven­
tions draw attention to this fact. 
I am not willing, however, to rest comfortably with what has by now 
become a critical truism: all texts are self-referential, all writing mirrors 
itself, all fiction is, first and foremost, about fiction. These assumptions, 
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which serve critics of eighteenth- and twentieth-century novels so well, 
cannot account for all the conventions of nineteenth-century realism. Every 
novelist is interested in novels, and all fictional narratives comment, more 
or less overtly, upon the conventions of fictions that preceded them or the 
conventions they "take up, cite, parody, refute, or generally transform," as 
Jonathan Culler puts it (Pursuit of Signs 38). But, as political critics (Marx­
ists and, more recently, feminists among them) have long recognized, many 
of the realist novelists were also interested in the world of lived experience 
and in the impact their novels might have on it. Writers such as Elizabeth 
Gaskell, George Eliot, and Harriet Beecher Stowe thought of the novel as a 
vehicle for exerting influence on readers who would, in turn, work changes 
in the worlds of politics, society, and personal morality. These women 
novelists had very specific reasons for choosing the genre of realism. I 
suggest that their strategic reliance on earnest direct address illuminates 
their concept of what "realism" is. 
When I turn my attention to the writers' idea of realism, expressed 
both within and outside their texts, I indicate that I do not share some of the 
essential assumptions of semiotics, even though that field has been so 
closely allied to narratology in the past. Cullers account of those assump­
tions helps clarify my reasoning. According to semiotics: 
a text can be read only in relation to other texts, and it is made 
possible by the codes which animate the discursive space of a 
culture. The work is a product not of a biographically defined 
individual about whom information could be accumulated, but 
of writing itself. To write a poem the author had to take on the 
character of poet, and it is that semiotic function of poet or 
writer rather than the biographical function of author which is 
relevant to discussion of the text. (Pursuit of Signs 38) 
Within the system of semiotics, this reasoning is perfectly consistent. But 
it ignores one commonsense fact that the irresistible influence of new 
historicism may permit us to reconsider: the work literally is a "prod­
uct . . . of a biographically defined individual about whom information 
could be accumulated." Someone wrote it, someone who inhabited a par­
ticular culture at a particular time, someone who made certain choices 
among all the literary codes and conventions available to him or her within 
that culture and time. A poetics that tries to account for conventions of 
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discourse in a given period or genre cannot ignore the place of those 
conventions in history, including the circumstances in which the author 
produced the text. From this observation we can easily proceed to a renewed 
interest in authors' manipulation of the relation between their texts and the 
actual people who read them. Semiotics recognizes that the readers in texts, 
the readers created by texts, are not "real readers," but it provides no 
framework for acknowledging the real reader who must, after all, exist for 
the text to have any function or meaning. 
I will not try to propose a comprehensive theory of the relation 
between textual production and narrative discourse; I focus instead on the 
example of one genre in one time and language. I have chosen Victorian 
fiction for its didactic reputation: in depicting the "real world," realist 
novelists often tried to make genuine changes in that world by inspiring 
readers to transform their own notions of their moral and social selves, their 
sense of responsibility to others. Not every Victorian novel conforms to this 
aim of realist fiction—to change the world by representing it. But a realist 
novel that does attempt to alter the world it strives to represent requires a 
special relation between reader and text. For readers to act upon the novels' 
suggestions, they would have to take the texts seriously and think of the 
fictions as somehow true. Narrative interventions help to position the 
reader in relation to the text, at the same time expressing the novelists' own 
goals, either ironically or explicitly. Concentrating, then, on novels written 
in England and America during the heyday of the Victorian realist novel, 
from 1845 t  0 X865, I examine the role that narrative interventions play in 
establishing the reader's relation to the narrator and narratee, or—more 
broadly speaking—to the text. 
For formal reasons, I do not analyze any texts whose narrators double 
as characters in the novel. Although Genette has shown, through his 
analysis of Proust, that there is no reason why a character-narrator in a 
modern novel cannot be "omniscient," Victorian novelists followed much 
stricter conventions than Proust did for limiting the knowledge of charac­
ters who narrate. The actual reader of David Copperfield or Jane Eyre can 
determine who is speaking and from what vantage point comparatively 
easily: David speaks or Jane speaks, either from the perspective of what he 
or she knows at that moment in the story, or from the augmented perspec­
tive of what he or she has "learned since," or from a mixture of the two van­
tage points the character-narrator occupies—narrative past and narrating 
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present. In novels like these that take the form of mock-autobiographies, 
the narrators stance imitates that of a "real" autobiographer. But in texts 
with what used to be called omniscient narrators (or, to use Genette s more 
precise denominations, heterodiegetic narrators in extradiegetic situations 
of enunciation), the questions of voice and perspective in realist novels are 
more problematic. The real reader of Vanity Fair who pauses to wonder 
"Who is speaking?" is continually greeted by Thackeray in his guise as 
"manager of the performance" or "puppet master," a constant reminder of 
the fictionality of the text. I am identifying a particular kind of Victorian 
novel that literary theory has so far overlooked: realist novels with narrators 
who are not characters, but whose narrative strategy is nevertheless to use 
interventions that efface the fictionality of the text, rather than reinforce it 
as Thackeray's do. 
I wish I could claim that I am not trying to defend serious narrative 
interventions in realist fiction, because in accordance with the principles of 
narratology, my goal is not primarily to evaluate texts or strategies. But I 
must confess that I like interventions, especially earnest ones, and that they 
have long been the parts of Victorian novels that most consistently attract 
my eye. Nevertheless, narrative interventions—whether distancing and 
ironic or engaging and earnest—have habitually annoyed even the most 
enthusiastic critics of the novels of the 1850s. The technique of pretending 
to confide in a "dear reader" is traditionally associated with novels that are, 
at best, drearily didactic and, at worse, cloyingly sentimental. Even in 
more recent criticism, which has rehabilitated narrative intrusion as one of 
the many conventions that combine to form the genre of the novel, the 
"dear reader" intervention is usually only defensible insofar as it is ironic, as 
in the novels of Fielding or Sterne. 
I do not agree with the many critics, traditionalists and progressivists 
alike, who take it for granted that earnest direct address is always a sign of 
bad writing. Originating in the tough-minded, prescriptive stance of New 
Criticism, the objection to direct address in fiction has made its way into 
many contemporary critical approaches, even among theorists who no 
longer cling to "maintaining an illusion" as the first goal of realist prose 
fiction. We find it in Iser, when he speaks of the "boredom that inevitably 
arises when everything is laid out cut and dried before us" in texts that are so 
completely narrated as to leave too few gaps for the imagination to fill in 
(275); we find it in John Searle, when he observes that fictional texts like 
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Tolstoy's, containing "serious" statements about the message of the work, 
are "tiresomely didactic" (332); we find it even in Helene Moglens recent 
work on narrative form and the ideology of gender. Performing an il­
luminating deconstructive reading of Dickens s Dombey and Son, Moglen 
explains a difference she sees between "sentimentality" (where emotion 
passes "between the author and reader" when a narrator addresses the reader 
on behalf of inarticulate characters such as dying children or suppressed 
women) and the more potentially radical mode of "melodrama" (where 
emotion inheres in the characters themselves, who have the opportunity to 
speak and act out their situations directly). According to Moglen, melo­
drama is a more effective mode of critiquing the realities it depicts because 
it is more memorable. Like Iser's and Searles, her privileging the more 
dramatic mode seems to look back to the traditional preference among 
critics of fiction for "showing" over "telling." 
But I do not see any reason why we should continue to assume—with 
James, Forster, Conrad, Ford, and others—that showing must be better 
than telling. The preference for showing, or for fiction that presents charac­
ters and situations dramatically rather than "narrativizing" them, has un­
doubtedly been instrumental in shaping the canon of texts that are studied 
as great works of literature. It partly accounts for the lowly place in the 
canon occupied by such strongly didactic, unabashedly narrated women's 
novels as Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple or Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle 
Tom's Cabin. Feminist criticism has gone a long way toward redefining 
literary canons to include such works, in which the story does not conform 
to the white-male-centered concerns of the "great American novel" whose 
mid-nineteenth-century conventions were developed by Cooper, Haw­
thorne, and Melville, often in reaction against popular female fictional 
traditions. Critics including Jane Tompkins, Elaine Showalter, and An­
nette Kolodny have shown how works that depict women's experience and 
women's perspectives have been neglected, and they have investigated vari­
ous political and literary reasons for that neglect. 
One reason for the devaluing of women writers that has not yet been 
identified is the role that narrative discourse has played. Nineteenth-
century women's writing is closely associated with the sentimental and 
didactic technique of direct address to the reader that dominates texts like 
Rowson's and Stowe's. (Tompkins, along with other recent commentators 
including Ann Douglas, Nina Baym, and Thomas Gossett, takes it for 
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granted that this technique is objectionable on the grounds of its sheer 
conventionality.) As my analysis of selected novels shows, both male and 
female writers of the period were capable of intervening in both distancing 
and engaging ways in their novels. But women novelists seem to have used 
engaging strategies to stir readers' emotions more frequently and more 
insistently than their male counterparts. This association between earnest 
direct address and feminine writing can, I think, help explain much more 
than the low status that sentimental novels have held in the canon. It may 
also account for the critical reluctance to see earnest direct address in "great 
novels" as something other than a stylistic lapse. 
My purposes, then, are threefold: i) to analyze the role that direct 
address plays in realistic fictional discourse; 2) to investigate the connection 
between gender and narrative strategies; and 3) to consider the ways a 
narrative strategy's "gender" influences its reputation among critics and 
theorists. In pursuing these ends, I combine the formalist approach of 
narratology with the historical, social, and gender-based questions associ­
ated with feminist-contextual criticism. 
As I said at the outset, I am more concerned with poetics than with 
thematic interpretation. My research provides no startling new readings of 
texts; on the contrary, the narrative strategies I analyze tend to reinforce, 
rather than subvert, the current readings of what these novels "mean." I 
emphasize instead how they "work" (or, in the case of the masculine-
gendered novels, how they "play"), and I hope this emphasis will illumi­
nate the impact that assumptions about poetics have had upon modern 
literary history, even in critical texts that do not address poetics explicitly. 
I believe that critical assumptions about the appropriateness of con­
ventions to genres are often suppressed in scholarly writing, and I am 
convinced that these assumptions are frequently based on unrecognized 
gender-bias. By proposing a partial poetics of narrative discourse (as femi­
nists seldom do) that places conventions of discourse in the context of their 
production (as narratologists almost never do), I hope to uncover one case— 
the case of the engaging narrator in realist fiction—that will help reveal the 
central roles both gender and poetics play (albeit covertly) in the history of 
literary criticism and theory. 
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I

Proposing a Model: Feminism 
and Narratology 

1 
Introduction: 
Why Don't Feminists 
Narratology? 
READER, if you are interested, as I am, in the history of narrators' attitudes 
toward their readers; if you adopt the models of narratology in your attempt 
to differentiate among the various strategies authors can use in narrative 
interventions; and if, in your research into nineteenth-century realist nov­
els, you discover that passages of earnest direct address (like the one you are 
reading now) occur more frequently and more prominently in novels by 
women than in novels by men, you will run into an interesting theoretical 
dilemma. Why is there no "feminist narratology" that could help account 
for such a difference? Until recently, narratology has not asked questions 
about gender, and feminist criticism, which by definition always asks the 
gender question first, has not inquired into narrative discourse. Before 
embarking on a theory of gendered interventions, then, I want to consider 
the reasons why these two theoretical approaches have resisted coming 
together. 
NARRATOLOGISTS, FEMINISTS, AN D FEMINIST 
NARRATOLOGY 
Narratology, in its original forms, seems to be gender-blind. Gerard 
Genette, using Proust as the primary example for his "essay in method" and 
referring to scores of other novelists in passing, mentions only half a dozen 
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women writers in Narrative Discourse, and never hints at the possibility of 
any gender-based differences or patterns among narrative structures. 
Neither Gerald Prince nor Mieke Bal, in their less specific and more com­
prehensive presentations of narratology, mentions gender as a factor influ­
encing the models they describe.' The oversight is not a sexist one: not only 
gender, but all variables of context remain outside of classical narratology s 
realm. As proponents of structuralism, the first practitioners of narratology 
lifted texts out of their contexts in order to distill from them the essential 
structures that characterize all narrative. If a general theory of narratology 
were to consider the influence of gender on the production of certain kinds 
of narrative structures, for instance, it would depart from the basic premises 
of a study that—in its earliest, strictest forms—purported to operate ahis­
torically, outside the restrictions imposed by consideration of the period 
and circumstances in which a text is written. For this reason, we cannot be 
surprised that a feminist critic such as Bal has shifted the emphasis of her 
scholarship to semiotics, where she can study recurring textual signs and 
structures in the context of the cultures that produce them.2 
Not all critics who apply the tools of narratology have maintained this 
pure distinction between narrative structures and their contexts. A critic 
who looks at the ways in which ideology shapes narratives—as Susan 
Suleiman has in Authoritarian Fictions (1982), her study of the French roman 
a these during the first half of the twentieth century—returns the text to its 
place in history. Combining descriptive poetics with interpretive criticism, 
Suleiman proposes a model for the genre of the ideological novel, then reads 
individual texts against the model. Proceeding from structuralist methods, 
she offers various charts and diagrams to illustrate her assumptions. The 
most useful of these—a map of the "Principal Constituents of the Narrative 
Text" (157)—most clearly reveals the current intersection between nar­
ratology and contextual criticism. 
This "schema," as Suleiman calls it, is "based chiefly on the works of 
A. J. Greimas and Gerard Genette," with slight modifications of their 
terminology (156): it divides the narrative text's main components into the 
"Level of Story" and the "Level of Discourse." Under "Discourse" are listed 
"Narration" (the functions of the narrator, that is, to tell the story, to signal 
the organization, to address the narratee, to provide "testimonials," and to 
interpret the story); "Focalization" (Genette's useful term for describing 
narrative perspective); and "Temporal Organization" (the "order, duration, 
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and frequency" of occurrences in a story). Under "Story" appear the compo­
nents one would expect: "Characters" (both in terms of what they are and 
what they do in the story); "Events" (including the sequences of actions); 
and "Context" (including historical, geographical, cultural, and "local"). I 
have reproduced the substance of Suleiman's chart to illustrate a point: 
narratology typically regards context as a component of story, rather than 
discourse. In other words, context has been a factor in narratological analy­
sis of what fiction depicts, but not in discussions of how fictions' contents 
get rendered in language. 
Neither Suleiman nor Genette says anything to rule out the possibil­
ity of considering narrative discourse within its historical or ideological 
context. To study, as Suleiman does, the narrator's testimonial function 
(that is, the ways in which the narrator explicitly accounts for what he or she 
"knows") or, more strikingly, the narrators interpretive function (especially 
instances where the uncharacterized or "omniscient" narrator analyzes, 
interprets, or judges characters, events, or situations within the story) is 
necessarily to look at the narrator's utterances within a context. This context 
might be the historical period and setting that a narrative voice shares with 
the story, as in Dickens s Hard Times or Trollope's The Way We Live Now, or it 
might be the context of a narrative voice that places itself in a time different 
from that of the story, as in Scott's Waverly novels, Coopers Leatherstock­
ing tales, or—for a much more explicit example—John Fowles's The French 
Lieutenant's Woman. To take the possibilities a step further in the direction 
Suleimans book beckons, away from purely formalist consideration of struc­
tures, we might look at the narrators utterances in the context in which 
they were literally produced, that is, in terms of the categories of the 
novelists own experience—historical, social, or even personal. Nothing 
prohibits us from asking, among other questions about the role of social 
factors in shaping narrative strategies, what part the writers gender plays in 
the kinds of interventions he or she uses in narrative. 
Although narratology itself has not addressed gender, and though 
gender has not yet been a factor in many narratological studies of the level of 
discourse, structural analysis on the level of story has proven very useful for 
feminist criticism. Nancy Millers The Heroine's Text (1980), a study of the 
two basic plots that characterize novels about women's experience written in 
France and England during the Enlightenment, shows the potential useful­
ness of narratology to a feminist project. Her study of "feminocentric" 
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novels includes only texts written by men, and her analysis of strategy 
remains on the level of story, restricting itself to interrogating what hap­
pens to the female protagonists of these novels. Millers approach carries her 
far into a critique of the culture that produced the novels: as she observes, 
"The plots of these feminocentric novels are of course neither female in 
impulse or origin, nor feminist in spirit, . . . despite their titles and their 
feminine T  " (149). The narratological analysis of these plots allows Miller 
to conclude that the feminocentric novel was written by men in the interest 
of men: women may be "its predominant signifiers, but they are also its pre­
text" (150). Narratology has obvious advantages for a project like Millers, 
among them the way in which categorical descriptions of plots can lend an 
evidently objective authority to potentially inflammatory conclusions about 
male writers and masculine-centered culture. 
Despite its sophisticated theoretical apparatus, Millers book belongs 
to the "images of woman" movement in feminist criticism, that is, the 
study of how women are portrayed in texts. This emphasis keeps her 
analysis focused on the level of story. To date, no feminist critic has taken 
a detailed look into gender's effect on the level of discourse in fiction, 
using "discourse" strictly in the sense established by Genette, Chatman, 
Suleiman, and other narratologists. I think that stepping past the level of 
story to analyze the level of discourse within a framework of questions about 
gender can bring narratology to the service of a later moment in feminist 
criticism. 
THEORIES OF GENDER DIFFERENCE IN WR I TI N  G 
Elaine Showalter has recently summarized the brief but rapidly devel­
oping history of feminist literary theory, tracing the roles that questions of 
gender have played in critical discussions during the past three decades. 
According to Showalter, criticism of women's writing originally 
took the form of an androgynist poetics, denying female literary 
specificity. The women's movement initiated both a feminist 
critique of male culture and a Female Aesthetic celebrating 
women's culture. By the mid-1970s, academic feminist criti­
cism entered a new phase of gynocritics, or the study of women's 
writing. With the impact of European literary and feminist 
theory by 1980, gynesic or poststructuralist feminist criticism, 
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dealing with "the feminine" in philosophy, language, and psy­
choanalysis, dominated the field. And in the late 1980s, we are 
seeing the rise of gender theory, the comparative study of sexual 
difference. ("A Criticism of Our Own," 21) 
Questioning Showalters account of the history of feminist theory on the 
grounds that it treats the field as a linear series of advances over previous 
approaches, Jonathan Culler has challenged the implication that each kind 
of feminist criticism has been superseded by the next. As Culler pointed out 
during a panel at the 1986 Modern Language Association convention (and, 
for that matter, as Showalters essay explicitly acknowledges), the debates 
among the various schools of feminist thought continue as a conversation 
that operates synchronically, even if some voices have joined in more re­
cently than others. Still, the appeal of "narrativizing" critical movements 
diachronically, as Showalter had done, is strong: to tell the story of feminist 
criticism is to account, if only experimentally, for why and how the field 
expands as it does. If we consider the position of narratology within Showal­
ters historical frame, we can more clearly see its potential and its limita­
tions as a prospective aid to feminist literary criticism. 
Clearly, narratology originally belonged to the moment in literary 
history that assumed an "androgynist poetics." If Prince, in the English 
translation of his "Introduction to the Study of the Narratee," uses more 
than seventy-nine examples and only two of them are from female-authored 
works, this is not merely because he is concerned with describing the 
features of a canon that is traditionally dominated by male writers. The very 
existence of that canon is predicated on an assumption that Prince naturally 
shares: regardless of whether any differences exist among the forms and 
strategies that male and female authors choose to employ in fiction, to ask 
questions about such differences would be to depart from the structuralist 
enterprise. As Showalter points out, some women writers (for instance, 
Joyce Carol Oates and Gail Godwin) continue to embrace an androcentric 
poetics, understandably wishing not to be "separate but equal" to male 
writers, but simply to be comparable, on precisely equal terms, to their 
male counterparts. From their point of view, the gender-blindness of nar­
ratology s descriptions of discourse would still be welcome. 
But, as Showalter explains, the women's movement brought on the 
Female Aesthetic, along with the feminist critique of male culture; since 
that time, feminist criticism has always addressed difference in some form. 
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The Heroine's Text is an important example of narratology s contributions to 
the feminist cultural critique. As I have already mentioned, using an 
androcentric tool like narrative analysis in the service of such a critique 
gives feminist projects such as Millers an extra-persuasive edge. It allows 
the critic to confront the masculine biases of feminocentric novels in terms 
that the male critical community has already created and, to some extent, 
adopted.3 In the meantime, the Female Aesthetic mode of criticism was 
carrying analysis of women's writing equally deep into the level of story. 
Inquiries into depictions of women's experience, of female communities, of 
mother-daughter bonds, and of biological differences between women and 
men concentrated on questions of plot, imagery, genre, and language in the 
broadest sense, but resisted the apparently androgynous orientation of 
narratology. Never addressing discourse per se, feminist aestheticians have 
not looked at such narrative conventions as "voice," "perspective," "focali­
zation," or "intervention." They have developed instead theories of the 
preferred styles for women's writing, insisting that women's sentences 
should be shaped differently from men's. 
While feminist aestheticians have tried valiantly to establish grounds 
for evaluating female styles that would not be bound by masculine critical 
assumptions, the movement suffers from two problems that are endemic to 
any aesthetic approach to literature. The first problem is that the theorists 
who try hardest to determine what a female style would look like can hardly 
describe what the formal features of such a style would be. The problem 
goes back to Virginia Woolf s provocative attempt in A Room of One's Own to 
propose a "woman's sentence" whose nature would differ fundamentally 
from a man's prose. But Woolf, like the aestheticians who take their inspira­
tion from her suggestion, cannot really say what kind of sentence it would 
be. Is femininity in a sentence a function of syntax? Of vocabulary? Of im­
agery? Of punctuation? Of some combination of these and other elements? 
When critics have tried to apply Woolf s idea, they have fallen into 
the second problem that aesthetic criticism invariably poses: it can become 
as prescriptive as any previous critical tradition, and continues to mar­
ginalize some women writers on the basis of their style. Josephine Dono­
van, for example, in trying to apply Woolf s notion of a "woman's 
sentence," pronounces George Eliot's prose "turgid, uncomfortable, and 
inappropriately suited to her context" (348), while finding the sentences of 
Jane Austen, Kate Chopin, and Woolf "appropriate" for rendering hero­
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ines' inner lives (349, 352). If it was unreasonable for androcentric critics to 
dismiss from the canon women's writing that strayed too far from implicitly 
acceptable masculine norms of style, surely it is equally unreasonable to 
object to some women authors for sounding less stereotypically "female" 
than others. Like the prescriptive critical traditions it emulates, feminist-
aesthetic stylistic analysis adheres more closely to models of what women's 
writing should be than to inquiries into what it has been. 
Moving away from prescriptive theories of women's writing to a more 
descriptive approach, the next phase of feminist criticism, which Showalter 
christened "gynocritics," sought to avoid the sexist implications of essential 
sexual difference implied by the Female Aesthetic. Gynocritics tried to 
return feminist literary criticism to an arena that could address male col­
leagues, as well as female scholars and critics. The impetus behind gyno­
critics was to alter the literary canon to include more works by women; in 
order to do this, the gynocritic adapts critical approaches from the main­
stream tradition and applies them to texts signed by women. In projects 
such as Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar s The Madwoman in the Attic or 
Showalter s A Literature ofTheir Own, this practice has led to the alteration of 
prevailing masculine models of influence, intertextuality, and conventions of 
story, resulting eventually in the construction of feminine literary traditions 
that presumably developed alongside the mainstream masculine canon, in 
continual response to and conflict with what male writers were doing. Like 
the Female Aesthetic, gynocritics has often led to the seemingly inevitable 
conclusion of feminist criticism: Women write differently from men. 
Explication of the problems raised by such a conclusion can be traced 
back to Simone de Beauvoir's basic observation about what constitutes a 
"second sex." To say that women don't write like men is to place men at a 
normative center and women in the margins; to say that women write 
differently from men is to decenter the observation slightly, but this for­
mulation still retains men's writing as the standard against which the 
difference of women's writing must be defined. To avoid perpetuating 
traditional, binary assumptions, feminist theory has recently embraced the 
approach of deconstruction, which offers a helpful strategy for focusing on 
difference while simultaneously dismantling conventional oppositions. In 
the hands of a practitioner of gynocritics like Elizabeth Meese, deconstruc­
tion becomes a powerful tool for interpreting texts with an eye to gender, 
even though—as Meese observes in Crossing the Double-Cross (1986)— 
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originators and early proponents of deconstruction tended to ignore wom-
en's writing. 
For Meese, as for Helene Moglen and others who deconstruct texts 
with an emphasis on the gendered aspect of diflFerence, deconstruction does 
not limit its goals to the ultimately purposeless, anti-ideological game 
playing that Terry Eagleton decries in Anglo-American deconstructive 
criticism. Eagleton observes that deconstruction 
frees you at a stroke from having to assume a position on impor­
tant issues, since what you say of such things will be no more 
than a passing product of the signifier and so in no sense to be 
taken as "true" or "serious." A further benefit of this stance is 
that it is mischievously radical in respect of everyone else's 
opinions, able to unmask the most solemn declarations as mere 
dishevelled plays of signs, while utterly conservative in every 
other way. Since it commits you to affirming nothing, it is as 
injurious as blank ammunition. (145) 
As Eagleton acknowledges, however—and as Meese, for one, demon-
strates—deconstruction can nevertheless help feminist critics who want to 
emphasize "how, though historically speaking the conflict between men 
and women could not have been more real, the ideology of this antagonism 
involved a metaphysical illusion" (Eagleton 150).4 
Indirectly addressing the appeal of deconstruction for feminist criti­
cism, Alice Jardine has pointed to the irony of the feminist's position in a 
poststructuralist age: whatever else it may do, feminist theory proceeds 
from a belief (in the fact that women have been oppressed), but it operates in 
a world from which Truth has disappeared. As Jardine remarks, the result of 
this dilemma may be for the feminist to experience a "vertigo of reading 
strategies" from the dizzyingly relative heights of infinite possibilities (31). 
According to Jardine, feminists experiencing this vertigo can avoid re­
sponding with mere silence by paying "a continual attention—historical, 
ideological, and affective—to the place from which we speak" (31). To 
combine feminist goals with deconstructive strategies is necessarily to 
attend to the "situation of enunciation" of the readings the approach will 
produce. And, too, deconstruction is not the only poststructuralist system 
which can yield this result: gynesic and Lacanian theories that adapt psy­
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choanalysis also exemplify the ways in which feminists can transform inter­
pretive strategies for their projects' purposes. 
Poststructuralist theories, then, have served gynocritics well in the 
enterprise of interpreting texts "signed by women" as well as texts in which 
women operate as the signifiers. Deconstruction especially is a useful way 
for the feminist critic to answer the question, What does this text mean? or, 
more accurately perhaps, What does this text signify? But to what extent 
has poststructuralist cirticism combined with feminism to ask, How does 
this text mean? Why has feminist theory avoided a systematic study of the 
conventions of literary discourse in women's writing, to parallel the models 
that phallocentric and androcentric criticism have produced? Annette 
Kolodny has claimed that 
A largely male-dominated academic establishment has, for the 
last 75 years or so, treated men's writing as though it were the 
model for all writing. In other words, the various theories on 
the craft of fiction, and the formalist and structuralist models 
that have been based on this closed tradition but have been 
offered up as "universals" of fictive form or even (under the 
influence of the psycholinguists) as emanations of yet deeper 
structures within human cognitive processes may in fact prove 
to be less than universal and certainly less than fully human. 
("Some Notes" 89) 
Kolodny concedes that feminist critics should "use what we can from the 
past." The directions that feminist criticism has taken since Kolodny 
offered her manifesto suggest that feminist critics want to avoid merely 
rectifying the narrowness of the prevailing models, as though that would 
mean simply tinkering with "the tools and methods already available," as 
Kolodny has implied. Are "formalist and structuralist models" gender-
biased in their essence, as well as their details? Does structural analysis have 
to be discarded, and replaced with feminist-inspired strategies of reading 
and interpretation? 
Looking at the most recent feminist literary theories from the per­
spective implicit in such questions, I find it significant that Jardine, for 
example, concludes her important study, Gynesis (1985), by jubilantly 
describing the exhilaration she felt at having discovered that 
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the differences between the male-written and female-written 
texts of modernity were not, after all, in their so-called "con­
tent," but in their enunciation: in their modes of discourse ("sen­
timental," ironic, scientific, etc.); in their twisting of female 
obligatory connotations, of inherited genealogies of the femi­
nine; in their haste or refusal to use the pronouns "I" or "we"; in 
their degree of willingness to gender those pronouns as female. 
(261) 
The differences Jardine names are precisely the material from which struc­
tural analysis of texts is made: these are categories that careful attention to 
patterns of discourse might help to define and describe in detail. Yet 
nowhere does Jardine attempt such definitions or descriptions: her book, 
like other contemporary applications of gynesic theory and studies of 
ecriture feminine, veers away from participating in so overtly structuralist an 
enterprise. 
WH Y FEMINISTS DON'T : POTENTIAL CHALLENGES 
TO NARRATOLOGY 
The fact that feminists in the late 1980s tend not to "do narratology" 
per se, but prefer to concentrate on deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and 
semiotics, may be partly attributable to the objection Kolodny raises to 
merely adapting standard models of criticism that already exist. If femi­
nisms first goal is radical subversion of an existing order, then making 
minor adjustments in well-established critical systems seems unlikely to 
promote that goal. Of course, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and semio­
tics are all established critical systems today, but each of them—despite 
Kolodny s misgivings—has revealed its own fundamentally radical poten­
tial in feminist hands. And, too, feminists do "use narratology," particu­
larly in semiotics, in the course of pointing to the various signifiers in texts; 
literary conventions of story and discourse are signs, too. 
Perhaps feminists avoid the study of narratology as a system because 
they share poststructuralist assumptions about the basic conservatism of 
structuralist approaches. Implicit in the structuralist notion that certain 
systems will repeat themselves—from text to text, or from culture to 
culture—is the idea that the way things are is the way they must inevitably 
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be. A feminist proceeding (as Jardine says) from a belief that the way things 
are is that women are oppressed would necessarily find this idea antipa­
thetic. In addition, narratology, as a system within structuralism, shares 
that movements faith in the possibility of scientific, orderly classification 
of data, in the idea that at one deep level—at least—phenomena can be 
known, named, and thus distinguished as real. The structuralists them­
selves recognize the potential challenges to such a faith. As Genette so 
memorably phrases it, 
This is the paradox of every poetics, and doubtless of every other 
activity of knowledge as well: always torn between those two 
unavoidable commonplaces—that there are no objects except 
particular ones and no science except of the general—but always 
finding comfort and something like attraction in this other, 
slightly less widespread truth, that the general is at the heart of 
the particular, and therefore (contrary to the common precon­
ception) the knowable is at the heart of the mysterious. (Nar­
rative Discourse 23) 
Because it embraces constructs of truth, structuralism participates in the 
Western intellectual tradition of binary oppositions that Derrida has sought 
to deconstruct (sometimes in the name of "woman") and that some theorists 
would say has always been undermined by that otherness that constitutes 
gynesis.5 Orderliness, whether in systems of metaphysics, politics, or liter­
ary criticism, has too often implied hegemony and hierarchy for radical 
critics to operate comfortably within it. 
But orderliness has its advantages, too. What I find appealing about 
the narratology that Genette, Greimas, Prince, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, 
and Bal have elaborated is the way it expedites communication about texts. 
Narratology provides a precise language for describing the features of texts 
within a genre and delineating the differences between any given text and 
others of its kind. It can do what feminist aesthetic criticism, for example, 
cannot do: describe exactly what the conventions of fictional discourse are 
and how they operate. Narratology has given us names for literary conven­
tions that formalist terminology made very difficult to discuss. (For ex­
ample, consider the complications of describing the narrative techniques of 
Henry James or Jane Austen without the concept of "focal izat ion"; consider 
the absurdity of referring to "Fielding" in Tom Jones as a "third-person 
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narrator" when his "I" is so omnipresent.) What makes narratology so 
useful is that it can take gender studies a step further into a tangible, 
arguable position on particular texts: instead of simply talking in gener­
alities about "women's styles," it can genuinely point to the features that 
constitute those styles in narrative. 
In addition to the descriptive power conferred by its terminology, 
narratology has another important advantage over the traditional formalist 
methods that contemporary feminists eschew: it seeks to describe texts, not 
to evaluate them, in terms of their formal features. In spite of the justifiable 
anxieties about the Western intellectual tradition that poststructuralist 
theories have made explicit, order does not have to involve hierarchy. 
Certainly, the critic who selects texts for narratological study necessarily 
privileges those texts: this fact of scholarly life is practically as explicit, 
though, in such projects as Genettes or Suleimans as it is in the work of a 
critic such as Stanley Fish.6 Any narratological system that presents itself as 
comprehensive while being based on a privileged selection of texts will 
necessarily contain gaps that studies of other, unconsidered texts could fill. 
But, as most narratologists would probably agree, if a particular text does 
not "work" within a narrative model, the limitation is in the model, not the 
text. After all, narratology acknowledges that no text can be entirely 
described by any model. The specificity of every text resists duplication in 
any description of how it works: the only really comprehensive account of 
all the structures that operate in a text is the text itself.7 The continuing 
study of narratology has sought only to test and expand the models, in the 
interest of making them more comprehensive. As a branch of descriptive 
poetics, narratology does not set out to exclude narrative texts of any kind 
from the parameters of its inquiry. 
Narratology's desire to be comprehensive, rather than exclusive, is 
what makes it especially suitable to feminist criticism. And the flexibility 
of its models is narratology s answer to any objection that might be raised 
about the methods being too orderly or too systematic to be (as Kolodny 
might put it) "fully human." By testing the models of discourse (not story) 
against women's texts, we can sketch in some of the gaps in models that are 
based almost exclusively on men's writing; by placing the narratological 
analysis of those texts in a historical context that takes into account the 
circumstances in which they were produced, we can use narratology as a 
bridge to cross over from gynocritics into what Showalter calls "gen­
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der theory, the comparative study of sexual difference." ("A Criticism of 
Our Own" 21). 
GENDER THEORY AN D TEXTUAL STRATEGIES 
When it takes the form of studying gynesis, gender theory can em­
phasize essential differences between the sexes—between their psychlogical 
natures, or between their operation as subjects or signifiers in history and 
philosophy. Gender theory can also be useful in the study of culturally 
determined differences between the sexes, or differences between the bio­
logical and cultural signs of gender. The subjects of gender theory may be 
the distinctions between male and female, masculine and feminine, or even 
male and masculine, female and feminine. 
Since this last application of gender theory may seem paradoxical in 
the abstract, I will borrow an illustration from Susan Brownmiller: female 
humans grow hair in their armpits, but American culture insists that it 
is not feminine to leave that hair unshaven. As social critics such as 
Brownmiller have emphasized, cultural constructs of gender differences are 
often based entirely on convention, rather than on biological realities. (The 
fantasy of the hairless "feminine" body, for instance, can be traced back 
through the idealized portrayal of nudes in Victorian painting to the 
smooth surfaces of Greek sculpture.8) Whether such conventional concep­
tions of gender are grounded in politics (does the desire to deny that 
women's bodies grow hair inhere in a wish to emphasize the biological 
differences between the sexes in order to perpetuate patriarchy?) or psychol­
ogy (does the fantasy of the hairless female body betray a repressed cultural 
inclination for pedophilia?) or metaphysics (does the idealization of smooth 
feminine bodies, in denying part of the physical reality of femaleness, 
participate in an attempt to separate women from material nature, and to 
align them with the "spirit"?) is grounds for interesting speculation. Nar­
ratology traditionally has not trafficked in such speculations, for we need 
not inquire into the causes of cultural concepts of gender to study their 
effects. Unlike gynesic or psychoanaltyic theory, narratology alone would 
not be helpful in determining the original causes of differences that might 
occur among the structures in men's and women's texts. What narratology 
can do is to help describe such differences when they occur, which would be 
the first step in developing a poetics of gendered discourse. The second step 
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would be to augment narratology with history, by placing those differences 
in context: that is, to consider their relation to the cultures concept of 
gender differences at the time the text in question was written. 
Cultural signs of gender—unlike biologically determined sex charac-
teristics—develop more or less arbitrarily within societies, and are subject 
both to general change and individual choice. Masculine and feminine 
norms for dress, hair length, or use of jewelry and makeup change fairly 
rapidly, as any comparison of Western fashions over the past thirty years 
will show. One of the hallmarks of twentieth-century fashion has been that 
cross dressing no longer signifies the kind of radical rejection of gender roles 
that it would have a century ago. While it is still strictly feminine to wear a 
skirt and nylon stockings, a woman who dons a pair of khaki chinos and an 
Oxford-cloth, button-down shirt from Brooks Brothers is no longer tread­
ing the dangerous ground that George Sand risked when she put on a man's-
style suit. Nor is the man who wears an earring necessarily making a 
statement about his sexual orientation or his gender identity. Opportuni­
ties for ambiguously displaying one's gender identification are much more 
widely available today than they were in the 1950s, let along the 1850s. 
That cultural norms for outward signs of gender distinctions were 
stricter in nineteenth-century England and America than they are today is 
perhaps too obvious to point out, at least insofar as they concern clothing, 
personality traits, and social roles. What may be less obvious is that writing 
could take on the same kinds of gender differentiation in a culture where 
gender lines were as distinctly drawn as they were in the mid-Victorian 
Anglo-American world. Feminist linguists have investigated differences 
among twentieth-century men's and women's oral and written language, 
and even in the relatively androgynous era of the Women's Movement, they 
have discerned differences ranging from sentence length, to use of paral­
lelism, to vocabulary choice.9 (Of course, linguistic analysis often finds 
differences, as Mary Hiatt's did, that subvert received assumptions about 
what masculine or feminine writing should be like.) 
Analysis of narrative discourse, too, sometimes approaches the 
boundaries of a theory that would distinguish modern women's writing 
from men's. Susan Sniader Lanser's analysis of the ways in which ideology 
shapes narrative point of view sets up a contrast between the techniques in a 
woman's text ("The Story of an Hour" by Kate Chopin) and a man's ("The 
Killers," from Ernest Hemingway's Men Without Women). Lanser's applica­
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tion of her formulation of point of view certainly points out differences 
between the woman's text and the man's, but it stops short of distinguishing 
on that basis between women's texts and men's. Her more recent work 
"Toward a Feminist Narratology" takes bolder steps in the direction of 
uncovering gendered differences in discourse.10 
As Lanser has observed, strategies of narrative perspective change over 
time, varying according to literary period and according to the ideology 
that informs each text. At any given historical moment, certain techniques 
may be associated with male writing, while others are associated with 
female texts. Feminist critics often assume that women writers—like all 
female activists, and, for that matter, like the principle of gynesis itself— 
have always strained against convention, subverting the expected or tradi­
tional literary codes. I would suggest—along with most practitioners of 
gynocritics, I suppose—that women's writing in the nineteenth century 
had codes and conventions of its own. Comparison of narrative techniques 
at the middle of the century in realist novels written by men and women 
shows that certain narrative strategies dominate texts according to the 
writer's gender. The difference, described in the next chapter, between what 
I call the "distancing" strategies that dominate novels signed by men and 
the "engaging" strategies that dominate novels signed by women in the 
mid-nineteenth century is an example of one such instance of gendered 
writing. 
The "tests" for my models of distancing and engaging interventions 
in Part II should show, however, that this study departs from gynocritics 
and moves toward gender theory in that I would not claim that engaging 
strategies are specific to women's texts, nor that distancing strategies occur 
exclusively in men's. Every realist novel of the nineteenth century contains 
some ironic narrative interventions that seek to distance the actual reader 
from the fiction, by addressing a narratee with whom the reader should be 
reluctant to identify or by drawing attention to the fictionality of the text; 
similarly, every realist novel of the period contains some passages of earnest 
interventions that attempt to engage the actual reader, to encourage him or 
her to take the narrative commentary seriously and to take the novel's story 
to heart. The difference between the novels written from 1845 to 1865 
by the women writers in this study (Elizabeth Gaskell, George Eliot, and 
Harriet Beecher Stowe) and those written by the men (William Makepeace 
Thackeray, Charles Kingsley, Charles Dickens, and Anthony Trollope) is 
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that engaging interventions dominate the women's texts and distancing 
interventions dominate the men's. When I say they dominate I mean that 
instances of one kind of strategy occur more frequently and in more rhetori­
cally prominent positions than do instances of the other type of interven­
tion. Although no novel is perfectly consistent in its strategies, the texts in 
this study use techniques of intervention that color the overall rhetorical 
effect of the novels and that are, for the most part, consistent with their 
authors stated theories of how the texts should operate. As I show in Part 
III, there are historical reasons why women and men in the mid-nineteenth 
century would use the discourse of realist fiction to differing ends. Whereas 
men had ample opportunity to exert serious, didactic influence over others, 
women had few forums in which they could publicly "say something"; the 
realist novel provided one of the few socially acceptable and effectual outlets 
for their reforming impulses.u 
This is not to say that men's novels of the period are not earnestly 
didactic; they often are. Nor is it to claim that women's realist novels are 
never ironic or metafictional. My analysis of novels that don't fit the model 
of feminine-gendered engaging interventions and masculine-gendered dis­
tancing interventions shows how novelists could, if only momentarily, 
"cross dress," usually for specific rhetorical purposes. Up to now, reader-
centered critical theory that focuses on gender has asked the question that 
Judith Fetterley so effectively raises in The Resisting Reader (1978): What 
happens if the reader of a text whose narratee is implicitly male happens to 
be a woman? Jonathan Culler, making the almost chivalrous gesture of 
treating this subject first (before deconstruction proper) in his On De­
construction (1982), summarizes the work of several feminist theorists to 
extend that question a step further toward gender theory. Speaking as a 
male critic and following the examples of Showalter, Peggy Kamuf, 
Shoshana Felman, and Gayatri Spivak, he transposes the question into: 
What happens if the reader is reading as a woman?t2 
Gynocritics has been asking the corollary of Fetterley s question: 
What happens to a text when the writer is a woman? In analyzing the 
strategies in nineteenth-century texts, I want to follow the direction that 
Culler's approach implies. My question for the novels I study is: What 
happens to a text when the writer is uniting as a woman? Although the 
question is not at all a strictly biographical one (since male writers borrowed 
feminine-gendered techniques, and vice versa), I consult authors' personal 
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circumstances and historical contexts, as well as textual signs of the kinds of 
interventions they use, in considering the "situation of enunciation" that 
their texts reproduce. In this respect, what I am doing is not, strictly 
speaking, semiotics, which would inquire into textual codes exclusively as 
products of their textuality. I am trying instead to extend narratology s 
usefulness to a more literally historical analysis of literature. 
Feminist theory takes it for granted that everything a woman does, 
she does "as a woman"; gender distinctions, whether biologically or cultur­
ally imposed, color our experience so deeply as to take part in our every 
move. Many feminist critics have lamented the "immasculation" of such 
canonical writers as George Eliot, who seems so often to adopt a man's 
writing to suit her mans pseudonym. A phenomenon that is even closer to 
home is the immasculation of female scholars and critics who are trained to 
read as men (in the sense that Fetterley and Kolodny have described) and, of 
course, to write as men. When I was a graduate student in the late 1970s, I 
took a seminar called "Authorial Voice in Verse and Prose." Gender's rela­
tion to written "voice" was one of the professors interests, and he asked us 
one day to submit unsigned samples of our writing, specifying that the 
samples should represent what we considered to be our characteristic styles. 
Reading through the dozen or so samples, he felt he could determine the 
gender of only two or three writers. He was absolutely sure he could identify 
the gender of the person who wrote my sample. The ironic tone, the 
scrupulously correct punctuation, the parallel sentences, and the logical 
structure of my paragraphs convinced him the writer was male. I confess 
that I was proud to have fooled him: still in the grip of an androcentric 
attitude toward literature and scholarship, I was glad to be able to "pass." 
But I realize today that when I choose to write an academic "man's prose" in 
order to address a mainstream critical audience, I am imitating the gestures 
of George Eliot and Harriet Beecher Stowe (who sometimes borrowed 
masculine-gendered strategies in their fiction) and of Dickens and Trollope 
(who also sometimes borrowed feminine-gendered writing to suit their 
novelistic ends). Gender in writing strategies arises, I believe, from the 
writers making a series of rhetorical choices, whether or not those choices 
are consciously intentional. 
Doubtless, the texts in this study contain material for other distinc­
tions that could be drawn on the basis of gender.l3 Narratological analysis on 
the level of story, for instance, might reveal gendered differences between 
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treatments of relationships among characters, shapes of plot, or influence of 
ideology. I restrict my attention, however, to an examination of gendered 
interventions. I look at those moments in realist novels where (as Eliot put 
it in Adam Bede) "the Story Pauses a Little" while the narrator explicates, 
evaluates, or comments upon the materials of the text. The interventions 
that I see as being most clearly gendered are those in which the narrator 
establishes his or her attitude toward the reader, toward the characters, and 
toward the act of narration itself. My analysis of texts focuses upon the 
degree to which the narrators present themselves as distancing or engaging, 
and the ways that they play the two kinds of strategy off against each other 
in individual novels. Elizabeth Gaskells Mary Barton has the definitively 
feminine-gendered engaging narrator; Charles Kingsley s Yeast and William 
Makepeace Thackeray's Vanity Fair exemplify two extremes of the mas­
culine, distancing approach. To reveal the interplay among strategies in 
texts by novelists who "cross dress," I look at George Eliot's Adam Bede and 
Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, both earnest, realistic novels 
whose narrators sometimes make moves to distance the actual reader from 
the fictional world, as well as Charles Dickens s Bleak House and Anthony 
Trollope's Can You Forgive Her? two more self-consciously metaliterary 
novels that nevertheless rely, in certain rhetorical moments of crisis, on 
engaging techniques. 
SOME REMARKS O N METHODOLOGY: 
DOIN G NARRATOLOGY TODAY 
Pointing to narrators and declaring them distancing or engaging 
tends to look like a critical reversion to a period of theoretical innocence 
when we could accept binary oppositions without blinking. Indeed, the 
poststructuralist problematization of the subject raises many questions that 
a narratological study simply cannot address: Is it really possible for the 
scholar to stand outside a text, conducting critical operations on it that are 
unaffected by the operations the text conducts on the scholar herself? Can 
anything in a literary text transcend its textuality—is it possible for the 
fictive "you," the narratee, to have any relation to an "actual reader"? Does 
an individual "reading subject" even exist, independent of the text? Can a 
critic ever propose oppositional labels for textual phenomena without dis­
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torting the text through the lens of ideological bias? Does the very act of 
finding binary categories in a text imply the imposition of a hierarchy? How 
can hierarchy be justifiable in literary study? Such questions could paralyze 
any narratologist who was to take them as central to all studies of literature. 
The theory of distancing and engaging narrative strategies cannot 
refute the philosophical arguments that motivate such questions. But it 
can, I believe, provide one example for the reasons why these are not the 
only questions at the heart of every critical inquiry. Granted, if I claim to 
find differences among the rhetorical strategies in texts, what I am report­
ing are the results of one persons subjective/selective reading, as are the 
products of all literary criticism. But finding a textual difference and trying 
to account for it raises questions that interpretive reading strategies such as 
deconstruction or psychoanalysis do not often address. What, specifically, 
does the difference look like? Where is it to be found?—that is, in which 
texts? in what parts of those texts? How did it get there? A narratological 
approach that draws on contextual criticism can seek answers to these 
questions that refer more specifically to texts and to literary history than 
other approaches have so far allowed. 
This is not to say that a narratological study must aspire to a "scien­
tific" stance, as though untouched by poststructuralist inquiries. Like most 
specific applications of narratology, the theory of engaging and distancing 
strategies does not prescribe hard-and-fast categories into which narrators 
must discretely fit. On the contrary, the ground between the most ex­
tremely distancing narrator (perhaps Fielding's in TomJones) and the most en­
gaging one (probably Gaskell's in Mary Barton) is not an empty space, but 
rather a spectrum of techniques. Like Seymour Chatman and Susan Sniader 
Lanser, I see the terms I am proposing as the extremities of a continuum 
that includes countless combinations of distancing and engaging strategies. 
In fact, the combinations occur within the oeuvre of each nineteenth-
century novelist, within any single novel, and even in some instances 
within a single passage from one novel. I have constructed models to 
describe the features of the two extremes, and following the examples of the 
classical structuralists (for instance, Roland Barthes, Claude Levi-Strauss, 
and Fernand Braudel) I play off individual examples against those models in 
my analysis of specific cases. The purpose is not so much to learn which 
novels fit the models and which do not, as it is to recognize the models' 
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limitations as well as their power to describe the functioning of individual 
texts. Inevitably, I look at those texts through a subjective lens, but the 
focus it provides reveals, I believe, genuine differences. 
And those differences signify more than the authors' gender. As I 
illustrate throughout the descriptions of the two models in the next chap­
ter, distancing techniques generally characterize metafiction and engaging 
techniques occur in realism. Initially, I was surprised to realize (and almost 
reluctant to admit) that the mid-nineteenth-century metafictional novels 
relying on distancing strategies are most often written by men, and the 
engaging, realist novels by women. It is already a critical commonplace to 
think of the story in nineteenth-century women's fiction as typically be­
longing to the genre of realism, with its emphasis on domestic settings, 
financial concerns, and psychological detail, but the reasons for women 
novelists to wish to exploit realist discourse are less obvious. 
"Realism" signifies various literary matters: depending on the context 
in which the term is used, it is the dominant mode of Victorian fiction, a 
philosophical stance, a critical construct, or a genre of fiction that seeks to 
be representational by employing strategies of verisimilitude. Those strate­
gies may be functions (narratologically speaking) of story or of discourse. 
The story in each of the seven novels in this study conforms to the generally 
current definition of what realist fiction would contain. The move away 
from realism and into metafiction that I see in distancing novels is mainly 
located in the discourse of some of the novels. No nineteenth-century novel 
in the canon is as explicitly metafictional in its discourse as Sterne's and 
Diderot's were in the eighteenth, or John Barth's and Italo Calvinos are in 
the twentieth century. Still, some Victorian novelists seem to have taken 
more delight in playing at the boundaries of the fictional illusion than oth­
ers; not coincidentally, the more playful novelists of the period are the men. 
If we were to think of metafiction as the more advanced form of novel 
because of its resurgence in the postmodern period, we could easily assume 
that the nineteenth-century female novelists' adherence to earnest, serious 
realism betrays a naive literary conservatism on the women's part. But self-
conscious self-reference in fiction that is explicitly "about" fiction, and that 
draws attention to its own structures of artifice, is as venerable a tradition 
as the English novel itself. No twentieth-century narrator could pay more 
attention to the fiction's frame than Fielding, with his elaborate arrange­
ment of Tom Jones into "Books," each containing a prefatory essay that 
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discusses the protocol for writing and reading the comic-epic-poem-in-
prose. Part of what made the form "epic" in the first place was the distance 
Fielding's narrative establishes between the narrator, the narratee, and the 
fictional material. Metafiction is nothing new, and even if it were, one could 
hardly defend privileging more "modern" fictional techniques over tradi­
tional ones: it makes more sense simply to examine literary forms within 
their own historical contexts. The women novelists of the mid-nineteenth 
century in England and America strove for a heightened realism in their 
novels, not because of a straitened imagination or a conventionally limited 
vocabulary of techniques, but rather (as I argue in chapter 7) because the 
novel was their one public opportunity to exert some political or moral in­
fluence on the "real world." 
Discriminating among male and female writers is, at best, a risky 
business for any critic who seeks to base a theory on textual evidence, rather 
than arguing from essentialist principles of gender difference. Selecting and 
analyzing a corpus of works becomes a problem for the literary historian 
interested in narratology, through difficulties that do not arise for theorists 
of essential difference. Proponents of"ecriturefeminine" like Monique Wittig 
or Helene Cixous are not troubled by any necessity to find examples of 
women's writing that illustrate their theories—they simply generate origi­
nal texts that exemplify what they are talking about. Supporting argu­
ments about gendered differences in literary history is simultaneously 
simpler and more problematic than what the new French feminists do: 
simpler, in that discussing differences within a historical context obviates 
the necessity of making universal claims about essential differences between 
the sexes; more problematic, in that the potential samples for analysis exist 
in daunting numbers and at prohibitive length. 
In choosing texts for analysis, I face only obliquely the problem of 
whether my theory of gendered differences in writing strategy is "gener­
alizable": my conclusions about engaging and distancing uses of direct 
address, and their relation to gender in writing, are strictly limited—as is 
my corpus—to novels written in England and America at mid-century. 
Some colleagues, more statistically inclined than I, have suggested that I 
might strengthen this study's claims by using a computer to scan hundreds 
of novels looking for the word you outside of quotation marks (and therefore 
occurring in interventions, rather than dialogue), or by randomly sampling 
pages from dozens of texts and reading for instances of intervention a 
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computer could not recognize. Such an approach might determine that a 
phenonemon existed, but it could not begin to account for how direct 
address functions in individual texts, how distancing and engaging strate­
gies strain and play off against each other within a novel, or how they got 
there in the first place. I have therefore limited myself to the number of 
novels I could analyze without a computers assistance, and have chosen a 
sample that represents the range of possibilities I perceive. 
The questions that motivate this project are not How do women 
write? or How do men write? but rather, What are the conventions of 
narrative discourse in nineteenth-century realist fiction? In what respects 
do realist novels, seen through the lens of narratology, depart from con­
ventional critical notions about their techniques? Why has the engaging 
narrator been omitted from the formalist, narratological, and phenomeno­
logical models of fiction? Can it be a coincidence that the few canonized 
novels relying on engaging strategies (that is, Gaskell s, Eliot's, and—more 
recently included in the canon—Stowe's) are written by women? 
To this last question, my answer is obviously no. I focus here on male-
and female-written novels that are concerned with some kind of political, 
moral, or social reform. Having didactic goals in common, the novels 
might be assumed to share techniques as well: the fact that their strategies 
diverge is evidence of a gendered difference reflecting the relative positions 
of mid-nineteenth-century men and women in public life. My ultimate 
goal is not only to point to this gendered difference in writing strategies but 
also to expose the gender bias in literary theories that have overlooked the 
engaging narrator as a convention central to realist fiction. As I "do nar­
ratology" toward that end, my question to feminists is: Why don't we? 
2 
A Model of Gendered Intervention: 
Engaging and Distancing Narrative 
Strategies 
Uncle Tom's Cabin is a very bad novel, having in its self-
righteous, virtuous sentimentality, much in common with 
Little Women. Sentimentality, the ostentatious parading of ex­
cessive and spurious emotion, is the mark of dishonesty, the 
inability to feel . . . and it is always, therefore, the signal of 
secret and violent inhumanity, the mark of cruelty. (Baldwin 
578-579) 
BEHOLD A READER (James Baldwin, to be precise) who is not even remotely 
engaged, who is more than distanced—is revolted, disgusted. As Baldwins 
powerfully argued essay on Stowe's novel reveals, the social circumstances, 
political convictions, and aesthetic standards of individual readers can 
combine to construct insurmountable walls of resistance to narrators' tactics. 
Accustomed as she doubtless was to attacks from proslavery Southerners, 
Stowe would probably have been appalled to know that any black reader in 
any era would virulently refuse to identify with the sympathetic narratee 
her novel usually assumes. 
THE NARRATEE AN D THE ACTUAL READER 
Discrepancies such as this between narrators' moves and audiences' 
responses warrant mention here: strategies are rhetorical features of texts, 
choices of technique indicating novelists' apparent hopes about the 
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emotional power their stories might wield. Strategies can misfire; they 
guarantee nothing. A readers response cannot be enforced, predicted, or 
even proven. And, in the context of poststructuralist criticism, trying to 
determine a texts effect on a reading subject (trying, for instance, to 
ascertain the impact of interventions on the "illusion of reality") seems as 
futile as discussing an authors intention. Baldwins expressed aversion to 
the "sentimentality" of Uncle Tom is itself rhetorically shaped for the pur­
poses of his essay. In order to make his point, he may have constructed an 
image of secret inhumanity and masked cruelty more striking than what he 
actually experienced while he was reading—or, for that matter, he may 
have toned down his real feelings about the novel. Even in a case where a 
reader seems so candid in reporting his reaction to a text, it is difficult to 
make claims about the actual effect of narrative strategies. The participial 
forms of the terms distancing and engaging are not meant to imply an action 
that a text or a narrator could take upon a reader, but rather to identify the 
rhetorical moves these strategies represent. To understand their function in 
novels is to arrive at a new recognition of the narrative structures that 
constitute realism. 
Studying narrative structures, such as interventions and addresses to 
the reader, is clearly not the same activity as studying "reader response," 
though in many ways the two approaches have converged in the critical 
imagination. Perhaps because the English translation of Princes "Introduc­
tion to the Study of the Narratee" first appeared in Jane Tompkins's an­
thology, Reader-Response Criticism, theorists tend to identify the study of the 
narratee in fiction with the study of actual reading audiences or the reading 
process. An example of the conflation of the two areas of study is Mieke Bal's 
brief bibliographic section on "the Audience and the Reader," where she 
lists Prince's work on the narratee alongside that of Iser and Umberto Eco, 
which "discusses the readers activity in building a fictional world while 
decoding a text" (Narratology 152). Although we should be grateful for 
having Prince's essay in so widely available a source as Tompkins's an­
thology, we should also be careful—as is Tompkins herself in her introduc-
tion1—to distinguish between Prince's typology of the kinds of narratees 
that can occur in texts and the inquiries into the process, reception, and 
epistemology of reading that characterize the selections from Fish, Iser, 
Georges Poulet, Norman Holland, and the other reader-centered theorists 
represented in the anthology. The study of the narratee, like studies of 
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narrators, restricts its attention to the text, without reference to what hap­
pens when an actual person reads it. 
Still, the temptation to conflate the two kinds of inquiry is strong: the 
narratee is, after all, a figure of a reader, or as Prince puts it, "someone 
whom the narrator addresses" ("Introduction" 7). It stands to reason that 
the degree to which an actual reader can or cannot identify with the figure 
being addressed affects that readers reaction to the fiction. If I pick up a 
novel that assumes a narratee who has attitudes, opinions, and experiences 
that resemble my own, I am likely to read that novel with particular 
absorption. My response to the text would necessarily be affected by the 
attitude the novelist adopts toward the narratee I recognize as a mirror of 
myself. If the narrator needles, annoys, or offends me, my feeling about the 
literary work will be very different from what it would be if the narrator 
were to encourage, validate, and flatter me. Both kinds of reading, and all 
the range of attitudes between them, yield pleasures of their own. A 
detailed account of those pleasures would be, by definition, subjective, 
individualized, and perhaps too personal to be generally interesting (unless, 
indeed, it were written by someone like Roland Barthes).2 
In terms of the actual response of real readers, a systematic study of 
the relations between individual members of a reading audience and nar­
ratees in given texts would be difficult or even impossible to accomplish. 
Too much depends on variables: not only would readers' responses to being 
addressed through particular narratees vary according to their own subjec­
tivity, it would also change with their moods, their relative degree of 
concentration or distraction, the number of times they have read the text in 
question, and so forth. This is not to suggest that studies of reader-response 
cannot or should not be done; it is only to point out that the kind of study 
that Holland or David Bleich conducts entails questions about psychology 
and epistemology that do not enter into investigations of such textual 
strategies as the role of the narratee. 
Having acknowledged that descriptions of narratees in texts cannot 
account for the actual responses of real readers, I do want to dwell on the 
relationship of narratee to reader, not so much from the perspective of the 
audience as from the perspective of the text itself. Every choice that an 
author makes in constructing a fiction can be regarded as a matter of 
rhetoric, in that each strategy or convention of fiction that a novelist can use 
will have certain connotations, inherited from its forebears, models, and 
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antitypes among the fictions that preceded it. Depending on how actual 
readers situate themselves in regard to these conventions, their reactions to 
the text will be influenced by the text's rhetorical moves. If we cannot 
determine that actual readers would always (or even usually) respond in a 
certain way to any narratee, and if we cannot recover the authors original 
"intention" in creating the narratee, we can base some conclusions on 
textual analysis. By investigating the narrators' stances toward their nar­
ratees, and by comparing and contrasting the various stances of narrators 
within the genre of realism, we can arrive at a more specific poetics of how 
that genre operates textually. Without making any grand claims, then, 
about how actual readers, Victorian or modern, would respond to the 
narratees in realist novels, let us focus on responses that the novelists 
evidently hoped readers would feel. We can get at this hope, I believe, by 
inquiring into the relations narrators try to establish between the actual 
reader and the "you" in the text. 
In recently revisiting his original theory of the narratee, Gerald 
Prince has admitted that his previous work no more than suggests "the 
possible differences between narratee, addressee, and receiver," which he 
takes "to be analogous to those between narrator, addresser, and sender" 
("Narratee Revisited" 302). He mentions that studying the distinctions 
among these three entities (that is, the "you" that may be inscribed or 
encoded in a text, the implied reader suggested by that "you," and the 
actual reader who receives that "you") might lead to "a better appreciation 
of the ways particular texts—as well as narrative itself—can function" 
("Narratee Revisited" 303). In fact, Princes work on the narratee has 
assumed, as a general rule, a necessary distance between the narratee, the 
addressee, and the receiver of fictional texts.3 The canonic example, used by 
both Prince and Genette, is that of the narratee of Le Pere Goriot (Genette, 
Nouveau discours 9; Prince, "Narratee Revisited" 301). Certainly, as Prince 
and Genette have observed, when Balzac's narrator speaks to a "you" who 
sits in a well-padded armchair, holding the book with white hands, this 
narratee may or may not be a figure with whom the actual reader can 
identify. "If it should occur that the reader bears an astonishing resem­
blance to the narratee," Prince writes, "this is an exception and not the 
rule" ("Introduction" 9). 
Prince is certainly correct for most novels in which the narrators and 
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narratees are—to borrow Genette s terms in Narrative Discourse—both ex­
tradiegetic (that is, where the act of narrating occurs outside the fiction) and 
heterodiegetic (that is, where neither narrator nor narratee functions as a 
character).4 The more specifically a heterodiegetic narrator characterizes the 
narratee, the less likely will be a resemblance between this addressee and the 
actual receiver of the text. A narrator who provides so much information 
about the narratee that the addressee becomes, as Prince says, "as clearly 
defined as any character" necessarily places a distance between the actual 
reader and the inscribed "you" in the text ("Introduction" 18). Such a 
narrator I call distancing. But not every narrator who intervenes to address a 
narratee does so to set the actual reader apart from the "you" in the text. 
Another kind, which I call engaging, strives to close the gaps between the 
narratee, the addressee, and the receiver. Using narrative interventions that 
are almost always spoken in earnest, such a narrator addresses a "you" that is 
evidently intended to evoke recognition and identification in the person 
who holds the book and reads, even if the "you" in the text resembles that 
person only slightly or not at all.5 
To be sure, narrative structures are always complex: novelists who 
typically employ distancing narrative interventions sometimes use direct 
address to engage their readers, and even the most consistently engaging 
narrators sometimes intervene in their texts in distancing ways. And, too, 
the critic cannot claim to distinguish authorial intent in textual manifesta­
tions. We can only read through the "tone" of authorial intrusions—and 
place our interpretations of what the intrusions say alongside extratextual 
assertions of intent—to find the signs of what writers wish their texts 
would do. But certain women novelists in mid-nineteenth-century En­
gland and America—particularly Gaskell, Stowe, and Eliot—seem to have 
been experimenting with engaging narrative as a strategy integral to their 
idea of realist fiction. Writing to inspire belief in the situations their novels 
describe—and admittedly hoping to move actual readers to sympathy for 
real-life slaves, workers, or ordinary middle-class people—these novelists 
used engaging narrators to encourage actual readers to identify with the 
"you" in the texts.6 An examination of the ways their works diverge from 
the conventions of distancing narrative intervention would not only help 
complete Princes typology of the narratee but also contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the conventions of realist narrative.7 
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I should pause to emphasize that when I refer to "the reader" I mean 
the actual reader. While this is a somewhat unorthodox thing to do in 
a work of literary theory, in some respects it follows the lead that 
other narratologists have taken. Like Genette {Narrative Discourse 260) and 
Suleiman ("Of Readers and Narratees" 91), I do not try to analyze the 
implied reader, the virtual reader, the ideal reader, or even (as I have 
mentioned) individual readers. The first three are figures created between 
the lines of novels, and as such, are unusually difficult to pin down: they are 
the products of literary interpretation of texts, and not textual features 
themselves. Just like individual readers, they are too variable and indefin­
able to categorize in a narratological study. When a created reader is in­
scribed within a text, I refer to that figure, with Prince, as a narratee. When 
I want to point to the relation between those fictive figures and the receiver 
of the text, the person—whoever it might be—who actually holds the 
book and reads, I call this latter entity "the reader." The actual reader, is, 
after all, an essential link in the chain of communication a text represents; 
without a receiver to process the text, the text lies inert, silent. The reader 
to whom I refer is not, like the narratee, a feature of the text or even (except 
in the strictest poststructuralist sense) a product of language. The reader is 
an unpredictable, infinitely variable person who is physically present in the 
act of reading—a person realist novelists often confessed to trying to visu­
alize as they wrote. 
Embracing Suleimans proposal of "a moratorium on the implied 
reader, with more attention paid to narratees and actual readers, and to the 
possible relationships between them," then, I concentrate here on the 
relation in engaging narrative between the narratee and the actual reader 
("Of Readers and Narratees" 92). I examine the differences in strategy and 
effect between distancing and engaging narrative interventions, providing 
specific examples of distancing narrative from works that are commonly 
mentioned in studies of the narratee (for example, TomJones and Vanity Fair) 
and juxtaposing them with examples of engaging strategies from Gaskells, 
Stowes, and Eliot's early novels. The two modes of intervention constitute 
the gendered difference that I see in mid-nineteenth-century fiction; as the 
examples here and in Part II indicate, the differences inhere in these male 
and female novelists' apparent ideas about the purposes and functions of 
realist fiction. 
GENDERED INTERVENTION 
DIRECT ADDRESS: THE ENGAGIN G AN D 
DISTANCING MODES 
Generally speaking, a distancing narrator discourages the actual 
reader from identifying with the narratee, while an engaging narrator 
encourages that identification. Sketching out the similarity between the 
narrator-addresser-sender relationship and the narratee-addressee-receiver 
relationship, Prince has used a simple example that can help describe the 
significantly different rhetorical effects of distancing and engaging ad­
dresses to narratees. Prince writes, "Just as in I ate a hamburger for lunch,' 
the character-I is the one who ate and the narrator-I the one telling about 
the eating, in 'You ate a hamburger for lunch,' the character-you is the one 
who ate and the narratee-you the one told about the eating." Prince uses the 
example to show that "the difference between intra- and extradiegetic 
narratee is no more fundamental than the one between intra- and extra­
diegetic narrator" ("Narratee Revisited" 301). This can be true in only a 
limited sense, however, as we must realize if we consider the rhetorical 
effect these utterances would have on an actual interlocutor or an actual 
reader. Depending on (1) the accuracy of the statement about "you" and 
(2) the speaker's stance toward "you" in making the assertion, the relation 
between the narratee and the receiver of the statement could be either 
distanced or engaged. 
Consider the effect the two statements about lunch might have in a 
real-world conversation. If I tell you that I ate a hamburger for lunch, you 
may or may not believe me, according to your sense of my reliability (you 
may not know me well enough to know whether I am characteristically 
truthful, or you may know that I habitually lie about my calorie intake) and 
according to anything you know about my lunch beyond my assertion 
(maybe you sat across the lunch table from me and watched me eat that 
hamburger, or maybe you watched me eat quiche instead). But you can 
never be certain whether my report of my own experience is true: possibly I 
did not lie about what I ate for lunch, even if I customarily do; possibly I 
slipped away after I had the quiche and secretly ate a hamburger as a second 
lunch. You may believe my statement or not, but you can never be as certain 
of its truth as you can be about my statement "You ate a hamburger for 
lunch." You know—if you are not impossibly absentminded—whether 
Proposing a Model 
you ate a hamburger, just as you know, while you are reading Pere Goriot, 
whether your hands are white and your armchair is comfortable. 
The example shows that in fact there is a difference between the 
narrator-addresser-sender relationship and the narratee-addressee-receiver 
relationship, a difference that must occur to the actual reader in reading the 
text. The reader may or may not be interested in how closely the narrative 
"I" resembles the actual author; readers can only speculate about such a 
resemblance, which—even if it exists—would have no bearing on the 
rhetorical effect of the text. But one can know whether the narrative "you" 
resembles oneself, and surely the way one experiences the fiction is affected 
by how personally one can take its addresses to "you." 
Keeping this in mind, we can pursue the example for its distancing 
and engaging potentialities. The effect of my assertion "You ate a ham­
burger" will depend on your interpretation of my rhetorical intent. Since 
you know whether you ate a hamburger, you may assume that my assertion 
is not intended to convey information to you. If you know I saw you having 
quiche for lunch and I say "You ate a hamburger," my utterance will be 
ironic. I might expect you to respond with laughter, annoyance, or perplex­
ity, but in any case—since you would be unable to identify your experience 
with my assertion—you would separate your actual self from the "you" in 
my statement. My remark would then be distancing. 
The distancing narrator may evoke laughter, or even annoyance, from 
an actual reader who cannot identify with the narratee. The task of the 
engaging narrator, in contrast, is to evoke sympathy and identification 
from an actual reader who is unknown to the author and therefore infinitely 
variable and unpredictable. The engaging narrator is in the position I 
would be in if, to win your trust and support, I had to approach you, a 
stranger, and tell you what you had for lunch. I could try to win you over 
through what I say or through the way I say it, through the substance of my 
assertion or through my attitude in asserting it. I could make a guess about 
what you ate, based on my idea of what most people eat; engaging narrators 
often do base assertions about "you" on such general assumptions. Chances 
are, though, that my guess would be inaccurate, in which case I could only 
hope to win you with the appealing attitude I try to take in addressing you. 
In realist novels—engaging narrators functioning as their authors' surro­
gates in earnestly trying to foster sympathy for real-world sufferers—work 
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to engage "you" through the substance and, failing that, the stance of their 
narrative interventions and addresses to "you." 
While the distinction between engaging and distancing stances may 
seem inconsequential on the purely textual level, the significance of the 
difference asserts itself in novels that aim to inspire personal, social, or 
political change. When the narrator of Uncle Tom's Cabin speaks to "you, 
generous, noble-minded men and women of the South—you, whose virtue 
and magnanimity and purity of character, are the greater for the severer trial 
it has encountered" (622), the speaker can have no certain knowledge of the 
virtue and magnanimity of actual Southern readers, nor of the Southern 
affiliations of any individual actual reader. Operating in a context where her 
information about the "real you" may be faulty, the narrator tries to win 
"you" with the ingratiating rhetoric of her engaging appeal. And if she can 
thus draw you in, she could possibly change your mind; if she does change 
your mind and you happen to be a Southern slave owner, she might change 
the world. 
INTERVENTIO N STRATEGIES: THE ENDS OF 
THE SPECTRUM 
In Gaskell's Mary Barton (1848), Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin (1851 — 
1852), and Eliot's Adam Bede (1859), earnest, engaging strategies of inter­
vention are strikingly present in passages of the novels addressed to "you." 
Typically, these novelists' engaging narrators differ from distancing nar-
rators—such as Fielding's in Tom Jones (1749), Thackeray's in Vanity Fair 
(1846-1847), Trollopes in Barchester Towers (1849), Hawthorne's in The 
House of Seven Gables (1851) or Eliot's in her first novel, Scenes of Clerical Life 
(1857)—in their explicit attitudes toward the narratees, toward the charac­
ters, and toward the very act of narration. The differences occur in five forms: 
1. The names by which the narratee is addressed. Whereas a distancing 
narrator may specify a name or title for an extradiegetic narratee (for ex­
ample, "Miss Bullock," "Miss Smith," or "Jones, who reads this book at his 
Club," in Vanity Fair, "Your Majesty . .  . my lords and gentlemen" in 
Dickens's Bleak House [1852-1853}; "Madam" or "Mrs. Farthingale" in 
Eliot's Scenes), an engaging narrator will usually either avoid naming the 
narratee or use names that refer to large classes of potential actual readers. In 
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Mary Barton, the most straightforward example of the first engaging ap­
proach, the narrator never calls the narratee anything but "you." In Uncle 
Tom's Cabin, the most extreme example of the second approach, the narra­
tor will, Walt Whitman-like, specify narratees in a group ("mothers 
of America") or include large numbers of more specifically defined groups 
in passages of direct address ("Farmers of Massachusetts, of New Hamp­
shire, of Vermont, of Connecticut, who read this book by the blaze of your 
winter-evening fire,—strong-hearted, generous sailors and ship-owners of 
Maine . . . Brave and generous men of New York, farmers of rich and 
joyous Ohio, and ye of the wide prairie states" {623]). Even such exhaustive 
lists exclude more readers than they can include. Straining against the 
limitations such specific names must enforce on actual readers' ability to 
answer appeals to the narratees, Stowe s narrator intersperses her novel with 
remarks directed simply to "Reader" or "you," designations that can signify 
any actual reader. 
2. The frequency of direct address to the narratee. A distancing narrator, 
such as Fielding's, often refers to "the Reader" or "my reader" as a third 
party, someone not present (as it were) at the narrative conversation. Actual 
readers perusing the novel are no more likely to take such third-person 
references personally than they would take remarks that refer to characters 
in the novel. "He" and "she," whether the pronouns stand for Tom Jones 
and Sophia Western or for "my readers," have referents within the text— 
they do not shift as does the referent of "you." Whether an actual reader 
answers to remarks directed to "my reader(s)" will depend on how much the 
portrait of those readers actually resembles him or her: the actual reader gets 
to choose whether to take such narrative interventions to heart. An engag­
ing narrator avoids giving the actual reader a choice in the matter, and, very 
much like an evangelical preacher, more frequently speaks to "you."8 In 
Mary Barton, for instance, the narratee is addressed as "you" in at least 
twenty-two passages, included in the narrative "we" in at least five pas­
sages, and seldom, if ever, referred to in the third person. 
3. The degree of irony present in references to the narratee. Irony is, of 
course, always multivalent, and never definitively determinable. If verbal 
irony may be defined as a presumably self-conscious disjunction between 
what a speaker says and what he or she appears to mean, then two particu­
larly ironic conventions characterize the distancing narrators attitude to­
ward the narratee. Both kinds of irony occur in passages of direct address to 
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the narratee that are distinctly not engaging in their approach. The first of 
these is a distancing narrator's pretense that "you" are present on the scene of 
the fiction; the second is a distancing narrators habit of inscribing flawed 
"readers" from whom actual readers should want to differentiate them­
selves. In both kinds of ironic intervention, the effect is distancing in that 
the strategy encourages the actual reader not to identify with the narratee 
being addressed. 
The sarcastic pretense that "you" are present on the fictional scene is 
one way that a distancing narrator discourages the actual reader from identi­
fying with the textual narratee. These are passages in which narrators play 
the game of "endangering the Readers Neck" (as Fielding calls it) by 
pretending to locate the reader at the side of the characters or the narrator 
himself. A nineteenth-century example of this narrative jest would be 
Hawthorne's heterodiegetic narrator's intervention in chapter 28 of The 
House of Seven Gables, the scene which describes the room where the dead 
Judge Pyncheon sits alone: "You must hold your own breath, to satisfy 
yourself whether he breathes at all. It is quite inaudible. You hear the 
ticking of his watch; his breath you do not hear." In the climax of the scene, 
the voice places the narratee even more clearly on the narrator's diegetic 
level, by including the narratee in a collective "we": "Would that we were 
not an attendant spirit, here!"9 
Genette's term for this technique is metalepsis, or the practice of 
crossing diegetic levels to imply that figures inside and outside the fiction 
exist on the same plane {Narrative Discourse 236). To illustrate the term: in 
this example, the extradiegetic narrator (who is inside the novel, but not 
inside the "diegesis," or story, because he does not participate as a character) 
places himself in the same room, and therefore on the same plane of "real­
ity," with the extradiegetic narratee (the person to whom the story is being 
told, who—like the narrator—does not exist within the story) and the 
character (the judge, the only one of the three figures involved in this scene 
who, properly speaking, belongs in the diegesis). The effect of metalepsis in 
distancing narrative is usually to affirm the fictionality of the story: when 
Hawthorne's narrator pretends, for instance, that "you" are present with 
him in the room with the dead judge, the fictionality of the scene becomes 
obvious. You, the actual reader, are not a ghostly presence in the Pyncheons' 
house. You are a person holding a copy of The House of Seven Gables, read­
ing it. 
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Describing the use of metalepsis in Cortazar, Sterne, Diderot, Proust, 
and Balzac, Genette has pointed to its metafictional potential: its effect, he 
writes, "is either comical (when, as in Sterne or Diderot, it is presented in a 
joking tone) or fantastic" (Narrative Discourse 235). Genettes account of the 
metaleptic effect describes very well the goal of the distancing intervention: 
"The most troubling thing about metalepsis indeed lies in this unaccept­
able and insistent hypothesis, that the extradiegetic is perhaps always 
diegetic, and that the narrator and his narratees—you and I—perhaps 
belong to some narrative" (236). 
Stowe, Gaskell, and (especially) Eliot can also use metalepsis that 
pretends to place the reader on the scene of the fiction. A notable example 
would be the narrator's introductory description of the rectory in Adam 
Bede. The narratee is invited into the Irwines' dining room. "We will enter 
very softly," the narrator tells "you," "and stand still in the open doorway, 
without awakening [the dogs]" (98). But in Adam Bede the overall domi­
nance of engaging interventions tends to transform the intended effect of a 
passage like this one. Instead of experiencing a comical or fantastic aware­
ness of the activity of reading, the actual reader should indulge in a momen­
tary exercise of imagination. Readers are encouraged to feel that perhaps 
they could be in Hayslope; perhaps the world they are reading about is as real 
as their own. The invitation to "enter very softly" both beckons the reader 
into the fictional world and emphasizes the fact that he or she is not really 
part of it; the implication is, though, that if the reader will participate in re­
creating a real world predicated on the lessons of sympathy that reading the 
novel imparts, perhaps the real world, as well as the actual reader, will be 
transformed. Indeed, the engaging narrator's frequent appeals to the 
reader's imagination, her earnest requests to the reader to draw upon per­
sonal memories to fill in gaps in the narrative, prompt the actual reader to 
participate in creating the fictional world itself, just as he or she should 
actively alter the real world after finishing the reading. 
In the second type of ironic address to the reader, the distancing 
narrator humorously inscribes the addressee as a potentially "bad reader," 
thus discouraging the receiver of the text from identifying with the person 
addressed. Balzac's address to the complacent, pleasure-seeking narratee of 
Le Pere Goriot is an example of this ironic mode. So is Fielding's amusing 
directive on how to read Tom Jones, typical of Fielding in its self-conscious 
GENDERED INTERVENTION 
awareness of the distance the narrator encourages between the narratee, the 
implied reader, and the actual reader: 
Reader, it is impossible we should know what Sort of Person 
thou wilt be: For perhaps, thou may st be as learned in Human 
Nature as Shakespear himself was, and, perhaps, thou may st be 
no wiser than some of his Editors. Now lest this latter should be 
the Case, we think proper, before we go any farther together, to 
give thee a few wholesome Admonitions. . . . We warn thee 
not too hastily to condemn any of the Incidents in this our 
History, as impertinent and foreign to our main Design. . . . 
For a little Reptile of a Critic to presume to find Fault with any 
of its Parts, without knowing the Manner in which the Whole is 
connected . . . is a most presumptuous Absurdity. (398) 
Here, the narratee is not entirely foolish: Fielding's "Reader" is at 
least presumably capable of appreciating the contrast between the wisdom 
of Shakespeare and that of "some of his Editors"; the narratee is also patient 
and cooperative enough to attend to the "wholesome Admonitions" on how 
to read this book. But the same narratee has the potential to read badly, or 
"too hastily to condemn" the novels parts before apprehending the whole. 
The "little Reptile of a Critic" is not a narratee, in that the narrator refers to 
him indirectly, rather than speaking to him. Still, the logic of the para­
graph implies that if the narratee were to succumb to the inclination to 
"condemn," he or she would be imitating the reptilian critics activity. The 
implied reader is someone who gets the joke and can chuckle at the expense 
of the hapless narratee. The actual reader, then, should hesitate to identify 
with the narratee, in order to avoid becoming laughably ridiculous. Simi­
larly distancing is Thackeray's ironic reference to "some carping reader" 
who is incapable of enjoying the sentimental passages in Vanity Fair (147). 
As much as the actual reader might be amused and entertained by these 
interventions, he or she is to be discouraged from identifying with any 
"carping" "little Reptile of a Critic." 
Engaging narrators, in contrast, usually assume that their narratees 
(not to mention their actual readers) are in perfect sympathy with them. 
When Gaskell's narrator in Mary Barton assures the narratee, "Your heart 
would have ached to have seen the man, however hardly you might have 
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judged his crime'' (422), or when Eliot's in Adam Bede interrupts a love 
scene to remark, "That is a simple scene, reader. But it is almost certain that 
you, too, have been in love" (537), the narrators' earnestly confidential 
attitudes toward "you" encourage actual readers to see themselves reflected 
in that pronoun. 
As these two examples show, an engaging narrator sometimes does 
imply imperfection in the narratee's ability to comprehend, or sympathize 
with, the contents of the text, even while expressing confidence that the 
narratee will rise to the challenge. These implications of the narratee's 
fallibility often come through narrative interventions that Prince calls 
surjustifications . . . situated at the level of meta-language, 
meta-commentary, or meta-narration. . . . Over-justifications 
always provide us with interesting details about the narratees 
personality, even though they often do so in an indirect way; in 
overcoming the narratee's defenses, in prevailing over his preju­
dices, in allaying his apprehensions, they reveal them. ("Intro­
duction" 15) 
Although engaging narrators tend to inscribe their narratees through 
over justify ing their own assertions, they usually do so in the spirit of 
sympathetically and earnestly attempting to convert the narratees to their 
own points of view. This mode of address encourages actual readers 
to identify with the narratees, unlike the sarcasm of distancing narra­
tors, which attempts through irony to embarrass readers out of such 
identification. 
The engaging narrators' overjustifications portray their narratees less 
as potentially bad readers than as potentially limited sympathizers. The 
narrators defend their characters' rights to the actual readers' sympathy by 
explicitly demonstrating those rights to the narratees. One of the most 
notorious passages of such over justification occurs in Uncle Tom's Cabin, 
interrupting the scene of Eliza's barefoot escape over the frozen river. Antici­
pating an incredulous response, the narrator encourages the narratee to put 
herself in Eliza's place: "If it were your Harry, mother, or your Willie, that 
were going to be torn from you by a brutal trader, tomorrow morning—if 
you had seen the man, and heard that the papers were signed and delivered, 
and you had only from twelve o'clock till morning to make good your 
escape,—how fast could you walk?" (105). The passage provides specific 
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information about the narratee: she is certainly female, and is perhaps, by 
the narrators standards, overly judgmental. But the narrators stance, im­
plicit in her faith that the narratee can be persuaded to sympathize if actual 
readers will pause to recognize similarities between Elizas experiences and 
their own, is what makes the passage engaging.10 The actual reader, re­
quired to draw upon memory and sympathetic imagination to fill in the 
emotional details of the story, is engaged in collaborating on the creation of 
the fictional world. 
4. The narrator's stance toward the characters. A distancing narrator may 
seem to delight in reminding the narratee that the characters are fictional, 
entirely under the writer's control. Some of the most extreme examples 
would be the references in Vanity Fair to the characters as puppets that come 
out of a box and the famous passage in Barchester Towers where Trollope s 
narrator reassures "the reader" that he would never let his Elinor Bold marry 
the likes of Mr. Slope, thus predicting the outcome of the plot and remind­
ing the narratee that the fiction is an arbitrary creation, a game. An engag­
ing narrator avoids reminders of the characters' fictionality, insisting 
instead that the characters are "real." The difference between the distancing 
and engaging attitudes toward characters thus parallels the difference be­
tween metafiction and realism. In moves that parallel their attitudes toward 
their narratees, both distancing and engaging narrators use metalepsis in 
establishing their relation to their characters, but whereas distancing nar­
rators use it to subvert realism, engaging narrators use it to reinforce the 
veracity of their stories. 
A distancing narrator does indeed use metalepsis for the humorous 
effect that Genette describes. Perhaps the best example of the disconcerting 
effect of distancing metalepsis is the shifting presentation of the characters 
in Vanity Fair. At the beginning and the very end of the novel they are 
puppets; often they are fictional figures under the author's explicit control; 
then quite suddenly, near the end of the story, they are people the narrator 
met in Pumpernickel before he had heard all the details of their biogra­
phies. Their changeable status contributes to the novel's humor, as well as 
to the narratees awareness that they are creatures of fiction. An engaging 
narrator, though, uses metalepsis to suggest that the characters are possibly 
as "real" as the narrator and narratee, who are, in these cases, to be identi­
fied with the actual author and actual reader. Stowe s narrator simply claims 
that her characters—or people exactly resembling them—exist in the real 
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world (for example, that "the personal appearance of Eliza, the character 
ascribed to her, are sketches drawn from life. . . . The incident of the 
mothers crossing the Ohio river on the ice is a well-known fact" [Uncle Tom's 
Cabin 618]). Gaskells and Eliot's narrators occasionally claim personal 
acquaintance with their characters, even though the narrators never figure 
as intradiegetic characters themselves. 
One of the many over justifications in Mary Barton is an example of 
metalepsis that places the heterodiegetic narrator and the intradiegetic 
characters on the same level. The narrator defends her comments about one 
characters physical appearance by citing a "personal" impression of the 
fictional woman: "I have called her 'the old woman . . . because, in truth, 
her appearance was so much beyond her years . . . she always gave me the 
idea of age" (385-386). This heterodiegetic "I" is never present in the 
fictional world, hence never in a position to see the character in the context 
of the fiction; the implication is, then, that the character must exist within 
the context of the narrator's own world. Eliot makes a similar implication in 
one intervention that refers to a conversation between the heterodiegetic 
narrator and the hero: "But I gathered from Adam Bede, to whom I talked 
of these matters in his old age" (225). These instances of metalepsis— 
implying that the characters exist, as the narrators do, outside the world 
represented in the fiction—produce an effect that differs from the humor­
ous discomfort that Genette had identified as the usual result of the device. 
Instead of distancing the actual reader from the characters by reminding the 
narratee that they are fictional, these metalepses are meant to reinforce the 
readers serious sense of the characters as, in some way, real. 
5. The narrators implicit or explicit attitude toward the act of narration. 
The distancing narrator, directly or indirectly, often reminds the narratee 
that the fiction is a game and the characters pawns. Such reminders may 
be as direct as Vanity Fairs references to the narrator as a stage manager or 
puppet master, as indirect as the mock-heroic "epic" language in the "battle 
scenes" of TomJones orJoseph Andrews, or as comparatively subtle as the type 
names that Fielding, Thackeray, Dickens, and Trollope assign to minor 
characters. In each of these examples, the distancing strategy pushes a text 
that in many other respects conforms to the conventions of verisimilitude in 
realist fiction over into the realm of metafiction. This playing with the text's 
fictionality goes hand-in-hand with the irony that characterizes the distanc­
ing approach. 
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Henry James heads the critical tradition that has correctly assessed 
this whole spectrum of self-conscious artifice as a means of destroying the 
illusion of reality and reminding the reader that the text is, after all, only a 
fiction.11 Objecting to TroUope's penchant for such names as Dr. Pessimist 
Anticant, Mr. Neversay Die, and Mr. Stickatit, his frequent authorial hints 
about the probable outcome of the plot, and his narrative reminders that the 
novelist "could direct the course of events according to his pleasure," James 
called TroUope's "pernicious trick" of narrative intervention "suicidal." 
James's summary of TroUope's strategy describes the distancing narrator's 
attitude perfectly: "There are certain precautions in the way of producing 
that illusion dear to the intending novelist which Trollope not only habitu­
ally scorned to take, but really, as we may say, asking pardon for the heat of 
the thing, delighted wantonly to violate" (i 15-18). 
James does not distinguish between distancing and engaging nar­
rators, since all narrative interventions must, at some level, interfere with 
the illusion of reality, if in fact such an illusion could ever exist in the mind 
of a reader sophisticated enough to process these texts. Like any intervening 
narrator, the engaging narrator also intrudes into the fiction with reminders 
that the novel is "only a story." The difference is that engaging narrators 
imply it is "only a true story," one that represents personal and social 
realities virtually, if not literally. In this respect, engaging narrators differ 
from distancing narrators in that their purposes are seldom playful: they 
intrude to remind their narratees—who, in their texts, should stand for the 
actual readers—that the fictions reflect real-world conditions for which the 
readers should take active responsibility after putting aside the book. 
Whether the situation depicted is that of American slaves, or the working-
class poor in Manchester, or middle-class rural folk in England, the engag­
ing narrator explicitly draws on the actual reader's memory and emotion, 
through direct address to the narratee, to foster a commitment to improv­
ing the extradiegetic situation the fiction depicts. Engaging narrators sel­
dom play with metafiction; rather, they earnestly assert the veracity of their 
stories as they attempt to inspire the readers' sympathetic action. 
Uncle Tom's Cabin is full of direct, sermonlike exhortation to the 
narratee, demanding sympathy for the slaves and even action on their 
behalf. The passage mentioned above, addressed to "mothers of America," 
specifically directs the narratees to transfer their emotional response from 
the characters to the actual slaves: 
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you who have learned, by the cradles of your own children, to 
love and feel for all mankind,—by the sacred love you bear your 
child . . . —I beseech you, pity the mother who had all your 
affections, and not one legal right to protect, guide, or educate, 
the child of her bosom! By the sick hour of your child; by those 
dying eyes, which you can never forget; by those last cries, that 
wrung your heart when you could neither help nor save . .  . —I 
beseech you, pity those mothers that are constantly made child­
less by the American slave-trade! And say, mothers of America, 
is this a thing to be defended, sympathized with, passed over in 
silence? (623-624) 
Here, the narrators strategy is simply to arouse the egocentric feelings of 
any actual readers who can identify with the narratees, then to ask the 
readers to project those feelings into compassion for actual slaves. If the 
narratees can feel for the characters, then the actual readers the narratees 
represent should be able to feel for the actual persons—or classes of per-
sons—the characters are supposed to represent. 
Gaskells narrator in Mary Barton pursues a similar strategy, asking 
the narratee to see through a characters eyes and including "you" in her 
implicit criticism of the character's egocentricity. In this scene, John Barton 
walks down a Manchester street, absorbed in his own sorrows: 
He wondered if any in all the hurrying crowd, had come from 
such a house of mourning. But he could not, you cannot, read 
the lot of those who daily pass you by in the street. How do 
you know the wild romances of their lives; the trials, the 
temptations they are even now enduring, resisting, sinking 
under . . . Errands of mercy—errands of sin—did you ever 
think where all the thousands of people you daily meet are 
bound? (101-102) 
Like many other narrative interventions in Mary Barton, the passage dem­
onstrates the way direct address to the narratee can "realize" the fictional 
situation for the actual reader, that is, transform a fictive event (like John 
Bartons self-absorbed walk through the city) into a genuine confrontation 
between "you" and the figures represented in the fiction. Gaskells strategy 
for inspiring actual readers to learn more actively to sympathize with people 
they do not know is to cajole readers into imaginatively aligning themselves 
with the characters inside the fiction. Having placed themselves in that 
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position, readers should realize how closely the fictional world resembles 
their own. If readers can look at strangers on real urban streets and imagine 
biographies for them, just as Gaskell has imagined the histories of her 
characters, those strangers will take on identities and fates that matter: 
readers will become responsible for feeling and expressing compassion for 
them. Even though the strategy occurs in a narrative intervention, it has 
the odd effect of placing the narrator in the background for the moment: 
deflecting attention from herself, she facilitates an imaginative moment of 
connection between the narratee and the characters on her Manchester 
street, a moment that is supposed to inspire a similar sense of community 
between actual readers and the people they will encounter when they have 
put down the book and walked out into their own worlds. 
In Adam Bede, Eliot's narrator also asks readers to recognize affinities 
between their own experiences and those depicted in the novel. Her engag­
ing strategies apply the philosophy that Eliot summarized in her earlier 
novel: "Sympathy is but a living again through our own past in a new form" 
{Scenes 358). The Adam Bede narrators attitude toward the purpose of 
narration plays such a crucial role in the novel that it is the subject of an 
entire chapter, "In Which the Story Pauses a Little." This enormous inter­
vention, interrupting the narrative after it has been unfolding for sixteen 
chapters, is an extraordinary instance of overjustification, defending at 
length the narrators refusal to idealize the portraits of the novel s characters. 
The chapter opens with a classically distancing quotation from "one of my 
lady readers," a prejudiced narratee with whom few would be eager to 
identify. The self-referential nature of the entire chapter, drawing attention 
to the fictional framing of Adam's story, pulls the narrative in a distancing 
direction that recurs in crucial passages throughout Adam Bede. Eliot's 
strategies are not purely, unconflictedly engaging: the very presence of a 
chapter on how the novel was written is, in itself, a profoundly distancing 
move. And yet the tone of this chapter is so earnest, so confiding, that it 
could hardly be more different from the metafictional gestures in Vanity 
Fair or Tom Jones. One way Eliot achieves this tone is by relying, after that 
opening paragraph, upon engaging direct address to an unnamed, un-
characterized "you." Every engaging address to "you" simultaneously re­
minds the narratee (and the actual reader) that the story is only a fiction and 
encourages the reader to apply to nonfictional, real life the feelings that the 
fiction may have inspired. In this respect, engaging strategies both under­
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mine and underline the realism of texts by stressing the position they 
occupy in relation to the world they are meant to represent. 
In a certain sense, the distancing narrators stance also emphasizes a 
"real" aspect of novel reading: in constantly coming forward to confront the 
narratee, the distancing narrator draws attention to the reality of the novel's 
textuality, dismissing implications that the story is in any literal sense 
"true." The actual reader stands clearly and distinctly outside the text; the 
narrator, narratees, and characters are within. Through engaging narrative 
interventions, however, novelists can place actual readers in a more am­
biguous position vis-a-vis the text. When an actual reader responds to the 
engaging narrators call to identify with a narratee, the reader is drawn into 
the story while at the same time recognizing that it is most certainly a story. 
The lines between fiction and the world of lived experience blur; the 
interventions imply that the fiction's referentiality may extend beyond the 
covers of the book. For the purposes of didactic realism, engaging interven­
tions can both raise readers' questions about the connections between the 
real and fictional worlds and gesture toward answering them. 
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II

Testing the Model: Interventions 
in Texts 

3

Engaging Strategies, Earnestness, 
and Realism: 
Mary Barton 
IN 1848, intervention would have had no connotations of anything as rarified 
as narrative theory. In the language Elizabeth Gaskell spoke, the term 
referred to one of two controversial alternatives for facing the economic 
transitions affecting the British working class. Confronting the rapidly 
widening gap that the industrial revolution was establishing between "mas­
ters" and "men," mid-nineteenth-century political theorists debated the 
advisability of a laissez-faire system that would allow the free market to 
expand uncontrolled, taking its victims where it would, versus the policy of 
"interventionism." As Joseph Kestner has pointed out (8), the question of 
whether the state ought to intervene in economic matters that were ad­
versely affecting the lives of the working poor preoccupied several women 
who were writing protest novels at the time, among them Harriet Mar­
tineau and Charlotte Tonna. 
Kestner argues that the rise of the "novel with a purpose" reflects 
women novelists' attempts to intervene in the process of political decision 
making. As he puts it, "writing social fiction allowed women, although not 
enfranchised, to participate in the legislative process" (13). Kestner is 
concerned (as was Robert A. Colby before him) with the "story" in these 
novels-with-a-purpose: the idea of narrative intervention enters his discus­
sion no more than it would, perhaps, have entered Gaskell s own descrip­
tion of her novelistic goals and techniques, had she ever attempted such a 
description.' Gaskell did favor the notion that the state should intervene in 
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the establishment of economic stability for the working class, but—as a 
look at the preface to Mary Barton will reveal—her interests lay not so 
much with the details or results of legislation, as with the conviction that 
the poor would benefit from recognizing any sympathetic gesture that the 
middle and ruling classes could extend to them. Gaskells narrative inter­
ventions, then, are related to her adherence to interventionism. Both would 
function primarily, from her perspective, as signals to the working poor, 
signs that would indicate a middle-class interest in their plight. The writ­
ing of Mary Barton therefore embodies two kinds of "gendered interven­
tions": a woman's means of participating in public policy formation was to 
write a novel, and Gaskells means of attempting to ensure that her first 
novel would serve its purpose was to employ earnest, engaging narrative 
techniques among the realist conventions she adopted. 
That a social-problem novel should be realistic to be effective has been 
taken for granted by commentators on the genre from Louis Cazamian to 
Kestner, who have tended to emphasize novelists' reliance on documentary 
fact as the primary indicator of the verisimilitude of these texts.2 On this 
scale of realism, Mary Barton has often ranked rather low, because of the 
plot's notorious shift from depiction of the everyday lives of Manchester 
factory workers to a sensationalist (some have called it Gothic) tale of 
seduction, murder, and happy-ending romance escapism.3 To look at this 
novel in terms of plot is not to see it as entirely or consistently realistic, for 
despite a conscientious depiction of the circumstances surrounding the rise 
and fall of the Chartist movement, and a careful representation of the sights 
and sounds of life in Manchester, the story of Mary Barton (and I use "story" 
here in the narratological sense, to include the characterization and scenic 
setting as well as the events in the fiction) diverges in many respects from 
verisimilitude.4 Gaskells narrative discourse, however, reveals a con­
cern with the "real" that establishes a pattern for engaging narrative in 
nineteenth-century novels. 
Throughout Mary Barton, the consistently engaging narrative inter­
ventions reveal Gaskells attempt to collapse the intra- and the extra­
diegetic, to bring together the worlds within and outside the fiction, as 
though both existed on the same plane of reality. Gaskell s is the definitively 
engaging narrator, in that she frequently signals a precise identification of 
her narrative "I" with the actual author and her narrative "you" with the 
actual reader. The conflation of the real and the textual occurs in three 
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different phases of Mary Barton's writing: first, in Gaskell s decision to write 
a social-problem novel as a means of reconciling herself to loss and suffering 
in her own life; second, in her declared intention to stir real readers' 
sympathy for the poor, thus potentially improving the morale of actual 
working-class people; and finally, in her narrator's reliance on engaging 
interventions. In each of these respects, Gaskell's first novel represents an 
attempt to establish a connecting route between the real and fictive worlds, 
a bridge of sympathy which her strategies encourage the actual reader to 
cross in responding to the fiction and carrying that response over into extra­
diegetic life. 
The circumstances in which Gaskell decided to write her first novel 
are very familiar to Gaskell scholars, and have provided introductory mate­
rial for many critical essays on Mary Barton. By the summer of 1846, 
Elizabeth Gaskell had written some stories for her own and her children's 
amusement and for her clergyman-husband's use in teaching courses for 
working people in Manchester. She had given no thought to publishing her 
stories: her energies were absorbed by her roles as mother and ministers 
wife. But in August of that year, her fourth child and only son, Willie, died 
of scarlet fever when he was only ten months old. Her husband suggested 
that she should try writing a novel, "to turn her thoughts from the subject 
of her grief" (Gerin 74).5 Elizabeth Gaskell's preface to Mary Barton, 
written for the first, 1848 edition, assures her audience that she wrote the 
novel out of her personal need for distraction, as well as her interest in the 
working people of Manchester, and not—as her contemporaries presum­
ably might have suspected—to exploit the topicality of the social upheavals 
then occurring in Europe.6 
Despite being shielded by anonymity on the novel's title page, Gaskell 
shrinks from directly mentioning her son's death in the preface, which 
begins: "Three years ago I became anxious (from circumstances that need 
not be more fully alluded to) to employ myself in writing a work of fiction." 
She goes on to explain that she had originally thought of diverting herself 
by writing a historical romance: 
Living in Manchester, but with a deep relish and fond admira­
tion for the country, my first thought was to find a frame-work 
for my story in some rural scene; and I had already made a lit­
tle progress in a tale, the period of which was more than a cen­
tury ago, and the place on the borders of Yorkshire, when I 
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bethought me how deep might be the romance in the lives of 
some of those who elbowed me daily in the busy streets of the 
town in which I resided. I had always felt a deep sympathy with 
the care-worn men. (37) 
Imaginative escape to remote times and to places reminiscent of her happy 
childhood in the countryside could not answer her need for consolation. 
Struck by the unhappiness of the working people whose prevailing melan­
choly corresponded at this time so closely to her own, she determined to 
write of the "romance" in their lives, but nonetheless, in choosing a subject 
and setting so vividly present to her everyday existence, Gaskell was follow­
ing an impulse toward realism.7 
What Gaskell imagined to be the possible romance in the lives of the 
urban poor turns out to include, as critics have noted, elements of plot and 
imagery that are as far from being realistic as her historical romance might 
have been, particularly the melodramatic framework of coincidence, mur­
der, and intrigue over which the story of Mary Barton is stretched. But the 
romance also includes portrayals of working peoples emotions about more 
common occurrences, such as the loss of children. One of John Bartons 
primary motives for murdering Harry Carson, the mill owners son, is his 
own long-festering anguish from having watched his infant son die of 
scarlet fever, unaided by any of the food or medicine that a tiny portion of 
the mill owners' profits could have supplied. By giving John Barton a basis 
for sorrow that was very similar to her own (and one that was common even 
among middle-class families, in that age of high infant mortality), and by 
making Bartons situation still more miserable than hers because of his 
poverty, Gaskell gave herself and her middle-class readers personal ground 
for sympathy with the character. Building on her imaginations version of 
their common loss, Gaskell expands her sympathy for John Barton to 
encompass the whole realm of the working mans frustration over misery 
that he is helpless to abate. 
Writing a novel could not restore her son or abolish scarlet fever: that 
part of Gaskell's sorrow, like Bartons, was indelible. But she apparently 
believed that her novel could "intervene" in the unhappy lives of the poor, 
not so much by changing the circumstances causing their grief, as by 
inspiring her "more happy and fortunate" readers to feel and to express 
sympathy with the workers. The preface makes explicit her belief that such 
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sympathy could lighten the emotional load that was pressing the lower 
classes into desperation and violence. Claiming to know "nothing of Politi­
cal Economy," Gaskell emphasizes that she wished to work changes not on a 
political, but on a personal scale. Many critics, dismissing this prefatory 
confession as irrelevant to the text proper, have gone to great lengths to 
explicate the political ideology that the novel seems to endorse; as Elaine 
Jordan has shown, however, the political stance of Mary Barton is notably 
confused and confusing. If we take the preface seriously, we can see that 
Gaskell s hopes for social "intervention" had very little to do with details of 
public policy. As Gaskell puts it, she had become 
anxious . .  . to gi\e some utterance to the agony which, from 
time to time, convulses this dumb people; the agony of suffer­
ing without the sympathy of the happy, or of erroneously believ­
ing that such is the case. If it be an error, that the woes . . . pass 
unregarded by all but the sufferers, it is at any rate an error so 
bitter in its consequences to all parties, that whatever public 
effort can do in the way of legislation, or private effort in the way 
of merciful deeds, or helpless love in the way of widows mites, 
should be done, and that speedily, to disabuse the work-people 
of so miserable a misapprehension. (37 — 38) 
Interestingly, she does not urge legislation, merciful deeds, and 
widow s mites on the grounds that such actions could improve the physical 
living conditions of the working poor. Her primary concern is that the 
middle and upper classes should make these gestures as signals of sympathy 
to the working class. The reasoning of the preface implies that this novel's 
function should be to move middle- or upper-class readers to perform 
philanthropic actions demonstrating compassion, regardless of the effect of 
these actions on the daily lives of the poor. Keeping this in mind, we can see 
that a critical analysis of the novels political content, such as Jordan's, 
although it demonstrates the interplay of competing ideologies and literary 
genres in the text, does not necessarily reveal a fundamental contradiction 
to the declared goal of the novel. The introduction of confusion, romance, 
and Gothicism can be seen as part of Mary Barton's machinery for stirring 
actual readers' emotions to the point where sympathy for the characters 
might spill over the border between the actual and imagined worlds—as 
did Gaskell s own. 
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PATTERNS FOR SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE 
The redeeming power of sympathy is, accordingly, a dominant theme 
in Mary Barton, in both the novels realistic and its melodramatic sections. 
The novel does indeed fall into these two distinct parts, although (as Jordan 
has argued) elements of Gothicism surface in the first part, foreshadowing 
the sensationalist mode of the second. The first seventeen chapters recount 
the family histories, daily joys and disappointments, and ordinary loves and 
deaths among the Barton family and their neighbors, the Wilsons and the 
Leghs. This part of the narrative includes some political debate among the 
working-class characters, as John Barton turns the pain resulting from 
the losses of son, wife, and job into union activism and feelings of re­
crimination against the masters. Johns disappointments culminate in Par­
liaments refusal to support the Chartist demands, which he, with high 
hopes, had helped carry to London. The details of the books first half lead 
plausibly enough to John Bartons final desperation. The climax comes 
when Harry Carson, the son of Bartons employer, refuses to listen seriously 
to the requests of a delegation of his fathers workers. Young Carson further 
offends the delegation by drawing caricatures of their haggard faces on a bit 
of paper which he tosses carelessly into the fire as he leaves the room. The 
unhappy men retrieve the paper and denounce the cartoonist. Speaking to 
the other members of the delegation, John Barton reviles the masters, who 
cannot comprehend that the men need more wages, not for luxury, but 
simply for the essentials of life. He particularly condemns the extravagant 
and jolly Harry Carson: "Now I only know that I would give the last drop o' 
my blood to avenge us on yon chap, who had so little feeling in him as to 
make game on earnest, suffering men!" (239). With this, the delegation 
decides to assassinate young Carson, and the novel begins its eleven-chapter 
journey into melodrama. True to Gaskell's stated thematic purpose, what 
finally drives Barton over the edge of desperation is young Carson's indif­
ference to the men's suffering; after Harry's murder, sympathy and for­
giveness become the final saving grace both for Barton and for Harry's 
stricken father. 
Mary Barton reinforces its theme with the narrative "redundancy" 
that Susan Suleiman has identified as a characteristic of the roman a these: the 
story repeatedly depicts the power of sympathy dramatically, while the 
narrative discourse contains many assertions that underline the relevance of 
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sympathy to the novels point. Gaskell constructs the story so as to provide 
numerous models for the behavior she hopes to inspire in readers; the 
admirable poor people in this novel all practice sympathy and forgiveness. 
In the opening scenes, Mary Bartons pregnant mother has recently lost her 
sister Esther to what the Bartons assume must be a life of prostitution. This 
blow, which later leads to Mrs. Bartons death during a miscarriage, 
depresses Mary's mother a great deal, but does not prevent her from enter­
taining family friends at a tea party. When Alice Wilson, a very old, well-
meaning, but absentminded woman, proposes a toast "to absent friends," 
Mrs. Barton "put down her food, and could not hide the fast dropping 
tears. Alice could have bitten her tongue out" (53). This blunder breaks up 
the party, and prompts "the self-reproaching Alice" to apologize to Mrs. 
Barton, who surprises and delights her by embracing, forgiving, and bless­
ing her, promptly and openly. "Many and many a time, as Alice reviewed 
that evening in her after life, did she bless Mary Barton for these kind and 
thoughtful words" (54). A simple instance of compassion suspended and 
renewed among friends, the scene illustrates the healing power that sympa­
thy and forgiveness can wield in the fictional world Gaskell depicts, even 
when they can make no material difference in the unhappy situation. 
As the action becomes more involved with the dramatic repercussions 
of Harry Carson's murder, the instances of sympathy and forgiveness take on 
more significant thematic resonances. Just as Harry Carson's lack of sympa­
thy for the working men inspires their plot to kill him, John Bartons 
depleted store of sympathy for the masters enables him to carry out the 
deed. While Mary travels to Jem's trial in Liverpool and remains in the port 
city in a catatonic state after the trial, John Barton wastes away in guilt at 
home in Manchester. After Mary and Jem return, her father calls them and 
Harry Carson's father together and confesses to the crime, asking Carson to 
forgive him. Not until he witnesses Carson's anguish at this moment does 
Barton look past his own guilty misery and sense of loss to see the effects of 
his act. He cries out to Carson, 
"My hairs are gray with suffering, and yours with years—" 
"And have I had no suffering?" asked Mr. Carson, as if 
appealing for sympathy, even to the murderer of his child. 
And the murderer of his child answered to the appeal, 
and groaned in spirit over the anguish he had caused. (434) 
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The point of the episode is to demonstrate Gaskell s earnest conviction 
that compassion can break down class barriers and the desire for revenge: 
"The eyes of John Barton grew dim with tears. Rich and poor, masters and 
men, were then brothers in the deep suffering of the heart; for was not this 
the very anguish he had felt for little Tom. . . . The mourner before him 
was no longer the employer . .  . no longer the enemy, the oppressor, but a 
very poor, and desolate old man" (435). The spectacle of Bartons compas­
sionate penitence at first appears to have no impact on the "desolate old 
man," who initially resists the appeal. But after witnessing a minor inci­
dent of trespass and forgiveness among two children on the street and after 
reviewing the Gospel account of Christ's plea that "they know not what they 
do," Carson joins Barton in sympathy and forgiveness. In a scene that is 
exuberantly melodramatic—which renders it no less consistent with or 
necessary to the novel's project—John Barton dies in the arms of his murder 
victims father. Victimizer and victim come full circle, breaking the per­
petuation of the cycle, each by recognizing his affinity with the other (an 
affinity that the novelist makes obvious even in the orthography of their 
names) and by acknowledging his own responsibility for the pain in the life 
of the other. 
The novel's movement from realistic situations of distress into sensa­
tionalist excess finds a parallel in Gaskell's own emotional activity in writ­
ing the book. She could identify with the suffering of John Barton and his 
wife over the loss of their son, but she elaborates upon that pain, giving 
John heartrending memories about the circumstances of the boy's death: 
not only had little Tom, like Willie Gaskell, contracted scarlet fever, but he 
had become ill at a time when his father was laid off from work. Tantalized 
by the doctor's suggestions that luxurious foods and comfortable living 
might save the boy, John had lurked around a food shop contemplating a 
robbery, only to see his former masters wife come out of the store laden with 
extravagant purchases for a party. The narrator explains that John would 
have considered stealing food "no sin," a conclusion she implicitly endorses 
through the "ethic of care" that Carol Gilligan has identified at the core of 
feminine morality. Having no opportunity, however, John had returned 
home "to see his only boy a corpse" (61). In imagining this excruciat­
ing experience for John Barton, Gaskell was adding many layers of frustra­
tion, helplessness, envy, and revenge to the loss that she herself had felt 
so keenly. 
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The entire novel follows a similar train of amplification, moving from 
the simple moments of hurt among friends, to the more profound but still 
familiar pain of losing children, mothers, wives, and jobs, to the sudden, 
sweeping blow of Harry Carson's murder and all its sensational conse­
quences for the young heroine. The opportunities for the characters to 
sympathize with one another—and for the willing reader to join them— 
become almost grotesque in their number and scale. If this is the "romance 
in the lives of some of those who elbowed [Gaskell] daily" in Manchester, it 
is not all that far from the outlandish story she might have set a century 
earlier and hundreds of miles away from that city. 
Still, as the preface and many of the narrative interventions make 
clear, Gaskell took the difference between historical romance and social-
problem novel seriously. If the plot exaggerates the characters' claims on the 
sympathies of the narratee, it does so for an explicitly rendered purpose. As 
the narrator remarks near the end of the tale: 
There are stages in the contemplation and endurance of great 
sorrow, which endow men with the same earnestness and clear­
ness of thought that in some of old took the form of Prophecy. 
To those who have large capability of loving and suffering . . . 
there comes a time in their woe, when they are lifted out of the 
contemplation of their individual case into a searching inquiry 
into the nature of their calamity, and the remedy (if remedy 
there be) which may prevent its recurrence to others as well as to 
themselves. (459) 
"If remedy there be": again, we are urged to recognize that Gaskell's novel 
endorses no particular political solution for the "calamity." The context of 
this thesis-statement within the text is Mr. Carson's gradual conversion 
to compassionate awareness of what John Barton has lived through; like 
Carson's spiritual transformation, the remark constitutes a gesture toward 
significance that would extend beyond the text. To inspire actual readers to 
that state of "earnestness and clearness of thought" where "they are lifted 
out of the contemplation of their individual" woes, to move readers to 
emulate her activity in identifying John Barton's suffering with her own— 
and her characters' activity in recognizing one another's unhappiness as a 
kindred link among them—Gaskell employs numerous engaging narrative 
interventions. Her narrator circumvents the difficulty of rendering a melo­
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dramatic plot realistic by encouraging the narratee to acknowledge the 
affinities between the story and the literally real. The first of her rhetorical 
moves in this direction is the narrator's consistent identification of her "I" 
with the actual author; the corollary move is her implication that "you," the 
narratee, stands for each actual reader. 
THE ENGAGING NARRATIVE " I " 
An essential characteristic of Gaskells engaging narrator, then, is her 
candid and consistent depiction of herself holding a pen, creating the book. 
Through repeated references to her act of writing, she makes herself a 
concrete presence in the book; she is the narratees friend and correspon­
dent, who can be depended upon for generous interpretations of the charac­
ters' motives and of the narratee s own motives as well. She speaks directly, 
innocent of any self-consciousness about the danger of breaking into the 
illusion of reality her scenes might create. For instance, when Alice asks 
Mary's friend Margaret to sing "The Owdham Weaver," Gaskells narrator 
shifts from her depiction of the scene in Alice s room to an acknowledgment 
of her own narrative responsibility to fill in the gaps in the narratees' 
information: 
With a faint smile, as if amused at Alice's choice of a song, 
Margaret began. 
Do you know "The Oldham Weaver"? Not unless you are 
Lancashire born and bred, for it is a complete Lancashire ditty. I 
will copy it for you. (71) 
The narrator proceeds to do exactly what she proposes, and then comments 
on the tone of the old "ditty." Fearing that "to read it, it may, perhaps seem 
humorous," she assures her narratee that "to those who have seen the 
distress it describes, it is a powerfully pathetic song" (73). As a transition 
back to the narrative, she declares that Margaret has witnessed such dis­
tress, and continues with a description of Margaret s rendition of the ballad. 
An intervention like this, one of the many overjustifications that Gaskells 
narrator employs, serves two strategic functions: it suggests a narratee with 
whom the vast majority of the actual readership (every reader who is not 
"Lancashire born and bred") can identify, and it depicts the narrator as a 
person writing, a person identified with, if not identical to, the author. 
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On other occasions the narrator similarly pictures herself at her writ­
ing desk. Explaining the interest that amateur botany holds for some 
Manchester workmen, she mentions a biography that describes their scien­
tific enthusiasms: "If you will refer to the preface to Sir J. E. Smiths Life (I 
have it not by me, or I would copy you the exact passage), you will find that 
he names a little circumstance corroborative of what I have said" (76). Mary 
Barton, like all novels, is full of implicit intertextuality, especially in its 
allusions to other literary texts and traditions.8 However, a specific refer­
ence to another text, the biography of Sir. J. E. Smith, in the form of a 
citation lends an unusual element of the real to this fiction. Because Smiths 
biography actually exists, and because Gaskell's narrator acknowledges that 
she could copy the passage for the convenience of the narratee, the interven­
tion places both the narrator and the biography on a plane of existence 
where the narratee exists, too. The plane where the biography exists is the 
actual world; thus, by implication, the narrator and narratee exist there as 
well, in the forms of the author and the reader. In frequent comments on her 
way of telling the story, Gaskell reinforces the same implication. For ex­
ample, she draws attention to her role as the source of the narratee s informa­
tion when she confesses to having omitted pertinent information from her 
narrative, saying, "I must go back a little to explain the motives which 
caused Esther to seek an interview with her niece" (288). The identification 
between narrator and author is thus reinforced. 
This narrator who manifests no desire to screen herself from the 
readers attention could simply have been a sketchily realized fictional 
character, such as Mary Smith of Cranford, except that she gives herself no 
fictive name or circumstances; on the contrary, she places herself specifically 
in the authors particular situation. Describing the miserable, lonely night 
in Manchester that Mary Barton endures after realizing that her father has 
murdered Harry Carson, Gaskell comments on how little sympathy the 
"outward scene" of the city seems to manifest for Mary's "internal trouble": 
All was so still, so motionless, so hard! Very different to this 
lovely night in the country in which I am now writing, where the 
distant horizon is soft and undulating in the moonlight, and the 
nearer trees sway gently . . . and the rustling air makes music 
among their branches, as if speaking soothingly to the weary 
ones, who lie awake in heaviness of heart. The sights and sounds 
of such a night lull pain and grief to rest. (303, emphasis added) 
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The romantic argument on the surface of this intervention—that 
nature s beauties, unavailable to Mary in the city, can soothe internal pain in 
those who have access to them—does not contribute much to the narratees 
understanding of Mary's state of mind, unless the actual reader happens to 
have experienced the soothing power the passage describes. What the 
intervention does, though, is create for the narratee a vivid picture of the 
author herself, seated comfortably in the country somewhere, gazing out a 
window and feeling a strong sense of contrast between Mary's circumstances 
and her own. Detailing the "sights and sounds of such a night," the narrator 
implies that her own "pain and grief" can be consoled by them. Whether or 
not the picture is biographically accurate (that is, whether or not Elizabeth 
Gaskell really wrote these lines in the circumstances she depicts), the 
intervention draws the narratees attention to the figure of an author who, 
like the actual reader, lives in much more comfortable circumstances than 
the unfortunate characters do. 
A later passage hints at the source of this narrators unnamed grief, in 
an unusually personal intrusion. The paragraph describes Marys fears that 
Jem's mother, who has fallen asleep after learning that she must testify 
against her adored son at his murder trial, may be driven mad "in the 
horrors of her dreams"(327). The disjointed prose mirrors Mary's own 
mental distress, but the long parenthetical interruption speaks with an "I" 
that cannot be Mary's. 
What if in dreams (that land into which no sympathy nor love 
can penetrate with another, either to shake its bliss or its ag-
ony,—that land whose scenes are unspeakable terrors, are hid­
den mysteries, are priceless treasures to one alone,—that land 
where alone I may see, while I yet tarry here, the sweet looks of my dead 
child)—what if, in the horrors of her dreams, her brain should 
go still more astray? (327, emphasis added) 
Mary Barton has no child, alive or dead: the "I" is the narrator (who in this 
instance exactly resembles Gaskell herself) recalling dream visions of her 
own dead baby. The very personal pronoun here serves a double function in 
the passage. Not only can it be read as the narrator's specific reference to 
herself, but it also resembles the "I" of a lyric poem or a folk song: a persona 
with whom most readers or listeners can sympathize and identify in a 
general way. In this second sense the narrator's use of the pronoun "I" 
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parallels her use of "one" in the preceding description of dreams as "price­
less treasures to one alone." In shifting from that third-person observation 
to the personally voiced "I," however, the narrator once again prompts the 
narratee to attend to the presence of an author. 
In addition to these personal reminders of Gaskells presence behind 
the pen, her engaging narrator often refers to her own opinions and impres­
sions, giving the reader a strong sense of the personality that narrates the 
novel.9 The narrator openly displays her sympathy with the working 
people, her opinions about their plight, and her personal experience with 
them, citing these as her authority for writing the book. She is sometimes 
very definite in her assertions. She is positive, for example, that the poor 
have reasons to be dissatisifed, and that they deserve better. In one interven­
tion that interrupts the story, she introduces a long catalogue of miserable 
conditions with an impassioned testimony that she has heard it all first­
hand: "And when I hear, as I have heard, of the sufferings and privations of 
the poor . . .—can I wonder that many of them, in such times of misery 
and destitution, spoke and acted with ferocious precipitation?" (126-127). 
One goal of the novel is to ensure that, having read it, actual readers will 
also "have heard of the sufferings and privations of the poor." 
Trying to circumvent possible objections that the picture she presents 
is unrealistically distorted, the narrator is particularly anxious to demon­
strate her own distance from the conclusions her characters draw about their 
condition. While emphasizing her awareness that impoverished people 
have a limited understanding of economic conditions, she insists that the 
poor merit sympathy nevertheless. After describing John Bartons feeling 
that "he alone" must suffer from bad times, she interpolates a comment: "I 
know that this is not really the case; and I know what is the truth in such 
matters: but what I wish to impress is what the workman feels and thinks. 
True, that with child-like improvidence, good times will often dissipate his 
grumbling, and make him forget all prudence and foresight" (60). This 
aside, like the narrators depiction of her own serenely comfortable sur­
roundings, functions to establish the narrator and narratee as middle-class 
observers who regard the working man as an unfortunately inferior "other." 
Understandably, the passage has been cited as evidence of the narrator's self­
satisifed condescension to the class she writes about: David Smith observes, 
on the strength of this passage, that Gaskell "can never escape the patroniz­
ing tone of the Health Visitor" (103). The rhetoric of the passage does 
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condescend to its object (the working man), but functions to solidify the 
link between the speaking subject (the narrators "I") and the intended 
receiver of the text. The "I know . . . and I know" construction works in 
two ways: in second-guessing the narratees objection to Barton's feeling, it 
sketches out the narratees middle-class assumptions and demonstrates the 
narrator's familiarity with those assumptions; at the same time, the con­
struction of the intervention establishes the narrator's authority as an even­
handed, open-minded figure who speaks on behalf of the working class 
without belonging to it. The strategy enables her to follow up this inter­
vention with confident assertions such as: "The vices of the poor sometimes 
astound us here; but when the secrets of all hearts shall be made known, 
their virtues will astound us in far greater degree. Of this I am certain" (96). 
Whereas the content of such interventions places a barrier of differ­
ence between the middle-class narrator and narratee and the working-class 
characters, Gaskells narrative stance simultaneously operates to overcome 
that barrier by insisting that characters, narrator, and narratee all populate 
the same world, the "real world" of nineteenth-century England. The 
engaging narrator takes advantage of her confident, assertive side by com­
menting about the characters as if she were discussing real people. In one 
such scene, where Mary decides not to speak to Jem in jail about establish­
ing his legitimate alibi, Gaskell brings Mary's thoughts around to the 
realization that she would not be permitted to see Jem, even if she tried to. 
Then Gaskell skips again from Mary's thoughts to assess the heroine's 
feelings: "and even if she could have gone to him, I believe she would not" 
(312). To bring in this hypothetical possibility, to state a belief about what 
a character would or would not do, and to personalize that belief by saying 
"I," is certainly to employ metalepsis in the extradiegetic narrators stance 
toward a fictional character. During the same scene, the narrator yokes 
Mary with herself in their common fear of subpoenas, suggesting that 
author and character inhabit the same reality: "Many people have a dread 
of those mysterious pieces of parchment. I am one. Mary was another" 
(313). The narrator, who has consistently linked herself with the real-world 
Elizabeth Gaskell, here transports Mary Barton to that same real-world 
plane of "many people." 
Although the narrative "I" is definite in her opinions about some 
issues, her assertions more often falter, as she expresses doubts about her 
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grasp of the facts that she must narrate and insecurity about her ability to 
transmit those facts accurately to the narratee. This hesitant attitude is 
more characteristic of Gaskell s engaging narrator than is her more con­
fident side and serves rhetorically to reinforce the implication that the real 
world and the fictional may be identical. The doubts the narrator so fre­
quently and candidly expresses are her own acknowledgment that her vision 
is subjective, her judgment fallible, and her talent limited. By emphasiz­
ing her subjectivity, the narrator also implies that she is reporting events 
that are "true," and therefore open to subjective interpretation. 
Gaskell s insistence that she doesn't have all the "facts" suggests that 
facts exist, even though she claims they are out of her grasp. For instance, of 
a workman's day off, she writes, "I do not know whether it was on a holiday 
granted by the masters, or a holiday seized in the right of nature and her 
beautiful spring time by the workmen" (40). Similarly, she claims not to 
know all the facts about Mary's friendship with Margaret: "I do not know 
what points of resemblance (or dissimilitude, for the one joins people as 
often as the other) attracted the two girls to each other" (79-80). She 
sometimes "confesses" to not knowing the exact physical occurrences of a 
scene, as when she describes a collision among pedestrians: "I don't know 
how it was, but in some awkward way he knocked the poor little girl down 
upon the hard pavement" (437). At other times, she sets limits to her 
ability to read characters' thoughts. She summarizes the feelings of Mr. 
Carson during the night before Jem's trial, emphasizing that "until he had 
obtained vengeance," Mr. Carson could not rest. But then she pulls herself 
up, in a parenthetical aside: "I don't know that he exactly used the term 
vengeance in his thoughts; he spoke of justice, and probably thought of his 
desired end as such" (381). 
Strictly, such disclaimers are nonsense, or even lies. (P. N. Furbank, 
arguing from the bizarre premise that the "truth" about characters' motives 
is not only determinable, but provable against a narrators assertions, has 
dubbed Gaskell "the poet of mendacity" for her reliance on this kind of 
narrative prevarication.10) Of course the narrator could supply these facts if 
the author chose for her to, by inventing them along with the rest of the 
story. And the disclaimers are not, by any means, completely consistent: 
when she does choose to, the extradiegetic narrator is perfectly capable of 
reading characters' thoughts. But because the author does not choose to 
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invent every detail—and because the narrator draws the narratees attention 
to this choice—the narrative has the air of being one fallible observers 
account of actual events. 
Her expressed doubts about the facts of the story would seem to 
separate the voice of the narrator from that of the author, or the entity 
responsible for creating the "givens" of the story as well as for rendering it 
in discourse. This is offset, though, by other engaging remarks, which 
establish the narrators doubts about her ability to achieve accuracy in the 
novel. These particular disclaimers of omniscience refer more directly than 
other interventions to Gaskell herself, because they describe the limitations 
of her knowledge on extra-fictional matters and reflect her own expressed 
lack of confidence in herself as an all-knowing novelist. In these interven­
tions, the narrator is quick to acknowledge her own confusion, as when she 
makes a generalization about "the Jews, or Mohammedans (I forget which)" 
(i 32), or when she describes Mary's discovery of her fathers "bullets or shot 
(I don't know which you would call them)" (300). When she could attribute 
the lack of knowledge to a character, the narrator still takes the responsibil­
ity for slight gaps in the narrative, as in the scene in Liverpool in which 
Mary listens, bewildered, to sailors' speech that she cannot understand. 
Mary hears "slang, which to [her] was almost inaudible, and quite unin­
telligible, and which I am too much of a land-lubber to repeat correctly" 
(352). A self-effacing narrator could have omitted any extended mention of 
the slang, since the scene is focalized through Mary's perspective and the 
speech does not enter her consciousness. But the narrator specifically re­
minds us of her own presence, in order to ally herself with Mary in her 
ignorance and fear of the sea and to intensify the narratee's awareness of 
reading a text that has been created by a fallible (that is, human and 
therefore possibly real) person. 
Added to these confessions of limited knowledge, the narrators self-
deprecating comments on her ability to tell the story intensify her subjec­
tive pose. On the first page of the novel she chooses to deprecate her own 
descriptive abilities, conveying the "charming" effect, rather than the exact 
appearance, of a stile that figures in the opening scene. The narrator gives 
some details of sight and sound in this rural setting, but interrupts with a 
passage addressed directly to the narratee; "You cannot wonder, then, that 
these fields are popular places of resort at every holiday time; and you would 
62 
ENGAGING STRATEGIES 
not wonder, if you could see, or I properly describe, the charm of one 
particular stile, that it should be, on such occasions, a crowded halting-
place" (39). Gaskells confession of her inability to describe the stiles 
appearance serves as both a compliment to the readers power of imagination 
and a slight to her narrators power of description. Gaskell usually appeals 
directly to "you" in passages that serve this double function, as when she 
instructs the narratee to "picture to yourself (for I cannot tell you)" Marys 
tumultuous thoughts (329); similarly, she avoids attempting a potentially 
unsuccessful description of Mr. Carson's strong feelings, asking "how shall I 
tell you the vehemence of passion which possessed the mind of poor Mr. 
Carson?" (396). The cumulative effect of such expressions of doubt is to 
underline the implication that the characters' feelings and the story's events 
are real, and therefore that confident narrative assertions about them would 
necessarily be oversimplified, subjectively biased, or otherwise flawed. 
Although, as I have mentioned, Gaskells narrator treats the charac­
ters as though they were real people, she seldom goes so far as to claim per­
sonal acquaintance with them, and is vague about the sources of her definite 
information. Nevertheless, two comments—both occurring in the court­
room scene, a setting that evokes questions about "evidence"—suggest 
that the engaging narrator places herself within the characters' world. The 
metaleptic effect of these comments is more emphatic than it would be if the 
narrator were to place herself more consistently (for instance, as a fellow 
character) in the world of the fiction. When Jem's mother enters the wit-
ness-box, the narrator digresses into a brief explanation of her epithets for 
Mrs. Wilson: "I have often called her 'the old woman', and 'an old woman', 
because, in truth, her appearance was so much beyond her years, which 
might not be many above fifty. But partly owing to her accident in early 
life, . . . partly owing to her anxious temper, partly to her sorrows, and 
partly to her limping gait, she always gave me the idea of age" (385 - 386). 
Anxious to demonstrate her firsthand knowledge of Mrs. Wilson, the 
engaging narrator defends her term, "the old woman," on the grounds that 
the "real" Jane Wilson gave her the impression of being old. At the same 
time, the narrator does not place herself at the scene, as her disclaimer of 
being present at the trial indicates: "I was not there myself; but one who 
was, told me" (389). The stance of the engaging narrator is a tenuous 
mixture of knowing and doubting, of inhabiting the fictional world and of 
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remaining invisible. This narrator offers no answers for the technical ques­
tions that were later to be tackled by the narrators of impressionist fiction, 
questions such as How do I know what I claim to know? and Why should 
my reader believe me? In this sense, Gaskells narrative technique could 
have had a highly distancing effect, inspiring actual readers to turn such 
questions against the persuasive intentions of this sometimes confident, 
sometimes dubious narrator. 
ENGAGING STRATEGIES AND "YOU" 
The effect of all these narrative interventions could have been to 
prompt the actual reader to recognize a distance between the real world and 
the fictional one, or to intensify the actual readers sense of the story as 
fictive. But the narrator manipulates her direct address to the narratee in 
order to subvert that distancing effect. In her stance toward the reader, the 
narrator places "you" on the same plane of reality that she herself occupies, a 
plane which, she seems to suggest, could place "you" within the world of 
the fiction—hypothetically, at least. The narrator never challenges the 
narratee to admit to having been present at any of the story's events, but by 
using subjunctive phrases to describe the readers probable reactions, she 
suggests that "your" presence could have been possible. For instance, the 
narrator posits the reader's hypothetical presence at Mary's unhappy vigil 
after her refusal of Jem's proposal: "She could not have told at first (if you 
had asked her, and she could have commanded voice enough to answer)" 
(176). The narrator's parenthetical remark encourages the reader to imagine 
himself or herself at Mary's side, in a position to question or comfort her. 
The narrator similarly places the reader at the scene of John Barton's confes­
sion: "Your heart would have ached to have seen the man, however hardly 
you might have judged his crime" (422). Again the appeal aims at the 
narratee's imaginative sympathy: the narrator asks the actual reader to 
forget for the moment that he or she is reading. Significantly, she does not 
even address the narratee as "reader," but uses only "you." The narrative 
strategy here encourages actual readers to picture themselves in the scenes 
that the narrator's descriptions have evoked in their minds. 
And this engaging narrator quite often speaks to "you." She fre­
quently refers very openly to information she has previously related that the 
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actual reader could have forgotten: such phrases as "the shelf I told you 
about" (66), "you remember the reward?" (273), "as you know" (363), or 
"the facts were as well know to most of the audience as they are to you" (384) 
all reinforce the narratee s sense of the story's being conveyed through the 
medium of narrative. Rather than merely stating facts or descriptions, the 
narrator often asks the narratee to participate in the creation of scenes, 
asking, "Can you fancy the bustle. . . . can you fancy the delight?" (67), or 
"Do you not perceive?" (80). She calls upon the narratee's mental images of 
common objects, as when she refers to "that sort of striped horsecloth you 
must have seen a thousand times" (300). In addition to these appeals for 
imaginative participation in the narrative, she often reminds "you" that she 
speaks directly to "you." The novel is sprinkled with such phrases as "you 
may be sure" (443), "If you think this account of mine confused" (413), and 
"I must tell you; I must put into words the dreadful secret" (299). If the 
actual reader were to take these pronouns seriously and personally, he or 
she would experience an intensified sense that the novel is a personal act of 
communication between Elizabth Gaskell and "you." 
Of course, Gaskells narrator sometimes uses "you" in the conven­
tional sense that actually means "one." An example of this usage occurs in 
an aside that is not necessarily directed to the individual, actual reader. A 
character says, "Well-a-well," and the narrator amplifies, "(in a soothing 
tone, such as you use to irritated children)" (376). Not everyone speaks to 
irritated children in a soothing tone; not every actual reader could identify 
with this "you" as he or she could with the receiver of a remark such as "I 
must tell you." Though this infrequent usage of "you" to mean "one" is less 
personal than other uses of that pronoun in the novel's interventions, it is 
also more informal than the more polite "one" would have been. The casual 
tone converts even Gaskells truisms into partly personal remarks. Con­
sider, for instance, how different the effect of this exhortation would have 
been, had the narrator substituted "one" for "you": "It is a great truth, that 
you cannot extinguish violence, by violence. You may put it down for a 
time, but while you are crowing over your imaginary success, see if it does 
not return with seven devils worse than its former self!" (232). Gaskell 
evidently wants each reader to consider his or her personal responsibility to 
the people represented by the characters in the novel, as her narrators use of 
"you" in order to personalize general observations bears witness. 
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When Gaskells narrator uses the word "we," then, she is including 
the author herself and the actual reader in that plural pronoun, often 
implicitly linking author and reader with the novel s characters.u Her use of 
"we" underlines how much the narratee and the actual reader have in 
common with the speaker, as well as with those of whom she speaks. 
Describing the anxiety that preoccupies all the travellers en route to the 
Assizes in Liverpool, the narrator remarks that their emotional state says 
"little or nothing" about them in particular, "for we are all of us in the same 
predicament through life. Each with a fear and a hope from childhood to 
death" (343). Gaskells strategy is similar when she writes that "you and I, 
and almost everyone, I think, may send up our individual cry of self-
reproach" (328). Such generalizations embrace Mary Barton, as well as the 
narratee and the actual reader, reminding the receivers of the text that Mary 
and her kind inhabit a common plane of humanity with the narrator and 
themselves. 
At times, Gaskells narrator implicitly excludes the poor from her 
"we," subtly indicating that her intended audience is comfortable and well-
fed, without her having to address them specifically as such. Of Mr. Carson's 
servants, who fail to offer a hungry workman any of their plentiful food, she 
says, "they were like the rest of us, and not feeling hunger themselves, 
forgot it was possible another might" (106). The scene and its commen­
taries are reminders of the purpose of reading a social-problem novel: so that 
a complacent bourgeoisie does not forget that working people might expe­
rience physical strain which the middle classes have no occasion to share, as 
well as feeling emotional strains with which they could identify. Gaskells 
tone in such passages is consistent with the sympathetic, confidential atti­
tude she has established in her relations with the narratee. Capitalizing on 
the strong links her engaging direct address has attempted to establish 
between the narratee and herself, she again uses the pronoun "we" as she 
confronts the reader with the central moral question of the first, more 
realistic portion of the novel: "The people rise up to life; they irritate us, 
they terrify us, and we become their enemies. Then, in the sorrowful 
moment of our triumphant power, their eyes gaze on us with a mute 
reproach. Why have we made them what they are; a powerful monster, yet 
without the inner means for peace and happiness?" (220). The reproach she 
levels at herself and at us is far from being "mute," but the passage certainly 
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draws the narratees attention to the narrators sad, steady gaze as she awaits 
the actual readers looked-for response: emotional commitment to improve 
the lot of the poor, to give them that "inner means for peace and happiness" 
by expressing (and not only by experiencing) compassion for them. 
For the arousal of the actual readers sympathy is the declared aim of 
the book. Although the tension of the melodramatic trial plot may be 
effectively riveting, that part of the novel tends to deflect the particular 
kind of active empathy that Gaskell wanted most explicitly to evoke. The 
narratee may be presumed to hold his or her breath throughout the trial 
scene, to pity the catatonic Mary, and to rejoice with the triumphant Jem, 
but these characters' problems, strongly within the tradition of Gothic 
romance, end with the narrative. They flee the Old World, leaving behind 
Jems tainted reputation, the reminders of John Bartons crime, and the 
place Carlyle called "sooty Manchester." Jems merit enables their emigra­
tion to Canada, where he takes a respectable foreman's job and becomes a 
solid member of the very middle class to whom the novel is addressed. The 
end of the story runs counter to the urgent message with which the novel 
began: within the world of the fiction, all of the main characters are either 
dead or comfortably settled even though the actual reader did nothing more 
(and possibly less) than experience sympathy for them; the reader need take 
no further action in order to be able to experience the gratification of seeing 
the characters' suffering end at last. This is, of course, the limitation of all 
rhetoric as a means of intervention in real-world problems: because a novel 
is only a text, it cannot exert any material power over the actual reader. On 
the level of story, though, Mary Barton makes it manifestly clear that 
sympathetic intervention in unhappy circumstances can improve the emo­
tional state of a sufferer, for the story's closure follows from the individual 
acts of sympathy and forgiveness that accumulate throughout the plot. On 
the level of discourse, too, the engaging narrator's own interventions at­
tempt to wake the reader up to the necessity of transferring his or her 
sympathy from the characters to their counterparts in the real world. 
Perhaps the definitive example of an engaging narrative intervention 
in Mary Barton is a passage among those first realistic chapters, where the 
narrator insists that the actual reader should project some compassionate 
imagination upon his or her understanding of the lives of the poor, both in 
the novel and in the world. The passage echoes Gaskell's declaration in her 
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preface that she "bethought me how deep might be the romance" in the 
lives of people she met on the street; here, she asks readers to place them­
selves in that same position and to consider what some specific possibilities 
for that romance might be: 
But [Barton] could not, you cannot, read the lot of those who 
daily pass you by in the street. How do you know the wild 
romances of their lives; the trials, the temptations they are even 
now enduring, resisting, sinking under? You may be elbowed 
one instant by the girl desperate in her abandonment, laughing 
in mad merriment with her outward gesture, while her soul is 
longing for the rest of the dead, and bringing itself to think of 
the cold-flowing river as the only mercy of God remaining to her 
here. You may pass the criminal, meditating crimes at which 
you will to-morrow shudder with horror as you read them. You 
may push against one, humble and unnoticed, the last upon 
earth, who in Heaven will for ever be in the immediate light of 
Gods countenance. Errands of mercy—errands of sin—did you 
ever think where all the thousands of people you daily meet are 
bound? (101-102) 
The "wild romances" to which the narrator refers here represent little more 
than the condition of being human in a nineteenth-century urban environ­
ment. The open-ended ness of the possibilities she predicts for the narratee 
("you may be elbowed," "you may pass," "you may push") resists closure in a 
distinctively engaging way: these are not assertions of experiences that 
actual readers must have had in order to identify with the "you" being 
addressed, but are only suggestions for what could conceivably occur to 
anyone in Gaskell's intended audience. The intervention sketches out a 
model for ways in which the actual reader could imaginatively project life-
histories onto the strangers he or she does encounter. Although such projec­
tions would bring the actual reader no closer to knowing the realities of the 
strangers' lives, it would at least place the strangers in the same category as 
the novel's characters: they are to be seen as real people, with feelings and 
lives that could command the actual reader's sympathetic attention. The use 
of "you" in this passage—in addition to the examples of the types "you" 
may encounter in the real (as well as the fictional) world—demonstrates the 
engaging narrators attempt to extend what Elizabeth Meese calls (in an­
other context) "the play of the signifier beyond the text." 12 
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GASKELL AN D HER READERS: ABANDONIN G 
INTERVENTIO N 
To skip from Mary Barton to Gaskells late novels is to see engaging 
narrative strategies disappear from her work. Her later fictions rely on 
other, more conventionally established strategies for creating verisimilitude 
and the most sympathetic of Gaskell s critics have traditionally seen this 
shift in technique as a sign of her improving her novelistic art.13 Edgar 
Wright, for instance, makes a case for "reassessing" Gaskell as a serious 
novelist whose techniques developed in their sophistication over the course 
of her career; according to him, "the most important development is proba­
bly in the gradual shift away from use of authorial commentary" (18). 
Gaskell never articulated any theories of literary art, nor did she write or 
speak directly about her practicing narrative interventions, so we can only 
speculate about whether she considered the reduction in direct address an 
improvement over her early techniques. However, if we look at narrative 
discourse not as the product of "artistic intention" or "mastery of tech­
nique," but rather as the result of an authors choices about the relations she 
hopes to establish between her text and her actual readers, we can trace 
Gaskells abandonment of engaging interventions to a loss of faith in their 
efficacy. It came about through a loss of faith in her readers. 
Gaskell s shift in assumptions about her readers can be glimpsed in a 
letter she wrote to her friend Charles Eliot Norton in 1858, ten years after 
Mary Barton was published. In 1853 she had published Cranford, with its 
minimally characterized, first-person narrator, and Ruth, which employs a 
consistently engaging, extradiegetic narrator resembling Mary Bartons. 
After Ruth, she had written North and South, which is entirely devoid of 
direct address to a narratee, for serialization in Dickens s Household Words in 
1854-1855. Her Life of Charlotte Bronte"had appeared in 1857. As far as 
Gaskell was concerned, the biography was strictly true, and she let the 
"facts" speak for themselves: the Life, too, contains no remarks directed 
to "you." In her letter to Norton, Gaskell speaks of a painful awareness 
that was preventing her from thinking too concretely about her readers as 
she wrote: 
I can not (it is not will not) write at all if I ever think of my 
readers, and what impression I am making on them. "If they 
don't like me, they must lump me," to use a Lancashire proverb. 
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It is from no despising my readers. I am sure I don't do that, but 
if I ever let the thought or consciousness of them come between 
me and my subject I could not write at all. (Letters 503) 
"From no despising" her readers, perhaps, but rather from having learned 
to suspect their lack of sympathy, she had come to refrain from continuing 
the overt conversation between narrator and narratee in her later work. 
This attitude could be connected with the vehemence of the criticism 
of Ruth, a sympathetic fictional account of a highly idealized unwed 
mother. Enraged readers (or a public that pretended to have read it) burnt 
the book, denouncing Gaskell as an improper woman because of her choice 
of heroine. The attack was similar to that which Harriet Beecher Stowe had 
just suffered for Uncle Tom's Cabin, but Gaskell had less resilience than the 
American author, and the letters of praise that she finally received for Ruth 
did little to reassure her. As Winifred Gerin writes of Gaskell, "She was far 
too sensitive to people's opinion, to blame or praise, not to be deeply 
bruised by the public nature of [Ruth's] condemnation; she was crushed by 
the news of Bell's Library withdrawing it from circulation, and by the 
personal tone of such reviews as the Literary Gazette which deplored her 'loss 
of reputation " (139). 
Though Gaskell insisted that in spite of the painful criticism, she 
"would do every jot of it over again tomorrow," (Gerin 139), the experience 
appears to have left its mark on her narrative technique. When she was new 
to writing novels and hadn't yet tested her audiences responsiveness, both 
to her narrative interventions and to her implicit endorsement of "interven­
tionism," she had been able to try to establish an open, personal, earnest 
communion among author, narrator, characters, and reader. Mary Barton 
had drawn a sympathetic public response, on the whole, but Mary Barton is 
half romance, and never trespasses beyond the bounds of Victorian "moral" 
propriety in its treatment of the heroine. Ironically, Gaskell could employ 
her engaging narrator in realist fiction only as long as she could maintain for 
herself a fictive idea of what her audience would be like. The reading public 
had betrayed her engaging narrator's faith that actual readers would live up 
to her narratees' generous capacity for imaginative compassion. Perhaps, 
after that disappointment, Gaskell felt the need to shield herself from the 
thought of the disapproving or hard-hearted actual reader, and thus chose 
to stop making direct narrative appeals to a sympathy she could no longer 
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be sure would respond. Gaskells answer was simply to stop intervening in 
her narratives, apparently because she was convinced that intervention of 
this kind would not work. 
There was, of course, another strategic option available to the novelist 
who assumed failings on the part of narratees and actual readers: the dis­
tancing narrator, who sets up flawed narratees to tease and taunt them, to 
shame actual readers out of identifying with them. Distancing strategies, 
which tended to undermine the rhetorical goals of realism, may have been 
too metafictional to be useful to Gaskell. Furthermore, in the 1840s the 
distancing narrator was a strategy associated with male-written texts, as a 
close look at the interventions in Thackeray's Vanity Fair and Kingsley s 
Yeast will show. 
7 1 
Distancing Strategies, Irony, 
and Metafiction: 
Yeast and Vanity Fair 
CHARLES KINGSLEY S name is probably not among the first to come to mind 
in a discussion about nineteenth-century novelists and metafiction. This 
Anglican minister—whose demeanor while delivering lectures in history 
to Cambridge undergraduates was "grave as a church and earnest as an owl" 
(Huxley 113),1 whose commitment to Christian Socialism and radical prin­
ciples of reform was serious enough to impede his preferment to a bishopric 
(Huxley 28), and whose first two novels reflected his outrage at the inequi­
ties of the English class system—seems, at first glance, to be unlikely 
company for Thackeray in an arrangement of mid-century novelists. Kings­
ley has long held the reputation of an eminently earnest Victorian novelist. 
Indeed, George Eliot, who claimed that her "dominant feeling to­
ward [Kingsleys] work in general is that of high admiration" (Essays 132), 
objected to the novelists "perpetual hortative tendency." As she put it in a 
review of one of Kingsley s later novels, "He can never trust to the impres­
sion the scene itself will make on you, but true to his cloth, must always 
'improve the occasion'" (Essays 126). Eliot confessed that she would have 
liked Kingsley's novels better had he avoided his often illogical "hobby­
horse" (128) and had he not made of each character "a text to preach from" 
(129). What Eliot's review calls Kingsleys "parsonic habit" (129) in narra­
tion characterizes the image of Kingsley as novelist that survives in criti­
cism today. 
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THE "MASCULINE CHRISTIAN" AN D INTERVENTIO N 
For all his personal and parsonic earnestness, though, Kingsley also 
stands as an emblem of the "muscular" or "masculine" Christian of his era. 
The traditionally heroic ideals he propounded in his later historical ro­
mances, the militaristic patriotism he evinced in his writings on the Cri­
mean War, the outspoken stand he repeatedly took against the dangers of 
celibacy (which he feared would spread with Catholicism and Trac­
tarianism), his devotion to outdoor sport (especially shooting and fishing) 
and to the gentlemanly hobby of naturalistic study, his habit of grasping a 
scythe or pick and pitching in to work alongside his parishioners—all point 
to his public self-portrayal as a strongly masculine clergyman. His narrative 
techniques in his first "novel of protest," Yeast (1848), are gendered mas­
culine, too. In the narrators ironic stance and in the novels frequent 
excursions out of realistic conventions into highly literary self-conscious-
ness, Yeast provides a revealing contrast to Mary Barton.2 
In their origins, Yeast and Mary Barton (which was published during 
the same year that Yeast was being serialized in Fraser's Magazine) have much 
in common. Both are their authors' first novels. Both address contemporary 
class inequities, and both depict tragic consequences for upper-middle-
class families who neglect their "duty" to the impoverished classes. Both 
make some reference to Chartism (though Alton Locke, Kingsley s second 
and last novel of protest, more closely resembles Mary Barton on this 
count). Both (unlike Alton Locke) have extradiegetic narrators. And both 
authors took their inspiration from firsthand observation of the living 
conditions of the poor. Kingsley the clergyman—like Gaskell the clergy-
man's wife—had become familiar with cottagers living in conditions 
squalid enough to satisfy the reforming zeal of a Dorothea Brooke; although 
direct financial intervention in their troubles was beyond his very limited 
means, he was to argue for reforms ranging from Chartism to public 
sanitation throughout his career. 
Yeast dramatizes Kingsley s concern for various causes by tracing a 
luxury-loving dilettante's progress as he falls in love, begins to recognize 
the "condition of the poor," comes to know an admirable gamekeeper, loses 
his own fortune, and finds Christian faith. The hero's beloved fiancee dies, 
from a fever contracted while visiting impoverished tenants on her family's 
land, but the hero escapes England for a paradise even more remote than 
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Jem Wilson and Mary Bartons retreat in Canada: accompanied by his 
faithful gamekeeper friend, he follows a "prophet" to a fictional Utopia. The 
story resembles May Barton in its depiction of wretched conditions, its 
rendition of political and religious debates among characters, its attention 
to relations among the classes, and its resorting to subplots of romantic 
love, as well as in its conclusion. 
Yeast has commanded less attention than Mary Barton from readers 
and critics alike. Not a best-seller in its own day, it has enjoyed no revival 
of the sort that the gynocritical revolution has brought about for Gaskell s 
novels. What little criticism of Yeast there is has focused mainly on the 
novel's content as an indicator of its author's political or religious positions.3 
Probably no one would venture to argue that Yeast is a carefully crafted 
novel; indeed, the circumstances under which Kingsley wrote it militated 
against painstaking craftsmanship. He composed the final chapters, as his 
most recent biographer says, "under great strain," simultaneously writing, 
running his parish at Eversley without a curate, commuting to London on 
the train once a week to lecture young women on Early English Literature at 
Queens College, and maintaining an overwhelming correspondence with 
strangers seeking his spiritual and practical advice. Worse, the editors at 
Fraser's requested Kingsley to speed up the ending during the novel's 
serialization because so many readers found the work objectionable. Finish­
ing the novel brought Kingsley to a state of collapse that was to last a year, 
during which he could neither write, read, nor talk without exhausting 
himself (Chitty 112-118). Critics seeking examples of aesthetic perfection 
in form or style have dismissed Yeast as an obviously flawed piece of work. 
But looking at it from a descriptive, rather than an evaluative, position 
reveals a social-problem novel that treats issues very similar to those in 
Mary Barton while establishing a relation between text and reader that is 
quite different. For Charles Kingsley was a minister, while Elizabeth Gas­
kell was (only) a minister's wife; whereas she was writing as a woman, he was 
emphatically writing as a man. 
Writing, as Kingsley did, for serialization in a magazine, the editor 
and audience of which were unenthusiastic about the work, probably con­
tributed to the establishment of a different kind of author-reader relation­
ship from the one that dominates Gaskell's first novel. Whereas Gaskells 
narrator expresses a confidence in her narratee s sympathy which she was not 
74

DISTANCING STRATEGIES 
to lose until later in her novelistic career, Kingsley was producing install­
ments with the knowledge that not only the public but even his most 
respected colleagues disliked what he was writing.4 The tone the narrator 
takes toward "my dear readers" is understandably exasperated by the time 
he gets to the epilogue, which collapses the novels denouement in a re­
markably discursive account of the flaws the narrator expects readers to find 
in the novel (364). Even more salient in the context of this study, though, is 
the stance Kingsley s narrator takes in the early installments of Yeast, before 
he could predict readers' responses with such glum certainty. Like Gaskell s 
narrator, Kingsley s frequently intervenes, and his interventions (like hers) 
often address narratees directly. But unlike the narrator of Mary Barton, the 
narrator of Yeast is seldom, if ever, "engaging." 
To sketch out the difference: Gaskell's engaging narrator never names 
her narratee anything other than "you"; Kingsleys distancing narrator 
addresses groups such as "fair ladies" (72) or narrows down his designation 
of "you" to "reader" (19, 42, 96, 147). Gaskell's engaging narrator always 
speaks directly to "you," never referring to"the reader" in the third person; 
Kingsleys distancing narrator speaks about "my reader(s)" (18, 20, 40, 
41, 173, 269) more often than he speaks to "you, reader." The most signifi­
cant difference, however, is the contrast between the two narrators' atti­
tudes toward readers, characters, and the act of writing a novel. Whereas 
Gaskell's engaging strategy leads her to treat readers and characters as 
though they were equally real while insisting upon the veracity of what she 
writes, Kingsleys distancing approach draws the narratees attention re­
peatedly to the fictionality of the characters and the literary nature of the 
text. Kingsleys intentions may have been as solemn as Gaskell's, and his 
commitment to political reform even more earnest than hers: nevertheless, 
his novel-with-a-purpose presents itself as being a text that is explicitly 
"about" its own textuality. 
YEAST O  N YEAST: PROTEST FICTION AS 
METALITERATURE 
This self-conscious literariness surfaces most often in Yeast in two 
kinds of narrative interventions: explicit comments about the conventions 
of writing fiction, and ironic claims (sometimes separated by brackets from 
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the narrative proper) about the authors procedure in composing this novel. 
The narrative tone is set with an example of the first type. Yeast opens with a 
curiously metaliterary paragraph that firmly establishes the narrators func­
tion as the framer of the story: "As this my story will probably run counter 
to more than one fashion of the day, literary and other, it is prudent to bow 
to those fashions wherever I honestly can; and therefore to begin with a 
scrap of description" (i). The ensuing description runs briefly through a 
country landscape, a few local personages, and the hero, Lancelot Smith, 
but soon stops short for another comment on current writing conventions: 
But what is a description, without a sketch of the weather?—In 
these Pantheist days especially, when a hero or heroines moral 
state must entirely depend on the barometer, and authors talk as 
if Christians were cabbages, and a man's soul as well as his lungs 
might be saved by sea-breezes and sunshine . .  . we must have a 
weather-description. (2) 
Ironically (and perhaps, at this point, predictably), the narrator postpones 
the weather description for two and a half pages more, embarking first on a 
satirical transcript of a weather-diary Lancelot kept in his youth and then 
giving a brief history of the hero's tastes in reading. After a couple of mock-
formal apostrophes ("Draw, draw the veil and weep, guardian angel!" [4}; 
"O fathers! fathers! and you, clergymen, who monopolize education!" [5}), 
the narrator pulls himself up once again: "But where is my description of 
the weather all this time?" (5). 
Nor do these Shandean shenanigans end with the novel's opening 
pages. Later in the first chapter, the narrator still hesitates to commit 
himself to a description ("Up, into the labyrinthine bosom of the hills,— 
but who can describe them? Is not all nature indescribable?" {14]). And, 
throughout the novel, the narrator subscribes to the literary convention 
that challenges the power of language to transmit visual images. After a 
detailed, two-page delineation of one of Lancelots sketches, the narrator 
remarks, "Descriptions of drawings are clumsy things at best; the reader 
must fill up the sketch for himself by the eye of faith" (175). 
In light of so much narrative game playing, one might well wonder: 
Faith in what? Evidently, the narrator is not referring to anything like faith 
in the fictions veracity. These last two interventions resemble Gaskells 
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narrative observation on the setting of Mary Bartons opening scene, which 
would move readers "if you could see or I properly describe" it. Both 
narrators draw attention to their responsibility for rendering the setting in 
language, but nowhere does Gaskell draw comparisons between her own 
activity and that of other literary voices, as Kingsley so pointedly does in his 
novel's very first paragraph. While Gaskell s engaging narrator asks the 
narratee to draw mental comparisons between the contents of her text and 
the extra-novelistic world, Kingsley s narrator openly invites comparisons 
between his text and other texts. This strategy of underlining the novels 
status as one among many literary constructs, one that presents itself as 
resisting prevailing fashions in literature just as it challenges bourgeois 
fashions in politics, establishes a distancing narrative stance that implies: 
This novel, like other texts, is a fictional construction; this is not real. 
Kingsley s narrator reinforces this suggestion with the second kind of 
intervention I have mentioned, asides that remark upon his narrative 
choices in constructing this story. These are sometimes marked as intru­
sions by Kingsley s unusual habit of placing them in brackets to set them 
apart from the progress of the story. Still in the vein of Sterne, the narrator 
interpolates an ironic observation: "{Here, for the sake of the reader, we 
omit, or rather postpone, a long dissertation on the famous Erototheogonic 
chorus of Aristophanes s birds, with illustrations taken from . . . the Vedas 
and Proclus to Jacob Boeme and Saint Theresa]" (18); the irony is, of 
course, that the postponed dirty joke never recurs. An even more pointedly 
metaliterary example occurs in a longish bracketed paragraph in which the 
narrator exhibits the parallels between his heroine, Argemone Lavington, 
and a character in a Tennyson poem. Within this aside, Kingsley s narrator 
pretends to confess; "[I should have honored myself by pleading guilty to 
stealing much of Argemone s character from The Princess, had not the idea 
been conceived, and fairly worked out, long before the appearance of that 
noble poem]" (31) 
The reference to Tennyson is not the only instance of the narrators 
defending himself against presumed charges of plagiarism. In a more se­
rious vein, he places his hero in a squalid scene where Lancelot wanders 
"from farm to hamlet, and from field to trampers tent," in hopes of "finding 
out . .  . for himself" the answer to the "Condition-of-the-Poor question" 
(132). "Hopeless and bewildered" by the accounts he has read in "blue 
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books, red books, sanitary reports, mine reports, factory reports," Lancelot 
decides to look into the matter personally. The narrator remarks, 
What he saw, of course I must not say; for if I did the reviewers 
would declare, as usual, one and all, that I copied out of the 
Morning Chronicle; and the fact that these pages, ninety-nine 
hundredths of them at least, were written two years before the 
Morning Chronicle began its invaluable investigations would be 
contemptuously put aside as at once impossible and arrogant. I 
shall therefore only say, that he saw what every one else has seen. 
(132-133) 
Never mind that the claim of having written 99 percent of "these pages" 
over two years ago contradicts Kingsley's biographers account of the novel­
ists frantically composing the installments at the last minute to meet 
deadlines: no narrator can be held accountable for failing to speak the 
authors literal truth. Consider the rhetorical strategy of this passage, 
though. As in the evocation of Tennyson, the narrator does not defend his 
portrayal on the basis that it is drawn from life; his defense rests instead on 
the claim that he wrote it (or in the case of Argemone, "conceived" and 
"worked [it] out") before he read other written versions of similar material. 
Predicting that the novel will be criticized for being derivative, the narrator 
makes claims for the literary originality of his work without making claims 
for its authenticity. On the contrary, he closes the scene of Lancelots 
investigations with another resort to a literary parallel: "He at last ended by 
a sulky acquiescence in Sam Wellers memorable dictum: 'Who it is I cant 
say; but all I can say is, that somebody ought to be wopped for this!'" (133)-
Argemone resembles the "Princess," and Lancelot feels the way Sam Weller 
feels, because—the narrative stance seems to suggest—these figures are 
creatures of fiction. 
Yeast's rhetorical insistence on its own fictional status is logically 
inconsistent with the intended function of a novel of protest: if the charac­
ters are, as the narrator calls them, "my puppets" (367), then the world they 
inhabit must be a puppet stage and the social problems they encounter 
might be no more real than the characters are. One of the features that 
renders this novel's narrator most distancing is his refusal either to address 
or attempt to circumvent this logical dilemma. In fact, it would be fair to 
say that the narrative discourse of this text is at war with its story. 
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The distancing narrator of Yeast repeatedly places the narratee in the 
position of acknowledging that the text is a fictive creation. In one late 
passage that explains the novels title, the narrator interrupts an account of 
Lancelots developing political convictions: 
And here I beg my readers to recollect that I am in no way 
answerable for the speculations either of Lancelot or any of his 
acquaintances; and that these papers have been, from beginning 
to end, as in name so in nature, Yeast—an honest sample of the 
questions which, good or bad, are fermenting in the minds of 
the young of this day, and are rapidly leavening the minds of the 
rising generation. (269) 
Kingsley s narrator, like Gaskell's, goes on to disclaim any agreement with 
the attitudes he is reporting. But here the intervention draws attention to 
the physical textuality of the novel in the references to "these pages" and to 
the title. The narrator also emphasizes his self-consciousness about having 
invented the text: rather than pretending that Lancelot is "real," or that 
the novels contents reflect the integrity of someone's actual experience, the 
narrator transforms the character into a composite figure foreshadowing the 
controversial subjects of the "new journalism" of the 1970s. He represents 
"an honest sample" of questions that concern his generation; the narrator's 
source for the character is not firsthand observation of someone real, but 
rather a piecing together of prevailing attitudes. To be sure, this is true to 
some extent for all Victorian novelists' activity in creating characters, 
because to write novels is inevitably to invent. The difference between a 
distancing narrator such as Kingsley s and an engaging one such as Gaskell's 
lies less in the authors' real-life activity as novelists, than in the attitude 
their narrators take toward the presentation of that activity. 
Part of the pointed literariness of Kingsley s narrative stance is his 
frequent use of apostrophe, a figure which Gaskell's narrator invariably 
avoids. This 379-page novel contains at least fourteen formal apostrophes. 
Some of them invoke abstractions in the traditional apostrophic formula: 
"O Bigotry! Devil, who turnest God's love into man's curse! Are not human 
hearts hard and blind enough of themselves without thy cursed help?" 
(332); and "Blest pity! true mother of that graceless scamp, young love" 
(18). More often the apostrophes are directed to the characters, in a habitual 
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pattern that leads the narrator to raise a question in the characters mind, 
then answer it in his own voice. The pattern produces interventions closely 
resembling one another in form: "Certainly, vicar" (224); "True, Argemone" 
(41); "True, Lancelot" (144); "Not yet, Lancelot" (326); "Peace! Poor 
Lancelot!" (119). In each of these instances the narrator follows the apos­
trophe with a paragraph that discusses the characters' limitations, detail­
ing the flaws in the characters' thoughts and perceptions and guiding 
the narratee through a superior reading of the situation. Doubtless, these 
are the passages that Eliot saw as transforming Kingsley's characters 
into "text[s] to preach from." Eliot was using text in the sermonic sense of 
a quotation requiring commentary and preceding exhortation in the 
preacher's rhetorical routine. But for our purposes, Eliot's objection to 
the characters' transformation into "texts" takes on different resonances: 
the apostrophes (with the attendant exegesis) textualize the characters by 
drawing attention to the fact that they are in, and of, a text. The apos­
trophes pull the narrative focus back from the characters' consciousnesses, 
thus underscoring the distance between the characters and the commenting 
narrator. The commentary that follows the apostrophes injects a perspective 
on the characters' thoughts that places narrator and narratee in the privi­
leged position of observers who can know what the characters cannot. 
Yeast is not devoid of direct address to the narratee. But in a novel that 
consistently presents itself as a literary text, it is not surprising to find that 
many of the narrator's direct comments to the narratee refer to the composi­
tion of the novel. In this respect, the instances of direct address differ from 
the engaging strategy of imitating a conversational arrangement where the 
narrator has information she transmits to an interested narratee. An engag­
ing narrator tells her reader about "facts"; a distancing narrator talks about 
the fiction. Some of Kingsley's interventions might be taken for engaging 
addresses to the narratee, in that superficially they resemble such lines 
in Gaskells novel as "I must tell you—I must reveal the dreadful se­
cret." Kingsley gives that conversation between narrator and narratee an 
ironic twist, though, when he interpolates teasing questions: "Lord 
Michampstead was thinking of cheap bread and sugar. Do you think that I 
will tell you of what Lancelot was thinking?" (116). The question prompts 
the narratee to notice the narrator's way of telling the story—of course, the 
narrator rather gleefully does not "tell you" the hero's thoughts. 
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Again and again, the narrator disappoints the hopes he attributes to 
his narratee. In a characteristic example, he withholds information, pro­
fesses concern for the narratees desires, and then refuses to deliver what the 
narratee is supposed to want: 
Whether he was afraid of her—whether he was ashamed of 
himself or of his crutches, I cannot tell, but I dare say, reader, 
you are getting tired of all this soul-dissecting. So we will have a 
bit of action again, for the sake of variety if for nothing better. 
Of all the species of lovely scenery which England holds, 
none, perhaps, is more exquisite than the banks of the chalk-
rivers. (42) 
As the leisurely descriptiveness of this last sentence implies, the promised 
"bit of action" is put off for another couple of pages of scene painting, 
philosophizing, and plot foreshadowing. This narrator—who operates 
within the great comic tradition of Fielding and Sterne, even when, as in 
this scene, he eventually focuses his attention on the wretched living condi­
tions of the poor—delights in the game of toying with the expectations of 
his reader. The air of mutual confidence and presumed ingenuousness that 
characterizes the engaging narrator is notably absent from Yeast's passages 
of direct address. 
An engaging attitude is by no means absent from all of Kingsley s 
writing. From time to time, the narrator of Yeast embraces the narratee in a 
brotherly "we": "Do not we all learn love so?" (18); "[Lancelot] meant to 
keep his promise, as we all do" (154); "What are we all doing from morning 
to night, but setting up our own fancies as the measure of all heaven and 
earth?" (121-122). Within a framework of engaging narrative strategies, 
such questions and observations would contribute to the accumulated sense 
of similarity between the real and fictional worlds. In the context of this 
novel's distancing pattern of interventions, however, these appeals to an af­
finity between narrator, narratee, and characters do little to offset the self-
conscious literariness of the text. Furthermore, to compare this narrators 
stance toward "you" with the use of direct address in Kingsley s sermons 
and his political writing is to see that Kingsley could exploit the power of 
engaging address when he so chose.5 
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KINGSLEY AND THE PRIVILEGE TO SPEAK 
Kingsley exploited almost every public forum available to him for the 
expression of his serious convictions on social, political, and religious 
matters. He composed and delivered weekly sermons and university lec­
tures, he addressed a public pamphlet to the soldiers fighting the Crimean 
War, as "Parson Lot" he contributed pro-Chartist essays to Politics for the 
People, and in his own name he wrote on issues such as sweatshop conditions 
for Fraser's and conducted a notorious theological debate with Cardinal 
Newman for years. It is hardly surprising that in his novel Kingsley evinces 
so little urgency to say something in a serious way about real-world issues— 
his opportunities to do so elsewhere were manifold. 
Kingsley s own awareness of the privilege he enjoyed in his role as 
public speaker is revealed in a biographical detail: in private conversation, 
he suffered all his life from a severe stutter, but in the pulpit or on the 
podium he almost never stammered unless he tried to improvise. Even 
then, he had far less difficulty saying something in public than at home, and 
he attributed his success to his attempts to "remember I was not speaking 
on my own authority, but God's" (Chitty 68). In situations where he spoke 
not for God but for himself, speaking was less easy. The first time he spoke 
at a meeting in London of Chartist sympathizers, listeners were so taken 
aback by his stammer that they wondered if he might be drunk (Chitty 
123). Still, he did speak. As an Anglican minister, an official voice for 
an institution to which he was devoted, he found himself in a position 
to speak. 
It was a position a woman (even a ministers wife) could not share, a 
position that allowed Kingsley the leisure to "play" when he turned his 
attention to writing fiction. In later novels—historical romances, children's 
stories, retellings of myths, adventure tales—he indulged still more openly 
in that play than in his social-problem novels. Certainly, as George Eliot's 
review laments, Kingsley continued to maintain a preacherly stance in the 
didactic content of his narrators' remarks. But the attitude that novel 
writing is first and foremost a way to make a contribution to the world of 
literature—that a novel is, broadly speaking, an aesthetic and entertaining 
artifact, even if the novel's story fits the category of "fiction with a pur-
pose"—is already incipient in Yeast's pattern of distancing interventions. 
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PUNCH AND THE PUPPET MASTER: WHO IS 
SPEAKING IN VANITY FAIR? 
Could Kingsley have been thinking of Thackeray when he wrote in 
Yeast of "our most earnest and genial humorist, who is just now proving 
himself also our most earnest and genial novelist" (20)? The accompanying 
allusion to a coarse-mannered baronet, who is almost certainly Thackeray's 
Pitt Crowley, implies that Kingsley did have Thackeray in mind. 
To think of Thackeray as a "genial" novelist is to join the ranks of 
readers and critics who have enjoyed the loquacious humor of Vanity Fairs 
narrator. Unlike Kingsley s, this narrator has recently been a magnet for 
positive critical attention, as focusing on the narrator has become the 
typical strategy for defenders of Thackeray's art. As Michael Sundell ex­
plained the situation over fifteen years ago: 
Sympathetic, scholarly, and otherwise sensible critics continue 
to be thrown off balance by outdated attacks on [Thackeray's] 
cynicism or sentimentality, on his authorial intrusions, and 
even on his intelligence. Too often they fight again the critical 
battles which have already been won, conveying the impression 
that Thackeray still needs to be proven artistically respectable. 
In defending him, some concentrate excessively on the narrative 
brilliance of Vanity Fair, which only an ideologue or a fool could 
deny. (514) 
Sundell is certainly right to question critics' continued defensiveness about 
the obviously brilliant narrative manipulations of Vanity Fair. And yet, 
surely not every critic who returns to the debate over how the narrator 
operates is merely tilting with ideologues and fools. Discussion of the 
Vanity Fair narrator circles around disagreements over the novel's many-
layered structure of ironies. With its simultaneous floutings and exploita­
tions of novelistic convention, this "novel without a hero" has long been 
seen as fundamentally ironic.6 
What, then, could Kingsley have meant by calling its author an 
"earnest" novelist? The appellation hardly makes sense unless, indeed, 
Kingsley s narrator is not speaking in earnest himself. To be earnest is to be 
determined, eager, zealous, serious, to show deep sincerity or feeling, to 
treat one's subject matter as vitally important, not trivial or petty. When a 
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novelist creates a narrator who presents himself as "Manager of the Perfor­
mance" of a puppet play, who implies that he is a "quack" (objecting, as 
he surveys Vanity Fair, to the "other quacks, plague take them!" [33]), and 
who is depicted in many of the novelist's own illustrations as strongly 
resembling a Punch puppet himself, the novelist is obviously not "in 
earnest." And though Kingsley may have genuinely considered Thackeray 
to be "earnest" as well as "genial," Dickens was the first among many 
commentators who have "regretted Thackeray's feigning of a 'want of ear­
nestness'" (Olmsted xiii). The narrators self-presentation in "Before the 
Curtain," the illustrations, and the frequent narrative interventions in 
Vanity Fair combine to subvert any earnestness this novel might have 
demonstrated. What could be less vitally important, more trivial and 
petty, than the activities or observations of puppets? 
And yet, constructed as it is on this basic assumption, the novel 
repeatedly dismantles its own foundations by making the characters' activi­
ties matter, by infusing enough life into them to have inspired numerous 
critical debates of the kind that treat characters as though they were real 
people. And the narrator, though he may sometimes look like the clownish, 
silent Punch, has plenty to say, much of it sounding zealous and serious 
enough. Indeed, many of Thackeray's early, more hostile critics took the 
narrator's comments to represent Thackeray's own moral standards, which 
for decades constituted the center of debate over the value of his novels.7 
Thackeray criticism continually returns to a set of questions which 
an appreciation for distancing strategies might help resolve. From the be­
ginning, Vanity Fairs interpreters and evaluators considered whether Van­
ity Fair is an example of the kind of moral "history" Thackeray's narrator 
and his journalistic personae argued novels should be.8 If Vanity Fair is, 
on the one hand, a work of realistic moral fiction, why does the narrator 
"repeatedly shatter the illusion by flaunting the inauthenticity of his fic­
tions?" (Segel, "Truth and Authenticity" 55). Or, on the other hand, "If 
Thackeray's preaching does not lead to moral clarification for the reader, 
why does he offer his text as a sermon?" (Rawlins 172). What, in brief, is 
the textually encoded relation between this novel and its audience's real 
world? In the past two decades, Thackeray's critics have answered each of 
these questions positively and ingeniously; typically they conclude that 
Vanity Fair is, in the final analysis, a realistic and didactic text that makes 
its moral points about the world by maintaining a special, intimate relation 
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between the chatty narrator and his readers.9 Of the recent arguments that 
seek to demonstrate how Vanity Fairs realism operates, Wolfgang Iser's is 
doubtless the most sophisticated and influential. I want, therefore, to point 
to some problems posed by Iser's essay on Vanity Fair that it shares with 
most critical work on Thackeray's narrators. The basic difficulty is this: to 
use Vanity Fair as a model for realistic narrative techniques is to run into 
logical inconsistencies and to overlook this novel's fundamentally ironic, 
metafictional nature. 
In Vanity Fair, Iser comments, "the narrator regulates the distance 
between reader and events" (106) and "the reader is continually placed at a 
distance from the characters" (108). Iser's complex argument isolates the 
"esthetic effect" of this novel in the activity the narrator continually assigns 
to the "reader," who is supposed to maintain a critical distance from the 
characters and events, supply personal judgments where the narrators 
ironic or contradictory statements leave "empty spaces" (106), and ulti­
mately turn those critical judgments "back upon himself" (119). Choosing 
Vanity Fair as his sole example of the "realistic novel," Iser emphasizes that 
this text's realism inheres not in its contents but in its effect, which "de­
pends on activating the reader's critical faculties so that he may recognize 
the social reality of the novel as a confusing array of sham attitudes, and 
experience the exposure of this sham as the true reality" (112). Iser observes 
that the novel therefore "remains as 'real' now as it was" in 1848, because 
"In Vanity Fair it is not the slice of life, but the means of observing it that 
constitute the reality" (119-120). 
Iser's choice of Vanity Fair as his model for the reader's role in realism 
is, however, problematic. Of all the canonic English novels of the realist 
period, Vanity Fair is the one that makes the least pretense of presenting a 
slice of life: as "Before the Curtain" makes clear, the novel is only a slice of 
a fair—a festive time and place where the participants are absorbed in 
"playing out" roles donned for the occasion. The "bullies . . . bucks . . . 
knaves . . . policemen . . . and yokels" are held up for observation along­
side the "actors and buffoons." And the Manager of the Performance sug­
gests that this slice of a fair will be doubly enacted, because the characters 
filling these roles will be played by puppets. Iser does not ignore this 
metafictional framing of Vanity Fair. He acknowledges that the narrators 
"reliability is reduced by the fact that he is continually donning new masks: 
(105) ranging from the Manager, to a novelist, to a character relating a story 
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that he overheard in conversation. Because Iser is trying to account for this 
text as an example of realism, he is forced into a perplexing conclusion 
about the effect of this "Protean narrator": "If the narrator is an independent 
character, clearly separated from the inventor of the story, the tale of the 
social aspirations of the two girls Becky and Amelia takes on a greater 
degree of objectivity, and indeed one gains the impression that this social 
reality is not a mere narration but actually exists" (106). But, as Iser seems 
rather suddenly to forget, this narrator is usually not "an independent 
character." In order for an actual reader to get the impression that Vanity 
Fairs social reality "actually exists," he or she would have to overlook, as 
Iser here does, those parts of the narrative frame that do identify the 
narrator with "the inventor of the story." 
Iser goes to some length to show that his reader s sense of Vanity Fair as 
real arises from the narrators habit of offering alternative assessments of 
characters motives and morals, and letting the reader choose or fill in the 
definitive judgment for "himself" (i 17-119). His argument for the novels 
effect of reality rests, too, on the observation that as the reader begins to 
realize "for himself the extent to which consideration of personal gain 
shapes the natural impulses of human conduct, . . . the difference between 
the reader and the characters in the novel is eliminated" (115-116). The 
first of these two realistic effects—the personal investment in a story that 
one has partly helped to create—would be more clearly illustrated, I think, 
by analysis of an engaging narrators open-ended questions to a narratee. 
Thackeray's distancing narrator appears to offer alternatives among which a 
narratee might choose. But the narrators irony, which often slides into 
bitter sarcasm, ususally makes it tolerably clear which judgment a flawed 
narratee would make and which one a self-respecting actual reader is sup­
posed to want to make. And, as Iser acknowledges, by the end of the novel 
the "correct" reading becomes explicitly clear (112). The open-endedness is 
an illusion, just as the narratee who can't tell which option to choose is a 
fictive figure. 
The point in Iser s argument where the conflation of the reader and the 
narratee poses the biggest problem, though, is the second of those realistic 
effects, the idea that the reader will "reflect on his own situation" while 
reading. Iser assumes that the reader will find himself guilty of the ego­
centricity and greed for which he has been censuring the characters, and 
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thus will recognize that differences between reader and characters are 
"eliminated." In this context Iser describes the concept of a narratee with­
out distinguishing it from an implied reader; "Just as the author divides 
himself up into the narrator of the story and the commentator on the events 
in the story, the reader is also stylized to a certain degree, being given 
attributes which he may either accept or reject' (114). This precisely defines 
the practice of the distancing narrator, who characterizes narratees so com­
pletely as to place a necessary distance between them and actual readers. 
Iser, however, denies this distance; "Whatever happens, [the reader] will be 
forced to react to those ready-made qualities ascribed to him" (114). True, 
the narratee might be forced to react: as a function of the text, a narratee is 
entirely under the authors control. But an actual reader cannot be forced by 
a text to do anything. The power struggle between the distancing narrator 
and his narratees may prompt the actual reader to step back even further 
from the fictional world, to maintain the distance that the novel's metafic­
tional frame has already established. 
In Vanity Fair that distance dominates the implicit relation between 
the narratee and the actual reader. The narrator's stance toward the narratee, 
the characters, and the act of narration fits the distancing model of humor­
ous metalepsis; the narrator moves himself and his narratees inside and 
outside the diegesis with unpredictably unsettling glee. In addition to the 
ironies he raises in his addresses to narratees, Thackeray's narrator pushes 
the metafictional potential of the realist novel to the limit. He does so 
primarily by making a game of one central, difficult question for realist 
fiction: Who is speaking? 
Who indeed? In "Before the Curtain" the narrator refers to "the 
Manager of the Performance" in the third person, alternating these refer­
ences with a more personal "I" (33-34). Yet the Manager takes credit for 
the ensuing spectacle, and "acknowledge(s) the kindness with which it 
has been received" (34). Is this "Manager," then, the author? The puppet 
master? A preacher in motley? Another puppet? A customer at the fair?10 
He implies, as I have mentioned, that he is a "quack" (33); later, the 
narrator addresses his audience as "brother wearers of motley," adding that 
his object is "to walk with you through the fair" (229). At the beginning of 
the sixth chapter he is a "piper," and the accompanying illustration shows a 
recorder-wielding Punch hypnotizing a small animal with his "mild tune" 
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(88). As Janice Carlisle has pointed out, Thackeray's line drawings for the 
original edition depict the narrator sometimes with a clowns face, some­
times as Punch, and even (at the end of Chapter 9, entitled "Family 
Portraits") as a befuddled-looking caricature of William Makepeace 
Thackeray with a comic mask and a clowns staffin his lap (Carlisle 36-39). 
At times the narrator pretends to distinguish himself from his creator. He 
says that the cover illustration of a "moralist" (a thin and therefore dis­
tinctly un-Thackeray-like orator in clowns garb) is "an accurate portrait of 
your humble servant" (95), but makes no reference beyond the sly chapter 
title to the cartoon of the novelist in Chapter 9. 
As this changeable narrator introduces characters he places them and 
himself on a stage, asking leave "as a man and a brother . . . occasionally to 
step down from the platform, and talk about them: if they are good and 
kindly, to love them and shake them by the hand: if they are silly, to laugh 
at them confidentially in the readers sleeve" (117). (Building upon the 
many layers of irony, this passage placing the narrator and characters on a 
public stage occurs in a chapter called "Private and Confidential.") But at 
the end of the novel, the actors shrink down into puppets that the narrator 
shuts into a box (797). The narrator, like the characters, is a chameleon: 
existing on many different diegetic levels, adopting the appearances of 
many different figures, he differentiates himself from any one real person or 
fictional character. His shifting identity accentuates his fictive status. 
So, too, does the brief reference to the narrator's having met the 
characters at the imaginary town of Pumpernickel. In this scene he places 
himself for the first time among the principal participants in Vanity Fair, 
recording the crowd's observations of Amelia, Jos, Dobbin, and their party. 
This is also one of the few passages where the narrator pretends to claim that 
his story is true: "It was on this very tour that I, the present writer of a 
history of which every word is true, had the pleasure to see them first, and to 
make their acquaintance" (721). Coming as it does so late in the narrative, 
the assertion is obviously a joke: all the references to puppets, plays, and 
pipers make the truth of this history highly unlikely. The claim also casts 
doubt on the narrators authority for reporting "truly" on the private 
thoughts of all the characters. The narrator has already made a Shandean 
witticism about the possibility of proving the novel's truth through exam­
ining its temporal structure. Reversing Tristram's perplexities about how 
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much longer it takes to narrate events than to enact them, Thackeray's 
narrator claims, 
And if you calculate the time for the above dialogue to take 
place—the time for Briggs and Firkin to fly to the drawing-
room—the time for Miss Crawley to be astonished and to drop 
her volume . . .—and the time for her to come downstairs— 
you will see how exactly accurate this history is, and how Miss 
Crawley must have appeared at the very instant when Rebecca 
had assumed the attitude of humility. (188) 
An absurdly humorous suggestion, this calculation would only reinforce 
the sense of this scene's carefully orchestrated resemblance to a meticulously 
timed stage farce. And the narrator's suggestion raises more questions about 
the history's truth-status than it can answer: if these actions "really" took 
this precise amount of time, how does the narrator know? 
Sometimes the narrator offers authenticating sources for his informa­
tion, such as the Peeping-Tom, eavesdropping footman at Lord Steyne's, 
Tom Eaves. The sources are not always such minor characters; at one point 
the narrator claims that Dobbin supplied him with a small detail: "The 
bride was dressed in a brown silk pelisse (as Captain Dobbin has since 
informed me)" (259). To claim a source for so minor—and, for that matter, 
so public—a detail, when hundreds of pages' worth of information goes 
unattributed, is to spoof the very idea that there could be anything true 
about this history.n 
When he pretends to be the gatherer and reporter, rather than the 
creator, of his facts, the narrator draws attention to their fictionality only 
indirectly. But he is not always so coy about his position. Early on, he 
admits that he can report Joss thoughts of Becky because "novelists have 
the privilege of knowing everything" (62). The narrator even more point­
edly asserts the novelist's unique perspective on Rebecca herself: "If, a few 
pages back, the present writer claimed the privilege of peeping into Miss 
Amelia Sedley's bedroom, and understanding with the omniscience of the 
novelist all the gentle pains and passions which were tossing upon that 
innocent pillow, why should he not declare himself to be Rebecca's confi­
dant too?" (192). Accordingly, he proceeds to reveals Becky's thoughts. 
"The omniscience of the novelist" is precisely the issue here: it is a 
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perspective that can only exist in fiction, can never be duplicated in life or 
even in the writing of history, and is inevitably the source of any hetero­
diegetically narrated novel. With this fact in mind, I find it odd that Iser 
claims "it is not the slice of life" in Vanity Fair but "the means of observing 
it that constitutes the reality." Why try to reconcile Thackeray's jubilant 
jumble of narrative claims with the label of "reality"?12 There is nothing 
literally realistic about the omniscient perspective, despite the fact that it is 
regarded as a convention of literary realism. But his chameleon narrator's 
insistence on his own fictive nature and on the powers accompanying his 
status provides constant reminders that the "means of observing" in this 
novel is as fictitious as the "slice of life" it observes. Thackeray's fiction 
points again and again to its own fictionality. The one real aspect of the 
"means of observing" in such a novel is the fact that actual readers really 
have to exercise memory and imagination to read it, similar to the reading 
activity Iser describes. But this is true of all narrative texts, not only of 
realist novels. Iser seems to reverse the novel's relation to realism when he 
claims that "Vanity Fair aims not at presenting social reality, but at present­
ing the way in which such reality can be experienced" (113). The novel's 
story is full of details representing "social reality": meticulous descriptions 
of costume and setting, elaborately represented dialogues, and humorous 
and serious analyses of relations among the classes, to give just a few 
examples. The mode of experiencing reality that the text presents is the 
most fictive thing about it. 
In another context (that of the novel's ending), Ina Ferris has per­
suasively argued that "Thackeray's realist resistance to ending leads finally 
to a transgression of the logic of realism itself. The uneasy nineteenth-
century ending . . . may well be less a gesture of realist fidelity than of anti-
realist dissent" (290). Vanity Fairs narrative interventions are, it seems to 
me, a complex expression of antirealist dissent, a continual reframing and 
rephrasing of the impossibilities inherent in realist fiction. Despite the fact 
that Thackeray's story draws on so many conventions of the realist novel, 
sometimes subverting them and sometimes using them straight, the dis­
course of this novel consistently draws away from realism and into metafic­
tion. The ironic distance this inevitably places between the actual reader 
and the contents of the text is reproduced in the narrators stance toward his 
narratees. The narrator repeatedly attempts to startle the actual reader out 
of slipping into communion with the numerous narratees in the text. 
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DISTANCING STRATEGIES AND "MY READERS" 
The question of "distance"—as Iser's analysis shows—is not easily 
resolvable for Vanity Fair. Commentators have usually taken it for granted 
that Thackeray's narrator, while placing a distance between himself and his 
characters, establishes a close relation with his reader. This sense of inti­
macy is, for example, in the background of Iser's assumptions about the 
novel; it is also one basis for Robert Polhemus s account of the satirically 
comic effect of Vanity Fair. As Polhemus puts it, Thackeray uses the nar­
rator "to create a psychic distance from experience and characters necessary 
to satiric comedy and also to establish an intimacy between performer and 
audience." This intimacy, bringing narrator and reader together, paradoxi­
cally serves to distance the reader from the fiction; the closeness of the 
narrator and reader encourages the reader to view Vanity Fair with an eye as 
skeptical as the narrators and (according to Polhemus) to withhold any 
sympathy "that would distract us for long from the corrupt farce of Vanity 
Fair as a whole" (152). Some actual readers might disagree with this conclu­
sion about the satire s effect. Anyone who has led a class discussion of Vanity 
Fair knows that despite all the narrators antics, some readers ("touched," 
like Becky, "in spite of [themselves]" [366]) cheer for Becky when she flings 
Johnsons Dictionary back at Miss Pinkertons Academy, some are moved by 
Rawdon Crawley's developing affection for his son, and some yearn with 
Dobbin for his ultimate marriage to Amelia. Still, what's at issue here is the 
narrators strategy, not its actual effects. Just as the narrator's irony can fail 
to obliterate actual readers' sympathies for the characters, his conspiratorial 
intimacy with his narratee is far from consistent. In fact, the narrator sets 
up numerous inscribed readers only to knock them down like the puppets 
that are his characters, leaving the actual reader no solid footing vis a vis 
the text. 
Thackeray's narrative strategies run the gamut of ways to create dis­
tance between the actual reader and the narratee. The first of these is his 
commenting to narratees who are named. A narratee may have a name as 
specific as "Miss Smith," as the narrator calls the generically envious woman 
reader who is unimpressed by Amelias reluctance to rebel against Georges 
faithlessness: "I know Miss Smith has a mean opinion of her. But how 
many, my dear Madam, are endowed with your prodigious strength 
of mind?" (292). The flawed narratee—impatient, unsympathetic, and 
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prudish—is sometimes addressed without a proper name, simply as 
"madam": 
a polite public will no more bear to read an authentic descrip­
tion of vice than a truly refined English or American female will 
permit the word breeches to be pronounced in her chaste hear­
ing. And yet, madam, both are walking the world before our 
faces every day, without much shocking us. If you were to blush 
every time they went by, what complexions you would have! 
(737-738) 
In both examples, the narrator begins with a third-person reference to the 
figure embodying objectionable attitudes, "Miss Smith" and "a truly re­
fined . . . female." Both references turn, though, to direct address, im­
plicating narratees in the readerly crimes. The strategy is to embarrass 
actual readers who do share the narratee's feelings of impatience or prud­
ishness out of identifying with these objects of the narrators scorn. 
Thackeray's narrator can use this strategy simply and directly, as in his 
defense of Beckys "setting her cap" at Jos: "I don't think, ladies, we have 
any right to blame her" (31), or in his sugar-coated but unmistakably bitter 
attack on yet another unsympathetic lady reader who judges Amelia for her 
tenderheartedness: "My dear Miss Bullock, I do not think your heart would 
break in this way" (219). 
Even more frequently, the narrator names figures of readers whom he 
does not deign to address. Strictly speaking, these are not really narratees. If 
the narratee is the figure to whom the narrator is speaking, these are third 
parties to that transaction, objects under discussion in the narrative conver­
sation. In this respect they resemble characters, but they exist on a diegetic 
level separate from the world of Becky and Amelia, because they are repre­
sented as reading about that world, not participating in it. The most 
famous of these named readers is probably "JONES, who reads this book at 
his Club" and "will pronounce [it] to be excessively foolish, trivial, twad­
dling, and ultra-sentimental." The narrator emphasizes Jones s character-
like status while having some fun with this readers inappropriate attitude: 
Yes, I can see Jones at this minute (rather flushed with his joint 
of mutton and half-pint of wine) taking out his pencil and 
scoring under the words "foolish, twaddling," etc., and adding 
to them his own remark of "quite true." Well, he is a lofty man of 
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genius, and admires the great and heroic in life and novels; and 
so had better take warning and go elsewhere. (43-44) 
Occurring in the novels first chapter, this remarkably metafictional move 
supplies an amusing portrait of a bad reader to instruct us on how not to 
read the novel. What's wrong with Jones is not his objection to sentiment; 
the narrator obviously disavows any faith in straight-faced, earnest senti­
mentality. Jones's problem is that in his eagerness to find the "great and 
heroic" in the book he does not recognize the distanced position the narra­
tor offers on the "foolish, twaddling" parts. While Jones underlines the 
words, the actual reader, standing at a comfortable distance, can laugh. 
The narratee s position in the passage is less comfortably clear. Who is the 
narratee here? Perhaps the narratee gets the joke at Jones's expense, or 
perhaps the narratee is presumed to share Jones's prejudice. In such a 
questionable situation, the actual reader might hesitate to identify with the 
narratee, since that figure may be inscribed as a poor reader. 
Vanity Fair is full of such shifting references to readers who may or 
may not represent the narratee. Opening Chapter 12, "Quite a Sentimental 
Chapter," with a sketch of another superficial reader, the narrator quotes 
her before twitting her: "We don't care a fig for [Amelia], writes some 
unknown correspondent with a pretty little handwriting and a pink seal to 
her note. 'She is fade and insipid,' and adds some more kind remarks in this 
strain, which I should never have repeated at all, but that they are in truth 
prodigiously complimentary to the young lady whom they concern" (146). 
The intervention proceeds to detail "similar remarks by good-natured fe­
male friends" that "the beloved reader, in his experience of society" is likely 
to have heard. Here, the "beloved reader" is pointedly inscribed as male. 
The narratee, then, must either be a man who recognizes the hypocritical 
back-biting typical of the kind of woman the narrator has in mind, or a 
person, male or female, who doesn't "care a fig for [Amelia]" and therefore 
must take the criticism the narrator directs at the "unknown correspon­
dent" and all her "good-natured" sisters. An actual reader who is female has 
no choice but to be distanced by this intervention; an actual reader who is 
male can form a positive link between himself and the narratee only by 
agreeing with the passages bitter attitude toward female friendships. 
And, lest the male reader should get too comfortable in his relation to 
the narrator, the sarcasm is turned against him later in this strikingly 
unsentimental chapter. Discussing Amelia's "blind devotion" to George, 
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the narrator remarks, "It is in the nature and instinct of some women. Some 
are made to scheme, and some to love; and I wish any respected bachelor 
that reads this may take the sort that best likes him" (153). Like most of the 
narrators comments, this one is ironic: if you read the phrase "that best 
likes him" in the archaic sense of "that he likes best," the wish is a pleasant 
one. But if you interpret the phrase in its modern sense, that is, "the type 
that likes him the best," it takes on a sardonic edge. The narrators wish for 
his modern bachelor-reader is that he will end up with the sort of woman 
who finds him most attractive, be she loving or scheming. 
If this narrator is intimate with his readers, it is an intimacy charac­
terized by teasing, bantering, and needling that constantly moves in one 
direction: only the narrator can tease, for the narratee and the actual reader 
have no opportunity, as it were, to answer in kind. As Roger Wilkenfeld 
observes, 
Much of the power of Vanity Fair resides in Thackeray's tough 
perception that there is an inevitable separation between the 
artist who creates and the readers and spectators who look. The 
artist may provide any number of imaginative access routes to 
his show but when he chooses to "shut up the box" he does not 
wait for a signal to act. We who have been metaphorically 
associated with "yokels" are finally identified as "patrons" but 
the nominal substitution is no more consoling than the dis­
placement of one engraved fool by another. (318) 
Though he does present himself at times as an "engraved fool," the narrator 
has all the power. The narratee, on the one hand, must submit to sardonic 
criticism (or, as Iser puts it, is "forced to react to those qualities ascribed to 
him"). The actual reader, on the other hand, is consistently placed at a 
distance, outside the combative exchange between narrator, inscribed read­
ers, and narratees. 
As often as the narrator refers to "readers" as the objects of his com­
ments, rather than the receivers of what he has to say, he also speaks 
surprisingly often to "you." Despite all the references to "the astonished 
reader" (506), "the respected reader" (359), "the beloved reader" (159), 
"the good-natured reader" (87), "the observant reader" (159), "some carp­
ing reader" (147), or "every reader of a sentimental turn" (186), the narrator 
is not incapable of addressing a reader directly. In the context of the 
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narrator's sarcasms and jokes at his narratees' expense, though, even the 
most potentially engaging passages of direct address represent distancing 
moves on the narrators part. Typically the Vanity fair narrators addresses to 
"you" are either sarcastic or accusatory. 
We have already seen examples of sarcasm in the narrators third-
person references to his "readers," and the tone carries over into speeches 
directed at them as well. For instance, his advice to "young ladies" directly 
reverses his admiration for Amelias "weakness," so evident elsewhere in the 
text: "Be shy of loving frankly; never tell all you feel, or (a better way still), 
feel very little. . . . [N}ever have any feelings which may make you uncom­
fortable, or make any promises which you cannot at any required moment 
command and withdraw. This is the way to get on, and be respected, and 
have a virtuous character in Vanity Fair" (220). The obvious verbal irony of 
such wise counsel to the narratee casts a shadow over other passages in the 
novel that might, in a different context, look engaging. When Thackeray's 
narrator says "You and I, my dear reader" (453) the actual reader might be 
supposed to wish to identify with this beloved narratee. Yet the narrator has 
so often used terms of endearment ironically that they take on a permanent 
taint of sarcasm. The narratee might be happy to have the narrator salute 
him as "my dear," but the actual reader attentive to textual strategies will 
be more cautious: he or she must reconsider the tenor of that phrase when 
the narrator—so unremittingly critical, in story as in discourse, of Becky 
Sharp—refers to her in her most unloveable moments as "our dear Becky" 
(593) or "our beloved Rebecca" (557). Considering the pall of sarcasm 
Thackeray's narrator throws over the adjectives "beloved" and "dear," we 
should not be surprised that earnest novelists like Gaskell and Stowe sel­
dom, if ever, address a "dear reader": Thackeray ruined the phrase for 
serious use. 
When he is more in earnest, Thackeray's narrator is perhaps even less 
engaging. He openly criticizes narratees for behavior that has nothing to do 
with reading novels; on matters extratextual as well as textual, he speaks to 
narratees who are hopelessly flawed. He accuses the narratee of tormenting 
little boys by sending them to boarding school: "Who feels injustice; who 
shrinks before a slight; who has a sense of wrong so acute, and so glowing a 
gratitude of kindness, as a generous boy? and how many of those gentle 
souls do you degrade, estrange, torture, for the sake of a little loose arith­
metic, and miserable dog-Latin?" (77). Considering the degrading experi­
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ences Dobbin undergoes in the setting of a boys' school—not to mention 
Thackeray's own notoriously unhappy memories of his boarding-school 
experience—there is no reason to read this passage as pure sarcasm. But the 
actual reader who is not a sadist will automatically be distanced from 
the narratee in the passage. If the reader has no connection to any boys, he or 
she will deflect the question as irrelevant to actual circumstances; if he 
or she manages boys' educations through another medium than boarding 
school, the reader can consider the question to be directed to someone else, a 
narratee who is not the actual reader. And the reader who does send boys to 
boarding school is unlikely to want to equate that with the decision to 
"degrade, estrange, torture" them. In any case, the actual reader is actively 
discouraged from identifying with the narratee. 
In less drastic instances, too, the narrator continually badgers the 
narratee for presumed faults. Usually they are moral or ethical errors that 
the narratee is imagined to share with the characters (and sometimes with 
the narrator himself). These failings include the respectable characters' 
willingness to socialize with Lord Steyne despite his deservedly terrible 
reputation: "In a word, everybody went to wait upon this great man— 
everybody who was asked: as you the reader (do not say nay) or I the writer 
hereof would go if we had an invitation" (553). Or the Crawleys' humoring 
their unpleasant but wealthy aunt: "You yourself, dear sir, forget to go to 
sleep after dinner, and find yourself all of a sudden (though you invariably 
lose) very fond of a rubber" (124). Or Becky Sharp's behavior as she sinks 
even lower into a life of degradation: "The actions of very vain, heartless, 
pleasure-seeking people are very often improper (as are many of yours, my 
friend with the grave face and spotless reputation; but that is merely by the 
way); and what are those of a woman without faith—or love—or charac­
ter?" (738). In each of these examples, the narrator forces the narratee to 
acknowledge similarities between the erring characters and himself. The 
relation between narrator and narratee is perfectly summed up in the nar-
rator's dictum: "do not say nay." It would be possible, of course, to read 
these passages as serious exhortations that are meant to jolt actual readers 
into awareness of their own culpability in the foibles of Vanity Fair: Iser, 
Carlisle, and other critics certainly read them this way. But in the context of 
the novel's pattern of distancing interventions—the metafictional frame, 
the changing identity of the narrator, the sardonic dismissals of bad readers 
and the sarcastic comments to "you"—the nature of these accusatory pas­
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sages seems to shift. Perhaps the narrator is no more in earnest in these little 
speeches than elsewhere in the text, perhaps the actual reader is no more 
obliged to identify with these narratees than with "Miss Smith" or 
"JONES," perhaps the novels distancing machinery lets the actual reader 
oflFthe hook. Perhaps the novel is no more than a puppet show depicting a 
fair—maybe it is all for fun. 
WHAT NOVEL WRITIN G IS FOR: THACKERAY'S GAME 
In his characteristically metafictional mood, Thackeray's narrator 
takes a moment to discuss the kind of novel he is writing and to contrast it 
with a few of the more popular forms of nineteenth-century fiction. This 
meditation is introduced by the passage in which the narrator draws atten­
tion to his responsibility as entertainer, confessing, "I know that the tune I 
am piping is a mild one." Playing into the narratee s supposed preference for 
excitement, he immediately adds, "(although there are some terrific chap­
ters coming presently)" (87). Before embarking on his account of unre­
markable occurrences at Vauxhall, the narrator catalogues the choices the 
novelist has rejected among alternative settings for this story: 
We might have treated this subject in the genteel, or in the 
romantic, or in the facetious manner. Suppose we had laid the 
scene in Grosvenor Square. . . . {O}r instead of the supremely 
genteel, suppose we had resorted to the entirely low, and 
described what was going on in Mr. Sedleys kitchens. . . . 
Or if, on the contrary, we had taken a fancy for the terrible, 
and made the lover of the new femme de chambre a professional 
burglar . .  . we should easily have constructed a tale of thrilling 
interest, through the fiery chapters of which the reader should 
hurry, panting. (88) 
The ellipses in the quotation represent details the narrator supplies for each 
of these possible kinds of novels, demonstrating, in a sentence or two for 
every option, his imaginative capacity to operate within all of the genres he 
suggests. "But," the narrator concludes, 
my readers must hope for no such romance, only a homely story, 
and must be content with a chapter about Vauxhall, which is so 
short that it scarce deserves to be called a chapter at all. And yet 
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it is a chapter, and a very important one too. Are not there little 
chapters in everybody's life, that seem to be nothing, and yet 
affect all the rest of the history? 
Let us then step into the coach with the Russell Square 
party, and be off to the gardens. There is barely room between 
Jos and Miss Sharp. (88) 
At first glance, this intervention appears to be a claim for the realism of 
Vanity Fair. It could have been a romance or a sensation-novel, a Silver Fork 
or Newgate blockbuster, but it is not; it merely treats the ordinary experi­
ences of unexceptional characters. The argument takes the point a step 
further with the comparison of this chapter to those "little chapters in 
everybody's life" that turn out to have greater consequences in one's "his­
tory" than one might have expected. This fiction is like life, the interven­
tion implies, and what's more, life—divided here into "chapters" as novels 
are—is like fiction. 
At the same time, though, the passage emphasizes one respect in 
which fiction is definitely not like life: the fiction is under the novelists 
arbitrary control and operates at his pleasure. I like the narrative "we" in 
this excerpt: it joins the narrator and the novelist into a unified figure who 
gets to choose what kind of a story Vanity Fair will be, what kinds of details 
it will convey, and what kind of denouement it will have. This figure 
mounts the stage here to remind the readers that it is, indeed, a stage. The 
transition from the intervention back to the action further emphasizes the 
fictionality of the narrative, as the narrator invites us to try to squeeze into 
the coach between Jos and Becky. We cannot. For all the narrators pre­
tended claims to the contrary, life and fiction are two separate realms—as 
the narrator knows very well and will not allow the actual reader to forget. 
When, at the end of the novel, Thackeray's narrator steps back again 
from the fiction to say, "Come children, let us shut up the box and the 
puppets, for our play is played out" (797), the move is hardly surprising. 
The novel has been an entertainment—a moral play, perhaps, but a play 
nonetheless. In order to grasp the radical difference between Thackeray's 
distancing narrative strategies and Gaskell's engaging approach, one need 
only consider how unthinkable it would be for Gaskell's narrator to refer to 
John and Mary Barton, Jem Wilson, and Job Legh as "puppets." Even if she 
were to use it metaphorically, the image would obliterate her consistent 
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treatment of her characters as "real," autonomous people. Thackeray's ap­
proach, like Kingsley s, is more playful. The distancing narrator represents 
the male authors access to a metaliterary realm, where novels refer to 
themselves and to other novels, as much as (or, in these cases, more than) 
they refer to life. As I argue in Chapter 7, it is no coincidence that the 
Victorian authors who took access to that playful realm in their texts 
were male. 
What is Thackeray's game? Kingsley is not, after all, the only reader 
to have considered him "earnest": one camp of twentieth-century critics 
persists in taking the narrators preacher pose seriously, treating the exhor­
tative passages as though they were straightforwardly moralistic messages 
for the edification of "the reader."13 The self-mockery implied by the 
preacher's presenting himself in motley, however, should not be over­
looked. This narrator is only playing preacher, as he is playing historian, 
and as his characters are playing out the play. Readings of Vanity Fair 
informed by more recent literary theory have suggested that Thackeray's 
text expresses profound doubts about the ability of narrative fiction to do 
more than play: it is, in Ferris's phrase, a pointedly "uneasy narrative" 
(289). Ferris sees in the Vanity Fair narrator an awareness that metaphor 
inevitably detaches signs from that which they signify (302); Robin Ann 
Sheets, too, notes that in the world of Vanity Fair, words invariably "have 
their own meaning . . . apart from reality. . . . When words do not corre­
spond to some objective, communally held body of meanings, but become 
arbitrary and subjective tokens, then literary art ceases to function as a 
mimetic structuring of extra-literary reality" (430). In a similar vein, Jack 
Rawlins has shown that Thackeray's narrator mimics a whole range of verbal 
styles, not only to undercut or parody selected modes of discourse, but also 
to discredit language and hence "the authorial process" altogether (158, 
160). Still, each of these critics views Thackeray through a lens colored by 
assumptions about the didactic purposes of realist fiction, and each con­
cludes that Thackeray's fiction isn't (as Ferris puts it) "mere linguistic 
play—far from it" (303). Each finds a message (one could almost say a 
moral) in Thackeray's text, as though it were still necessary to defend 
nineteenth-century novels against anyone who doubts their seriousness.M 
I do doubt that Vanity Fair is "serious," and yet I would never mean to 
imply that it is therefore not good. If we look at this novel's narrative 
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discourse against the backdrop of other novels by Thackeray's contempo­
raries, we can see that it differs strikingly in its self-presentation and 
narrative stance from such earnest realist fictions as Mary Barton. The 
difference lies in the novels' relative relations to play: I call the differ­
ence one of gender, but not one of quality or value.151 argue in Chapter 7 
that men's and women's social circumstances played a signifcant role in their 
choices of narrative stance. Before examining that role, though, I want 
to inquire into the rhetoric of texts whose authors "cross gender" in writing 
them. The next two chapters look at women authors who sometimes 
use distancing strategies and men authors who sometimes employ en­
gaging techniques—not to write "better" novels on any aesthetic or 
moral grounds, but rather to manipulate the rhetoric of prose fiction to 
their own ends. 
1 0  0 
Women's Narrators Who 
Cross Gender: 
Uncle Tom's Cabin and Adam Bede 
ENGAGING narrative strategies, when they work, make actual readers cry. 
Women novelists who had no personal access to public audiences could use 
direct address to accost the strangers represented by their narratees, per­
suade those strangers to identify with the novels' characters, convince them 
that the suffering depicted in the novels is "real," and goad them into 
succumbing to that most physical proof of "real" emotional response— 
tears. Through the first half of the nineteenth century, tears lost the privi­
leged position they had held as the emblems of sensibility and degenerated 
into a "womanish" activity, a mark of sentimentality.' To appreciate the role 
that emotional response was designed to play in engaging narrative texts, 
we must entertain the possibility—with Roland Barthes—of rehabilitat­
ing tears as a sign. Tears "prove to myself that my grief is not an illu­
sion. . . . [B]y weeping, I give myself an emphatic interlocutor who 
receives the 'truest' of messages, that of my body, not that of my speech" 
(427-428). To transmit "the message of the body"—the visceral response 
that signals the mental movement from identification, to compassion, to 
pain—is one of the engaging narrators primary goals. For women writers, 
evoking tears in an audience was one way to surmount the restrictions upon 
their public activity. If a reader weeps, the message of the body says that a 
real event has occurred; it is as though the writer has transcended language 
to assert her presence and to act directly upon her reader. Making a reader 
cry was a way for a woman to do something. 
1 0 1 
Testing the Model 
Making a reader cry was also typically, if not exclusively, something 
for a woman to do.2 Men could gain the same kind of access to an audiences 
emotions in person by delivering speeches or sermons. When George Eliot 
and Harriet Beecher Stowe set out to make their readers cry, they relied 
upon a sermonic use of direct address to establish the same link with their 
readers that revivalist preachers maintained with their listeners. What men 
accomplished through speech, women could try to accomplish in writing. 
Direct address, in both oral and written language, is the trope that most 
vividly asserts the presence of the sender and the receiver of the message. 
While presence may be—as Derrida reminds us—illusory in either situa­
tion, the rhetoric of direct address contributes to that illusion and even, in 
engaging narrative, constitutes it. The engaging narrator strives to estab­
lish her own presence and her readers, in order to refashion the actual 
audience's emotional relation to her subject matter.3 
With their first novels, Eliot and Stowe achieved the response they 
sought. Uncle Tom's Cabin has labored long under its popular and critical 
reputations for sentimentality, summed up in Hugh Kenner's memorable 
dismissal of it as "an eleven-Kleenex tract." For Eliot, whose stature as 
an intellect overshadows her reputation for sentimentality, response was 
equally important.4 When she was writing Scenes of Clerical Life in 1857, 
Eliot would read her new pages aloud in the evenings to George Lewes, 
who, by her own report, "laughed and cried alternately and then rushed to 
kiss me." Of Lewess tears and laughter she wrote to a friend, "He is the 
prime blessing that has made all the rest possible to me—giving a response 
to everything I have written, a response that I could confide in as a proof 
that I had not mistaken my work" {Letters III 63). The physical manifesta­
tions of response were her "proof" that she could use her novel—her 
"work," in the literal sense of her one available mode of labor—as a means 
of making something real happen within her audience.5 
In Uncle Tom's Cabin (1851-1852) and in Adam Bede (Eliot's first full-
length novel, 1859), both Stowe and Eliot exploit earnest direct address as a 
means of sparking actual readers' emotion through appeals to narratees; 
both authors insisted, within and outside their fictional texts, that they 
wanted their novels to be accepted as "real." Paradoxically, though, both 
novels are distancing as well as engaging in their strategies. At the same 
time that the texts try to establish a speaker's and auditors presence, they 
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participate in the inevitable recognition that such presence can always only 
be a function of language. While the contents of both novels conform to 
conventions of verisimilitude to suggest their "reality," each of the narrators 
intervenes in the fiction to insist upon her story's veracity by overtly claim­
ing that it is true. In the most extreme cases—the first chapter of the second 
volume of Adam Beck, "In Which the Story Pauses a Little" and the final 
chapter of Uncle Tom, "Concluding Remarks"—the narrators talk so can­
didly about the genesis of their stories as to contradict the claims of truth 
they are ostensibly making. When their narrators find themselves in this 
self-reflexive mode, the authors are treading the masculine territory of 
distancing narrative discourse; when they continue to insist upon establish­
ing their own presence and the readers presence through direct address, the 
authors are erasing the ironies of narration to inscribe the "truth" of their 
realist fictions. 
STOWE AN D THE RHETORIC OF SENSATION 
Uncle Tom's Cabin straddles the boundaries of several genres of 
nineteenth-century fiction. Full of the domestic details appropriate to the 
realist and sentimental novels of its era, Uncle Tom juxtaposes homely scenes 
with public scandals vivid enough to rival English sensation novels.6 If 
fictional accounts of illegal kidnappings, imprisonments, rapes, and mur­
ders could "produce a sensation" in the popular British novels of that genre, 
how much more scandalous must have been Uncle Toms suggestion that in 
America analogous activities were legal under the system of slavery. The 
rhetorical challenge that Uncle Tom takes on is to convince a white, middle-
class public accustomed to thinking of blacks as "other" that the emotional 
experience of slaves was exactly analogous to their own. As the novel s best-
seller status attests, Stowe accurately gauged her audiences willingness to 
be shocked into sympathy. Uncle Tom certainly produced a public sensa-
tion—not to mention the private sensations its readers experienced 
individually. 
In its day, Uncle Tom prompted scandalized reviewers to question the 
truth of its story. British and Southern reviewers, especially, expressed 
doubts about the likelihood that scenes such as Elizas last-minute escape 
over the frozen Ohio River or Uncle Tom's final martyrdom at the hands of 
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Legree's savage slaves could ever really occur.7 According to their own 
political agendas, critics labeled Uncle Tom's story true or false, its author a 
prophetess or a liar. 
Are the stories told in Uncle Tom's Cabin true? This is not a question for 
postmodern criticism to ask; the stories' being rendered in discourse, and 
the discourse being that of fiction, already places the novel's signifiers at two 
removes from its signifieds, and renders the question of its truth-status 
moot.8 For Stowe, though, her audience's acceptance of the novel as a "true" 
representation of slavery was essential. In response to critical attacks, she 
published A Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin(i853), a compilation of newspaper 
articles, advertisements, bills of sale, and anecdotes about slavery. This 
accumulation of evidence—much of it, paradoxically enough, invented by 
Stowe herself— was supposed to prove her novel's authenticity. Of Uncle 
Tom Stowe writes in the Key: "This work, more, perhaps, than any other 
work of fiction that ever was written, has been a collection and arrangement 
of real incidents,—of actions really performed, of words and expressions 
really uttered. . . . {TJhis is a mosaic of facts" (5). Occurring in a separate 
text from the novel, and uttered with intense seriousness, the claim inverts 
the tradition of the framed fiction, or the mock editor's note that ironically 
introduces Pamela or Robinson Crusoe as "real" manuscripts. Whereas the 
(masculine) tradition of the frame only pretends to claim that the story is 
true, Stowe's (feminine) strategy in the Key is to assert literally and earnestly 
that the story is factual—even though she knows that the novel and the Key 
itself are only loosely true, if they are true at all, based as they are on her own 
necessarily imperfect recollections and on other persons' reports of the 
actuality of slavery.9 The narrators assertions, even though they are, strictly 
speaking, inaccurate, are perfectly serious. The speaker of the Key justifies 
her attempt by alluding to the public reception of Uncle Tom: "It is treated as 
a reality,—sifted, tried and tested, as a reality; and therefore as a reality it 
may be proper that it should be defended" (5). For Stowe's contemporary 
readers, the question of the novel's truth was as important as it was for her: 
Southern critics cited their states' constitutions to prove that slaves could 
not legally be abused as they are in Uncle Tom; hostile linguists demon­
strated that Stowe's renditions of dialects were faulty and geographically 
misplaced; Southern ladies wrote "anti-Tow" novels to refute Stowes book, 
picturing the "true" happy situation of slaves in the South.l0 
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If the truth-status of Uncle Tom was controversial, its emotional im­
pact was never at issue. Stowes most vehement detractors have agreed that 
the novel evokes tears: the question has always been whether the novel's 
sentimental strategies are in themselves objectionable. George F. Holmes, 
a Southern reviewer who violently derided Uncle Tom, saw the sentiment-
provoking scene of Eva's death as "a gem shining amid surrounding rub­
bish" (he canceled out his praise, however, by accusing Stowe of having 
stolen the scene from Dickens).n More recently, critics concerned with the 
novel's potentially palliative effect upon the activism of individual readers 
have regarded sentimentalism as a dangerous falsehood. James Baldwin's 
asserting that "sentimentality, the ostentatious parading of excessive and 
spurious emotion, is the mark of dishonesty, the inability to feel" (578) 
returns, in a quirk of history yoking the civil rights activist with the 
conservative slave owner, to the original proslavery objection to Stowes 
work: the accusation of deceit. Baldwin implies that the emotional experi­
ence the novel aims to inspire is itself a pretense, and that actual readers of 
Uncle Tom could indulge in a good cry, feel exonerated, and then forget 
about the issues of oppression and exploitation that the story addresses; the 
experience of reading sentimental fiction provides a cowardly means for the 
"sentimentalist" to evade "his aversion to experience, his fear of life, his arid 
heart." 
But Stowe s own understanding of a text's emotional function was 
entirely different from Baldwins. His refusal to bend to her text's strategies 
testifies to the necessity of placing rhetoric in its historical situation before 
attempting to analyze it, because a message uttered in one period to an 
intended audience can go completely astray in another context. Increas­
ingly, critics are looking into the content of Uncle Toms message, the 
political and religious implications of the story's emphasis on feminine 
domestication of American culture, submission to suffering here as a key to 
bliss in the hereafter, and reinforcement of Christian family values.12 Any 
reader sharing Baldwin's social concerns would find much to object to in all 
of this. 
I am less concerned here, though, with the novel's messages—osten-
sible or encoded—than with the mode in which the messages get transmit­
ted. As though she could anticipate the political, ethical, and theological 
objections to her story's content, as though she could predict the intended 
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audiences reluctance to accept Uncle Tom as true, Stowe consistently relied 
on the rhetorical techniques of sermons—strategies she had internalized 
while listening to her father, brothers, and husband, among others—to 
bring home her message to her readers. From her point of view, doubt 
among readers resembles doubt among parishioners. Christianity provides 
a master-narrative that represents relationships among earthly events and 
eternal realities; the revivalist preacher who would "awaken" his congrega­
tion must inspire them to accept "Divine Truth" on faith. Genuinely 
hoping to spark a change in the system that condoned slavery, Stowe faced a 
similar task. Her novel needed to inspire readers to accept, on faith, the 
truth of her story—even though the story itself, like the "facts" she fab­
ricated to prove it, was invented. Like the preacher, she partly side-stepped 
the dilemma of how to prove the unprovable by moving away altogether 
from the message of speech toward the message of the body. Stowe s asser­
tions that the novel is true are, strickly speaking, nonsense: her overriding 
strategy is not to appeal to sense at all, but rather to sensation. 
By trying to provoke an emotional response in her audience, Stowe 
placed herself squarely in the tradition of the male Calvinist preachers who 
emulated Jonathan Edwards.13 Perry Miller has explained how Edwards 
developed the "rhetoric of sensation" to resolve for himself the dilemma of 
preaching in language which operated, by Lockean definition, always at one 
remove from reality. Edwards accepted Locke's theory that words are signs 
for the things they represent and deduced that "words are of no use any 
otherwise than as they convey our own ideas to others" (quoted in Miller 
177). Edwards was troubled, however, by the implications of abstract 
speech: to speak in words, to say "God, man, angel," is to evoke the 
arbitrary signs for those entities, rather than conceiving "the actual ideas." 
According to Miller, Edwards was torn between appreciating the efficiency 
of symbolic thought processes and abhorring the system of substitutions as 
a form of deceit. Edwards was in no position to anticipate—and playfully to 
accept—the inevitability of what Derrida would call "deferred presence" or 
"differance." His theology demanded a belief in the existence of "the actual 
idea," originating in God. In the potential for speaker and listener to take 
the sign for the actual idea, the false for the true, Edwards saw "the supreme 
manifestation of original sin." The preacher resolved this conflict by ensur­
ing that the words he must unavoidably use to work upon his congregation 
would be so pointedly arranged as to inspire the sensations they stood for. 
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Edwards hoped that the signifier could bring the signified into being within 
the bodies of his auditors. As he put it, "To have an actual idea of a thought, 
is to have that thought we have an idea of then in our minds. To have an 
actual idea of any pleasure or delight, there must be excited a degree of that 
delight. So to have an idea of any trouble or kind of pain, there must be 
excited a degree of that pain or trouble" (quoted in Miller 178). Miller 
observes that Edwards's reasoning on this point was "the most important 
achievement of his life and the key to his doctrine and practice" (179). 
Edwards's rhetorical means of exciting "a degree" of pain or trouble 
included heavy reliance on direct address, that trope by which he repeatedly 
pictures "you, sinner" in "the hands of an angry God." Typically, the 
"application" sections of his discourses shift the sermons' focus from ab­
stract exegesis to personalized accusations. In the final sections of his ser­
mons, audiences would find themselves confronted with catalogues of sins 
committed by "you": "How many sorts of wickedness have you not been 
guilty of! How manifold have been the abominations of your life! What 
profaneness and contempt of God has been exercised by you!" (Edwards 
671). Lest individual listeners try to shirk the accusations by distancing 
themselves from this unenviable "you," Edwards supplied details of sins so 
ordinary that no member of his intended audience could deny having 
committed them. In order to excite "a degree" of pain, the preacher would 
work upon the congregation's feelings, enforcing real tears when he could, 
yet impugning the authenticity of the emotion at the same time: 
Sometimes it may be you weep . .  . in your hearing sermons, 
and hope God will take notice of it, and take it for some honour; 
but he sees it to be all hypocrisy. You weep for yourself; you are 
afraid of hell . . . Is it a heinous thing for God to slight you, a 
little, wretched, despicable creature; a worm, a mere nothing, 
and less than nothing; a vile insect that has risen up in contempt 
against the Majesty of heaven and earth? (673) 
This worm, this vile insect—observed from an analytical distance—might 
seem to resemble Fielding's "little Reptile of a critic," the figure with whom 
the actual receiver of a text would presumably hesitate or even refuse to 
identify. The context, however, marks the difference in strategies. In Field-
ing's literary realm, the pretense, the falsehood at the heart of writing 
fiction is a given part of the game, and the distancing narrator labors under 
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no moral necessity to evoke a genuine experience in his reader. In Edwards s 
theolo'gical realm, the situation is reversed: the preachers primary goal is to 
subvert the pretense at the very heart of language by enforcing an emotional 
experience in the audience, by requiring them to see themselves reflected in 
that "you." 
What Stowe s narrator does in the interventions within Uncle Tom's 
Cabin more closely resembles Edwards's strategy than Fielding's. In the 
nineteenth-century world, the property of the preacher, the reliance upon 
earnest, exhortative address, belonged to men (in Chapter 7, I examine 
some of the reasons why it was impossible for a woman to imitate the 
preacher's activity directly). Stowe was accustomed to hearing sensationalist 
preaching from male members of her family. She was awakened to Chris­
tianity at age thirteen while listening to one of her fathers "frame sermons," 
a religious exhortation framed by a personal narrative of spiritual experi­
ence. The sermon moved Harriet to tears; she later wrote that she was 
"drawn to listen by a certain pathetic earnestness in his voice" (Gerson 13). 
That pathetic earnestness, that expressed faith in the link between sensa­
tion and genuine experience, and that concern for conveying "truth" de­
spite the "deceitful" nature of fiction and of language itself, combined to 
create the strategy that Stowe, the woman novelist, borrowed from 
Edwards through her father and brothers, the male preachers, thus trans­
forming a masculine means of enforcing spiritual presence into a feminine 
strategy for evoking presence in fiction. 
"HO W FAST COULD YOU WALK": BUTTONHOLING THE 
ACTUAL READER 
The narrator of Uncle Tom's Cabin is unusually explicit about her 
concern that her novel should be received as a direct representation of 
reality. In the final chapter, "Concluding Remarks," she explains how her 
desire to write the novel grew out of her observations of the political and 
theological debates about whether Northerners should be legally required 
to return fugitive slaves to Southern owners. From the tenor of these 
arguments she concluded that "these men and Christians cannot know what 
slavery is; if they did, such a question could never be open for discussion. 
And from this arose a desire to exhibit it in a living dramatic reality" (622). 
Though she uses exclamation marks pretty freely, Stowe seldom italicizes 
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for emphasis; evidently, this phrase is particularly important to her concep­
tion of the novel. 
The power of a "living dramatic reality" repeatedly erupts within the 
text. Throughout the "Concluding Remarks" and the narrative itself, the 
narrator frequently employs the conventions appropriate to "realism of 
presentation," implicitly suggesting the authenticity of her sources. In 
introducing one of the slave-heroines, for example, the narrator (referring 
to herself with an authoritatively masculine editorial "we") asserts that 
"Eliza, such as we have described her, is not a fancy sketch, but taken from 
remembrance, as we saw her, years ago, in Kentucky" (54). Similarly, the 
narrator reports of the slaves' horror of being sold down river: "We have 
ourselves heard this feeling expressed by them" (164). Stowe also adopts the 
realist convention of "omitting" or "disguising" proper nouns—for in­
stance the name of " street" in New Orleans (468)—as if to mask 
the identities of real people and places. Taking the narratives truth claims a 
step further, the "Concluding Remarks" refer often to "the writers" per­
sonal observations of slaves, and quote the novelists husband, Calvin 
Stowe, as an authority on slavery, without referring to his relation to the 
writer (627). 
Stowe's narrator manipulates the conventions of verisimilitude in 
order to realize the problem of slavery for her readers, to let them see "what 
slavery is" and to encourage them to accept her text as authentic docu­
mentation of the situation. As the action of the novel demonstrates every 
time a character takes a risk to aid a desperate slave, Stowe believed in the 
power of what the narrator calls "the magic of the real presence of distress— 
the imploring human eye, the frail, trembling human hand, the despairing 
appeal of helpless agony" (156). Just as the "magic" of "the real presence" 
works to stir sympathy among her characters, Stowe evidently intended the 
verisimilitude, the "living dramatic reality," of her novel to work magic 
among her readers, to move them to sympathy and action. 
Of course, concluding a novel with a chapter about how the fic­
tion came to be written foregrounds the fact that it is not an authentic 
document, but only a novel. The editorial "we" (the pronoun of male jour­
nalists) and the narrators distancing habit in this final chapter of referring 
to "the writer," rather than testifying with a personal "I," reinforce the self-
reflexiveness suggested by so much intervening commentary: as we have 
seen, in fiction these are indicators of a preoccupation with literariness. 
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These distancing elements in Stowe s interventions strain against the con­
tinued assertions that the story is real. In an uneasy blending of earnest 
direct address and distancing ironies, Uncle Tom's Cabin presents a turbulent 
marriage of feminine and masculine modes of fictional discourse. 
Stowe uses three basic types of interventions in Uncle Tom: (i) passages 
in the distancing tradition of Fielding's irony, which refer either dis­
paragingly or disarmingly to a third-person "reader" (for example, "our 
readers" [68, 122, 158}, "the reader" {310, 470], "many of my lady 
readers" [407]; (2) passages that oscillate between the distancing and en­
gaging approaches and are explicitly addressed to specific narratees who 
are meant to represent large segments of the intended audience, such 
as "mother" (153-154), "good brother of the Southern states" (156), 
"sir" (208), "you, generous, noble-minded men and women of the South" 
(622), "Christian men and women of the North" (624), or "mothers of 
America" (624); and (3) passages addressed not so much to any fictive 
narratees created by or within the text, as to the actual reader, under the 
name of "you." 
The first of these categories—third-person references to "the 
reader"—consists most frequently of straightforward reminders that it is 
the narrators duty to keep the narratee informed of the fictional facts; for 
instance, "it would be injustice to her memory not to give the reader a little 
idea of [Dinah}" (310), or "we must daguerreotype [Tom] for our readers" 
(68). Significantly, although these interventions assume the distancing, 
third-person stance, they subvert the metaliterary implications of that 
stance by stubbornly insisting upon treating the subject matter as if it were 
true, speaking of the characters as if they were real people to whose memory 
the narrator (who is not, after all, a character, but a figure who claims 
authoritative access to events and information outside the text) must do 
justice, or whose daguerreotype she would be able to take. 
The third-person references to "the reader" serve a rhetorical function 
very similar to that served by third-person references to "sinners" in a 
sermon. Even when Stowes narrator adopts the sarcastic tone that typifies 
the distancing narrators of Thackeray or Kingsley, she does so to invoke the 
"real presence" of the distressed characters, as well as "the real presence" of 
the reader who would sympathize with them. When she refers to "readers" 
in interventions that bring up presumed failings in her audiences ethics or 
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attitudes, her narrator makes the corrections for those failings perfectly 
clear. For example, in one passage Stowe twits "any of our refined and 
Christian readers" who "object to the society into which this scene intro­
duces them" (i 32), soberly reminding "them" that they belong to a culture 
that encourages and perpetuates the slave-catchers whom such readers may 
find disagreeable. The passage aims to spark a feeling of guilt in any actual 
reader who sees his or her own attitude mirrored in that group of "readers" 
to which the passage refers. 
On some occasions, the narrator inverts this strategy ironically, pre­
tending to disapprove of a "readers" presumed reaction to an event, but 
obviously endorsing that reaction. Consider an intervention in a scene 
describing the exploits of an escaped slave: 
If it had been only a Hungarian youth, now bravely defending in 
some mountain fastness the retreat of fugitives escaping from 
Austria into America, this would have been sublime heroism; 
but as it was a youth of African descent, defending the retreat of 
fugitives through America into Canada, of course we are too 
well instructed and patriotic to see any heroism in it; and if any 
of our readers do, they must do it on their own private responsi­
bility. (299) 
The narrators diction—"bravely defending," "fugitives escaping into 
America," "sublime heroism"—makes the passage's ironic intent obvious, 
in a way which seldom occurs among the similarly sarcastic interventions 
of, for example, Vanity Fair. Whereas Thackeray's narrators opinion on his 
characters may be difficult to trace through his ironic assertions about them, 
Stowe's narrator's analogy between the Hungarian hero and the escaped 
slave can leave very little doubt that she most heartily approves of "any 
readers" who see the resemblance "on their own private responsibility." 
And, by implication, any readers who don't ought to recognize their own 
failure, once they have considered the analogy. 
The most strikingly engaging of Stowe's rhetorical strategies, and the 
feature that most closely resembles the rhetoric of sermons, is her narrators 
heavy reliance on remarks directly addressed to narratees. Stowe's narrative 
interventions are structured as direct address nearly twice as often as they 
are third-person references. The second and third categories of intervention 
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listed above—interventions addressed to a "you" either named or un-
named—play an important role in Stowe's attempt to get the actual reader 
to take the narrative assertions to heart. When naming narratees, Stowe's 
narrator keeps them in broad categories and avoids limitations that might 
allow any given actual reader to deflect the remarks being addressed to him 
or her. Although a few passages of direct address are sarcastically aimed at 
some presumed flaw in the narratee, the narrator usually attributes amiable 
motives and compassionate assumptions to the "sir" or "mother" to whom 
she speaks. Such engaging passages include: "And oh! mother that reads 
this, has there never been in your house a drawer, or a closet, the opening 
of which has been to you like the opening again of a little grave? Ah! 
happy mother that you are, if it has not been so" (153-154). Any mid-
nineteenth-century mother, whether or not she had lost a child, would have 
been sensitive to the appeal.I4 Nor are Stowe's narratees exclusively female: 
"And if you should ever be under the necessity, sir, of selecting, out of two 
hundred men, one who was to become your absolute owner and disposer, 
you would, perhaps, realize, just as Tom did, how few there were that you 
would feel at all comfortable in being made over to" (476). Although these 
passages specify the sex of the narratees to whom they are addressed, they 
imply the existence of impulses which are not necessarily limited to moth­
ers or to gentlemen, and they encourage the actual reader who might be 
touched by their suggestions to sympathize with the novel's characters who 
lose their children or their freedom. 
Uncle Toms named narratees are sometimes delineated even more 
specifically than the "mother" or "sir" in the passages above, but Stowe 
usually includes a surprisingly large and varied number of groups in her 
addresses. The aim is apparently to include the largest possible number of 
actual readers among the figures of readers represented by the narratees. 
This is most striking in a long passage in "Concluding Remarks," in which 
the narrator speaks to 
men and women of America . . . [fjarmers of Massachusetts, of 
New Hampshire, of Vermont, of Connecticut, who read this 
book by the blaze of your winter-evening fire,—strong hearted, 
generous sailors and ship-owners of Maine,— . . . [b]rave and 
generous men of New York, farmers of rich and joyous Ohio, 
and ye of the wide prairie states . . . [a]nd you, mothers of 
America. (623) 
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In a late twentieth-century context, this sounds ridiculous: the appeal to 
"mothers of America" too closely resembles a wartime recruiting poster or 
television commercial. Stowe s narrator makes the appeal, however, with­
out a trace of irony: the long list of addressees concludes with the main 
clause of the sentence: "I beseech you . .  . I beseech you." The narrator 
pleads with the narratees—and, by implication, with those readers who can 
identify with them—to sympathize with the slaves. With the repeated 
plea, "I beseech you," the distancing references to "the writer" that intro­
duced the "Concluding Remarks" and the masculine editorial "we" that 
recurs throughout the text have yielded to the personal, engaging, feminine 
"I," the sign of the woman who would intrude her presence into the text as 
part of its "living dramatic reality." 
Stowe s rhetoric does not end in begging for pity or preaching com­
passion. The narrator uses interventions of the third type, addressed di­
rectly to "you" or "reader," to require the actual reader to recognize parallels 
between his or her own life and the lives of the fictional slaves. We have 
already seen examples of this strategy among the addresses to named nar­
ratees, for instance, the appeal to the "mother" to remember the pain of 
losing a child, or the request for "sir" to imagine being put up for sale. At 
important rhetorical peaks of the novel, the narrator ensures the widest 
possible response to her appeals by not limiting the regional identity or 
political biases of her narratees. One of the most famous passages in the 
novel, Elizas escape (which I mentioned in Chapter 2) is rendered all the 
more memorable by a brilliantly wielded example of this strategy. Appar­
ently Stowe was concerned with convincing her audience that the episode 
was not only plausible, but true, for in "Concluding Remarks" she asserts 
that "the incident of the mothers crossing the Ohio river on the ice is a well-
known fact" (618). But during the scene itself, she exploits the power of 
engaging direct address to persuade the reader of the scenes authenticity: 
If it were your Harry, mother, or your Willie, that were going to 
be torn from you by a brutal trader, tomorrow morning—if you 
had seen the man, and heard that the papers were signed and 
delivered, and you had only from twelve o'clock till morning to 
make good your escape, how fast could you walk? (105) 
Would a reader need to be a mother, or need to have a son named Harry or 
Willie, to feel the personal appeal of that italicized you? (Probably not— 
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but still, imagine the impact of this passage on a reader like Elizabeth 
Gaskell, still mourning the death of her own infant Willie at the time she 
read Uncle Tom.) The narrator requires the reader to exercise his or her 
imagination in such a way as to draw out the parental feelings that may be 
active or latent in his or her real life, and, having evoked those real feelings, 
implores the reader to direct them at the characters. The many passages in 
the novel addressed to "you," "thou," or "ye," without limiting even the 
sex of the narratee as this example does, carry as far as possible this strategy 
of making an appeal to the readers presumed experience of emotions, in 
order to render more immediately present the feelings attributed to the 
characters in the fiction. There are more than twenty-two such passages, 
(for example, on pages 167, 426, and 383). For any reader willing to take 
on the imaginative assignments the narrator demands, these interventions 
should increase the verisimilitude—and therefore, the emotional impact— 
of the novel. 
When it works, this strategy may, indeed, evoke tears: the actual 
reader who pauses seriously to consider what it would feel like to be in the 
characters' situations might experience the tightness in the throat, the 
wetness in the eye, that we conventionally associate with a sentimental 
response. When the narrator makes you cry, she is taking a prerogative that 
belongs, in the extratextual nineteenth-century world, to the man in the 
pulpit. Just as the female author appropriates the male preachers strategy 
for enforcing a sense of presence upon an audience, the feminine, engaging 
narrator wavers between her own territory of discourse and that of the 
masculine, distancing narrator. For all her earnest insistence that "you" 
must be persuaded to accept the characters' pain as a present reality, the 
narrative discourse (as opposed to the overt claims the narrator sometimes 
makes to the contrary) neither suppresses nor denies that one cannot finally 
transmit a representation of reality through words. The narrator's distanc­
ing moves point to an awareness that written language—even when it 
manipulates conversational modes of rhetoric to imitate the form of the 
"message of speech" (to return to Barthes's formulation)—is always and 
only language. Furthermore, crying over a novel is not the same as taking 
action against slavery: once the reader's sympathy is aroused, the reader is 
obliged to act upon the feeling by behaving sympathetically toward real-
world slaves." The narrators engaging moves are her means of circumvent­
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ing potential roadblocks in her project, to arrive at the "truest of messages," 
the "message of the body." 
SILLY READERS OF LADIES' NOVELS: ELIOT'S NARRATEES 
No one disputes that George Eliot was preoccupied with realism 
when she began writing novels.l6 Her anonymous essays in the Westminster 
Review, her early, pseudonymous correspondence with her publisher, John 
Blackwood, and her narrators' assertions in the interventions that con­
tinually interrupt her first two books repeatedly express her wish to avoid 
becoming one of those lady novelists who wrote silly novels. Wanting to be 
a novelist, she had no choice but to become a woman novelist; she could 
signal her unwillingness to be classified among the "lady novelists" by 
signing her fictions with a man's name and by employing masculine, dis­
tancing strategies in her narrative discourse. The silliness she was most 
concerned to avoid was the lady novelists' lapses of realism: Eliot says at 
every opportunity that she wants her novels to be true. Much like Stowe, she 
adapted earnest interventions as a means of encouraging a "real" sense of 
presence in her texts. 
Nevertheless, assigning a gender to Eliot's narrators is no straightfor­
ward task. The masculine pseudonym coheres with the few hints in Scenes of 
Clerical Life that establish the narrator as a man acquainted with the neigh­
bors whose tales he relates; in Adam Bede, however, the narrator betrays no 
solid clues as to gendered experience.l71 call the Adam Bede narrator "she" 
partly by default and partly because her engaging strategies dominate the 
text, marking its discourse as feminine. Still, masculine moves are also 
present in the novel—expecially in chapter 17—bringing the narrator's 
gender-identity continually into question.18 The gender of her narratee 
provokes questions, as well. The "readers" with whom she argues about the 
appropriateness of the narrative techniques are often specified as women— 
"silly ladies," one might call them. And yet the attitudes she attributes to 
those narratees are identical to the objections that she tries to answer in her 
letters to her publisher. The letters to Blackwood presume that he wants to 
transform her into a "lady novelist," even though Blackwood ostensibly 
believed he was corresponding with a man; the narrative interventions in 
Scenes and Adam Bede put Blackwood s supposed objections into the mouths 
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of "lady readers," even though the novelist was drawing upon arguments 
she was having with a man. Perhaps because the laughing/weeping 
Lewes—her ideal reader—was entirely sympathetic with her novelistic 
aims, Eliot projected what she saw as the adversarial position of Blackwood 
onto the part of her imagined audience that Lewes could not occupy: the 
ladies. 
Eliot implied that lady readers wanted to read "Silly Novels by Lady 
Novelists," and her Westminster Review article by that name specifies her 
reasons for objecting to that desire. Summing up the lack of "genuine 
observation" to be found in those novels, Eliot likens them to 
the pictures clever children sometimes draw "out of their own 
head," where you will see a modern villa on the right, two 
knights in helmets fighting in the foreground, and a tiger 
grinning in a jungle on the left, the several objects being 
brought together because the artist thinks each pretty, and 
perhaps still more because he remembers seeing them in other 
pictures. {Essays 315) 
She decries fiction that imitates other fiction, self-reflexive fiction of a 
different kind from the metafiction her male contemporaries played with. 
In hilarious detail, Eliot mocks the results of fiction writing that makes no 
reference to the extratextual world: ludicrous, improbable plots: awkward, 
inflated, often unintelligibly abstract language; preposterously overrated 
heroines, whose creators praise their brilliance while filling their mouths 
with nonsense; and fantasy visions of religious conversion, social climbing, 
or historical events. What appalls Eliot about these novels is that their 
authors know little or nothing about the worlds they are trying to depict. 
They imitate other art or fantasy, ignoring "reality." 
In her attack on "Silly Novels," George Eliot defines the tone that she 
would presumably wish her own narrators to take, instead of the pedantic, 
affected, showy style of the "Lady Novelists." She compares narrative tone 
with social behavior, noting how unpleasant it would be to spend time with 
any lady who flaunted her learning in the pompous manner of the lady 
novelists' narrators. Eliot would prefer the company of "a really cultured 
woman," whose behavior she describes specifically: "In conversation she is 
the least formidable of women, because she understands you, without 
wanting to make you aware that you can't understand her. She does not give 
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you information, which is the raw material of culture,—she gives you 
sympathy, which is its subtlest essence" (Essays 317). Sympathy, the 
"subtlest essence" of culture, is what Eliot the reviewer claims to want to 
see in a woman novelists narrator. It is also what her own engaging nar­
rators try to elicit from her actual readers. Perhaps because of the imagined 
battle with Blackwood, the narrator of Scenes is not particularly engaging in 
his stance: he relies upon the distancing motif or positing flawed nar-
ratees.19 His narrative style is gendered masculine, then, as are his sparse 
autobiographical details. 
If Lewes played the role of the ideally sympathetic reader in the 
novelists imagination as she wrote, Blackwood also seems to have been 
present in her mind as the silly reader who cannot grasp the point. If we 
compare the letters Eliot wrote to Blackwood while she was composing the 
Scenes and Adam Bede with the interventions in both novels, we can see that 
she often directly answered Blackwoods objections (or rather, what she 
construed those objections to be) while writing her fiction.20 Her letters to 
Blackwood show that she was classifying his literary tastes as perfectly 
aligned with those of the silly readers, and her summaries of his position 
were not always fair. Still, in the narrative passages of Eliot's first two 
novels, as in her letters to Blackwood and in the "Silly Novels" essay, she 
argues consistently for the precedence of the "real" over the "ideal" in 
fiction. 
As Gordon Haight has noted, "Neither George Eliot nor Blackwood 
was converted" by their correspondence (George Eliot 239). Perhaps because 
Blackwood remained unreconstructed, Eliot persisted in her interventions 
in Scenes of Clerical Life to ask the narratee to consider how much more 
George Eliot's characters resemble the people in one's own life than they do 
the figures in other novelists' fictions. Eliot has declared to Blackwood that 
she could not "step aside from what I feel to be true" in her fiction (Letters II, 
299), and her narrator took up the challenge of making actual readers also 
feel the fiction to be true, in order to arouse their sympathy. 
SYMPATHY: "THE SENSE OF HIS PRESENCE" 
For George Eliot, sympathy, the "subtlest essence" of culture, was 
also the highest moral force operating in the world. In this she departs the 
company of Stowe and Gaskell, who also preach sympathy, but who see it as 
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the necessary result of Christian faith. Having passed through a fervently 
evangelical period in her youth, Eliot rejected conventional Christianity in 
1842 in a traumatic break with her faith and her father. Influenced by her 
own painstaking translations of Strauss and Feuerbach, as well as by the 
events of her life, she gradually replaced her faltering faith in divine love 
with a humanistic belief in the power of sympathy. George Eliot continued 
at first to couch her moral writings in terms of a "God," particularly in her 
anonymous essays for the Westminster Review. But these essays contain strong 
undercurrents of her developing humanism as well. A lengthy article writ­
ten in 1855 attacks the teachings of the popular evangelist Dr. Cummings. 
The attack focuses on the harsh, destructive personality attributed to God 
in Cummings s writings and concludes with a summary of George Eliot's 
own version of God: 
The idea of God is really moral in its influence—it really cher­
ishes all that is best and loveliest in man—only when God is 
contemplated as sympathizing with the pure elements of hu­
man feeling, as possessing infinitely all those attributes which 
we recognize to be moral in humanity. In this light, the idea of 
God and the sense of His presence intensify all noble feeling, 
and encourage all noble effort, on the same principle that hu­
man sympathy is found a source of strength: the brave man feels 
braver when he knows that another stout heart is beating time 
with his; the devoted woman who is wearing out her years in 
patient effort to alleviate suffering or save vice from the last 
stages of degradation, finds aid in the pressure of a friendly hand 
which tells her there is one who understands her deeds, and in 
her place would do the like. The idea of a God who not only 
sympathizes with all we feel and endure for our fellow-men, but 
who will pour new life into our too languid love, and give 
firmness to our vacillating purpose, is an extension and multi­
plication of the effects produced by human sympathy. (Essays 
187-188) 
According to Eliot, the sympathetic person who senses the presence of an 
Other—divine or human—capable of sharing in his or her feeling will find 
supporting strength to intensify that feeling. In Adam Bede, Eliot drama­
tizes the effects of such a presence in two ways: Dinahs sermon evokes the 
presence of Jesus, bringing "the idea of a God" vividly to life for her 
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auditors; the narrator asserts her own sympathetic presence and that of her 
actual readers, bringing the fiction "to life." Both the preacher and the 
narrator depend upon direct address to achieve their effects. 
Dinahs sermon occurs early in the novel, functioning as a model for 
the way in which direct address can instill a sense of presence in an audience. 
Dinah begins in a low key, with a prayer for inspiration from God and an 
invocation of her text for the talk: "The spirit of the Lord is upon me, 
because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor" (68). Her 
explication of that text, lasting for six long paragraphs, emphasizes that 
"Jesus Christ spoke those words," and that the poor are of particular impor­
tance to Jesus and to the followers of Wesleyan Methodism. She details 
Jesus' kindness to the poor, his miracles, and his infinite sympathy, then 
turns the focus of her talk for a moment on her hearers: "Ah! Wouldn't you 
love such a man if you saw him—if he was here in this village?" (70). After 
this brief suggestion that Jesus could manifest a presence in Hayslope, she 
returns to her doctrine, explaining Christ's status as the son of God and his 
mission "not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." 
At this point Dinahs sermon shifts in tone, focusing on her hearers, 
and convincing the traveling stranger (through whose perspective the scene 
is focalized) that Dinah has the Methodists capacity to move an audience, 
even though her listeners don't fully understand her message. As if openly 
and spontaneously responding to Jesus' words, Dinah exclaims to her audi­
ence: "The lost! . . .Sinners! . . . Ah, dear friends, does that mean you and 
me?" (71). The observing stranger notes Dinah's shift in emphasis: "At last 
it seemed as if, in her yearning desire to reclaim the lost sheep, she could not 
be satisfied by addressing her hearers as a body. She appealed first to one and 
then to another, beseeching them with tears to turn to God while there was 
yet time" (72). The tearful gaze, beseeching tone, and individual appeals, 
"first to one and then to another," recall the narrator of Uncle Tom's Cabin, 
speaking passionately and personally to specific members of her audience. 
Dinahs message, like Stowes, relies heavily on repetitions of the word 
"you" to bring a sense of Christ s suffering and of the individual mortal's sins 
home to each listener. "'All this he bore for you!'" she exclaims of the 
Passion: "Tor you—and you never think of him; for you—and you turn 
your backs on him; you don't care what he has gone through for you. Yet he 
is not weary of toiling for you: he has risen from the dead, he is praying for 
you at the right hand of God'" (74). The effect of her sermon, very much 
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like the discourses in the Edwardsian tradition, is to force Dinahs hearers to 
feel themselves to be the specific subjects of her list of sins. The heavy, 
hammering "you . . . you . . . you" of her talk drives a double impression 
into her listeners: that they are sinners, and that the Jesus of whom she 
speaks so passionately is real, possibly even physically present among them. 
As the traveler notices, the individuals in the crowd hardly comprehend 
Dinahs characterization of themselves as sinners. The narrator asserts that 
one man resolves to go less often to the tavern and to "[clean] himself more 
regularly of a Sunday"; another "couldn't help liking to look at [Dinah] and 
listen to her, though he dreaded every moment that she would fix her eyes 
on him, and address him in particular" (72—73). The sermon appeals not to 
their logical sense, but to their sensations. 
The auditor who receives the biggest and perhaps the most confused 
impression from Dinahs sermon is "Chads Bess," a notorious young woman 
who, before this day, had always been rather proud than otherwise of her 
small-scale vanity and frivolity. Like her fellow villagers, Bess only vaguely 
understands the charges leveled against her. Dinah s doctrine of sin and 
repentance makes no logical sense to Bess, But Dinah uses the rhetoric of 
sensation to break through Bess's denseness: 
[Bess] had a terrified sense that God, whom she had always 
thought of as very far off, was very near to her, and that Jesus 
was close by looking at her, though she could not see him. For 
Dinah had that belief in visible manifestations of Jesus, which is 
common among the Methodists, and she communicated it irre­
sistibly to her hearers; she made them feel that he was among 
them bodily. (73) 
Dinah communicates "that belief in visible manifestations of Jesus" 
through a rhetoric of sensation that defies sense. She claims literally to see 
him—"See! . . . where our blessed Lord stands and weeps. . .  . He is 
among us; he is there close to you now; I see his wounded body and his look 
of love" (74). Her own "sense" of Jesus' presence, transmitted directly 
through her assertions and indirectly through her address to individual 
listeners, makes her subject seem so real to them that they respond emo­
tionally, even hysterically. At the climax of her sermon, Dinah turns to 
Bess, "whose bonny youth and evident vanity had touched her with pity": 
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"Poor child! Poor child! He is beseeching you, and you don't 
listen to him. You think of earrings and fine gowns and caps, 
and you never think of the Saviour who died to save your pre­
cious soul. Your cheeks will be shrivelled one day, your hair will 
be grey, your poor body will be thin and tottering! Then you 
will begin to feel that your soul is not saved; then you will have 
to stand before God dressed in your sins, in your evil tempers 
and vain thoughts. And Jesus, who stands ready to help you 
now, won't help you then: because you won't have him to be your 
Saviour, he will be your judge." (74—75) 
Poor Bess dissolves into sobs, and thereafter, under Dinah's continued 
influence, her behavior improves: the narrator establishes that Bess tries to 
change, not because she has really absorbed the logic of Dinah's argument, 
but because she has begun—under that barrage of"yous" and "yours"—to 
think less well of herself than she had. Similar to Jonathan Edwardss 
jeremiads in its direct application to her audience, Dinah's sermon differs 
from his in her enormous capacity for sympathy, which contrasts with the 
historical preacher's accusatory, authoritarian air of self-righteousness that 
Stowe's narrator so closely imitates. 
In her sympathetic mien, Dinah resembles the narrator of Uncle Tom. 
Dinah's specific appeals to particular listeners are more like Stowe's ex­
clamations to "mothers" or "good brothers of the South," than they are like 
George Eliot's more broadly applicable remarks to "you." But Dinah, 
according to the narrator, structures her sermon unselfconsciously, never 
calculating the effect it will have on her audience, though she strives for and 
believes in that effect. Dinah s technique recalls Eliot's remark about Stowe's 
narrative personality in Dred: "She never makes you feel that she is coldly 
calculating an effect, but you see that she is all a-glow for the moment with 
the wild enthusiasm, the unreasoning faith" of her Christian characters 
{Essays 327). The emotive strategy of Dinah s sermon is precisely that of the 
exhortative passages in Stowe's slavery novels, and the traveler observing 
Dinah's style makes an inward comment that parallels Eliot's remark on 
Stowe: "She was not preaching as she heard others preach, but speaking 
directly from her own emotions, and under the inspiration of her own 
simple faith" (72). Eliot sets up this Stowe-like figure, opens the emotional 
life of the book by having her preach a sermon that employs the rhetoric of 
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sensation to make Jesus "real" for her audience, and then endorses both 
Dinahs motivations and her earnest, engaging preaching style by allowing 
her to have a positive influence on every life that she touches within the 
book. Dinah s role in the plot reinforces the suggestion of her power that the 
sermon establishes. Eliot's narrator, furthermore, seeks to extend that 
power beyond the realm of the characters to that of the actual reader, relying 
heavily, as Dinah of course does, on direct, earnest gestures toward "you." 
Adam Bede opens with one of the most direct addresses to a reader 
imaginable: 
With a single drop of ink for a mirror, the Egyptian sorcerer 
undertakes to reveal to any chance comer far-reaching visions of 
the past. This is what I undertake to do for you, reader. With 
this drop of ink at the end of my pen I will show you the roomy 
workshop of Mr. Jonathan Burge, carpenter and builder in the 
village of Hayslope, as it appeared on the eighteenth of June, in 
the year of our Lord 1799. (49) 
This, the entire first paragraph of the novel, sets forth the date and location 
of the first scene as specifically as possible. But even before she mentions 
these details, the narrator establishes the relationship she is to hold with the 
reader: with the "drop of ink" at the end of her pen, she will create a world 
like the illusion that the sorcerer can create. The sorcerers "visions of the 
past" are not fabricated from nothing, but are visible in a drop of ink used 
"for a mirror"; that is, the sorcerers illusions are reflections of something 
that is real. Like the magician, this narrator intends to record in ink 
reflections of a real rural English world, sixty years in the past. The narrator 
does not call herself a sorcerer or a master of illusion, however; she only 
draws the parallel between the magicians trick and her own act, writing. 
Thus introduced to the reader, the narrator often returns, both openly and 
subtly, to remind the reader that Adam Bede is something written, that it is 
a reflection, as in a mirror, of reality, and not a reality in itself. One could 
certainly argue that the narrators recurring presence interferes with the 
"illusion of reality" within this novel; indeed the opening paragraph is a 
clear statement from the narrator that she consciously wants the actual 
reader to keep the illusory aspect of her history in mind.21 This earnest 
address—combining the engaging insistence upon "your" presence with 
the distancing suggestion that the story, though realistic, is not real— 
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establishes the paradoxical blend of feminine and masculine strategies that 
run throughout the novel. 
In terms of the technical moves of narrative discourse, Eliot's narrator 
seldom employs the distancing mode. The opening of chapter 17 is addressed 
to a disgruntled lady reader, that silly, female version of a Blackwood-like 
critic who would prefer a more idealized portrait of Irwine than the novel 
offers. The effect is distancing—as W. J. Harvey describes it, "The reader is 
repelled by having his reactions determined for him; he feels himself, and 
not the character, to be a puppet manipulated by the author" {Art of George 
Eliot 70). Only once among the other chapters does the narrator refer to the 
reader in the distancing third person. This occurs near the beginning of the 
book, in the chapter that follows Dinahs sermon. The narrator reflects that 
"Methodism" in Dinah s day denoted a faith and a way of life quite different 
from what Wesleyanism had become by 1859: "It is too possible that to 
some of my readers Methodism may mean nothing more than low-pitched 
gables up dingy streets, sleek grocers, sponging preachers, and hypocritical 
jargon—elements which are regarded as an exhaustive analysis of Meth­
odism in many fashionable quarters" (82). This is distancing in that the 
actual reader is supposed not to want to identify with those in "fashionable 
quarters" who are charged with accepting such a reductive version of the 
history of Methodism, especially after having seen in Dinahs sermon how 
much more Methodist faith and practice might once have embraced.22 This 
reference to "my readers" is clearly not engaging, and for Adam Bede it is 
exceptional. 
Each of the many other references to the reader in Adam Bede is a direct 
address, not to the "madam" or "Mrs. Farthingale" who sometimes crops 
up in Scenes of Clerical Life, but simply to "you." As Barbara Hardy has de­
scribed it, the dominant narrative "tone is personal: it is the tone of voice in 
which the author tells a story about remembered people. It is also the tone 
in which she addresses a living reader" {Novels of George Eliot 158). The 
repeated direct addresses inscribe a narratee who attends avidly to the 
narrators discourse, sympathizing with the characters and paying scru­
pulous attention to her assertions. Often the narrator compliments the 
narratee when repeating a bit of information or explaining an obscure 
motive, by deferring to the narratees memory and perspicacity: "you must 
remember" (145), "you perceive . . . you remember" (170), "you under­
stand" (172), "as you know" (356), "you know Hetty did not" (443), and 
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again, "you perceive" (258) or "you perceive how it was" (573). As if in 
conversation, the narrator thus graciously concedes that she is perhaps 
repeating or even belaboring points, while nodding to her listeners capacity 
for recognizing this, and trusting in her listeners indulgence. 
The narrator is more peremptory, though always gently so, when 
instructing the sympathizing narratee on how to receive what she is saying. 
Examples of these civil directives are "do not suppose" (118), or "do not 
reason about it, my philosophical reader" (294). These instructions pre­
sume that the actual reader might be inclined to suppose or to philosophize 
wrongly, were he or she without the benefit of the narrators admonitions, 
but their tone implies the narrator's assumption that her "philosophical 
reader" will tractably follow her advice. Other passages of address reveal the 
response that the narrator expects, and sometimes wishes to counteract. 
"You will perhaps be surprised to hear" (173) and "possibly you think" 
(399) are instances of this effort to second-guess, and to redirect, the actual 
readers developing impressions of the characters. The narrator can be very 
direct in this attempt, as when she launches a defense of Adams ill-advised 
passion for Hetty: "Before you despise Adam as deficient in penetration, 
pray ask yourself if you were ever predisposed to believe evil of any pretty 
woman—if you ever could, without hard head-breaking demonstration, 
believe evil of the one supremely pretty woman who has bewitched you. No" 
(198). This repetitive use of "you" in connection with Adam's most danger­
ous character flaw is the narrator's surest means of engaging the actual 
reader's empathy for "our friend Adam's" mistake. The narrator openly 
admits her intent to influence the narratee, shirking the use of "I" no more 
than that of "you." "I must remind you again" (209), she says, or "I assure 
you" (241), or "I beseech you to imagine" (242). The narrative "I" is 
present, personal, and insistent; she speaks directly to "you," bringing the 
actual reader's presence into the foreground as well. 
Not every narrative intrusion in Adam Bede presupposes a specific 
response from the narratee. Some of the narrators rhetorical questions seem 
genuinely to inquire into the actual readers feelings or experiences, as if in 
conversation. "Have you ever seen a real English rustic perform a solo 
dance?" she asks, going on to suggest an answer: "Perhaps you have only 
seen a ballet rustic, smiling like a merry countryman in crockery, with 
graceful turns of the haunch and insinuating movements of the head. That 
is as much like the real thing as the 'Bird Waltz' is like the song of birds" 
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(324). Here the narrator appeals to the actual readers experience of country 
dancers, real or artificial, and willingly fills in for the readers possible 
ignorance with her amusing parallels. 
In other instances, where the experience she asks the narratee about is 
less idiosyncratic, the narrator relies on the actual reader's own emotional 
memories to fill in the sentiment, as in the first scene in which Adam 
tentatively courts Dinah: 
That is a simple scene, reader. But it is almost certain that you, 
too, have been in love—perhaps, even, more than once, though 
you may not choose to say so to all your lady friends. If so, you 
will no more think the slight words, the timid looks, the tremu­
lous touches, by which two human souls approach each other 
gradually . . . you will no more think these things trivial, than 
you will think the first-detected signs of coming spring triv­
ial. . . .1 am of opinion that love is a great and beautiful thing 
too; and if you agree with me, the smallest signs of it will . . . 
be like those little words, "light" and "music," stirring the 
long-winding fibres of your memory, and enriching your 
present with your most precious past. (537) 
When she refers to "your present," the narrator evokes a consciousness of the 
moment at which the actual reader is reading that passage, absorbed in this 
budding love between Adam and Dinah. The "small signs" of their love 
should stir the actual readers memory, bringing the "precious past" into a 
present response to Adam and Dinah. In the readers experience, the past 
should momentarily enter the present: the personal memories should re­
inforce the readers consciousness of his or her own genuine presence in the 
act of reading.23 If the narrator can evoke the actual readers complete 
empathy for the characters, then she will have taken a step toward educat­
ing the actual readers faculty for sympathy. And to the extent that she can 
accomplish this, she aligns the reader even more specifically with her flawed 
hero, Adam, whose sympathies are educated through his contact with 
suffering and with Dinah. Significantly, the narrator does not generalize 
about the appropriate attitude to take toward these characters: instead she 
directs her remarks to "you." The technique parallels Dinahs strategy in her 
sermon when she exhorts Bess to imagine her own future sufferings in order 
to bring Jesus to life for her and to impress upon her a sense of what he has 
suffered for her. The device inspires belief. 
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This device of drawing on the actual readers memory and imagination 
to fill in her descriptions and explanations hints at a lack of faith in any 
narrators power to evoke a response without an actual readers help. In this 
Eliot's narrator resembles the consistently self-deprecating narrator of Mary 
Barton, so dubious about her ability to transcribe imagined scenes, emo­
tions, or even conversations "accurately." The narrator of Adam Beck ex­
presses no misgivings about describing such fundamental elements of her 
story, but candidly admits other limitations to her narrative capacities. Her 
diffidence is never as extreme as the eighteenth-century conceit that a 
character such as Sophia Western or the Widow Wadman is simply too 
beautiful to be described in words and is expressed more sincerely than 
Fielding's or Sterne's. When in doubt, the narrator turns to "you" to 
explain: 
It is of little use for me to tell you that Hetty's cheek was like a 
rose-petal, that dimples played about her pouting lips . . . —of 
little use, unless you have seen a woman who affected you as 
Hetty affected her beholders, for otherwise, though you might 
conjure up the image of a lovely woman, she would not in the 
least resemble that distracting kitten-like maiden. I might 
mention all the divine charms of a bright spring day, but if you 
had never in your life utterly forgotten yourself in straining your 
eyes after the mounting lark . . . where would be the use of my 
descriptive catalogue? I could never make you know what I 
meant by a bright spring day. (128) 
This is no hyperbolic trope, intended to imply that Hetty's beauty is so 
exceptional that it defies langauge, like Sophia's. Instead, it is a glimpse at 
the narrator's assumptions about the sources of actual readers' responses to 
realistic fiction. A reader who had never lived anywhere but Siberia, for 
instance, would obviously have no memories to correspond with the nar-
rator's English "bright spring day"; but, more significantly, a British born 
and bred person who had never fully responded to the power of such a spring 
day, who had "never utterly forgot [him]self" through the seasons romantic 
influence, could have no clearer idea of the narrators "bright spring day" 
than the Siberian could. 
Similarly, a reader who has never been affected by a woman "as Hetty 
affected her beholders" can only guess at what the narrator is trying to evoke 
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in describing Hetty's attractiveness. This is particularly true in that the 
figurative language surrounding Hetty throughout the text—images of 
furry, heartless kittens, or rosy, juicy peaches with hard pits—is peculiarly 
repellent, in spite of all the narrator's reports of the compelling effect Hetty 
has upon those who see her. It may be difficult indeed to conceive of what 
the narrator means by saying of Hetty's beauty that "it is a beauty like that 
of kittens, or very small downy ducks making gentle rippling noises with 
their soft bills, or babies just beginning to toddle and to engage in con­
scious mischief—a beauty with which you can never be angry, but that you 
feel ready to crush for inability to comprehend the state of mind into which 
it throws you" (127). It is all very well for the narrator to use "you" in this 
passage, perhaps in the impersonal sense of "one," but can the device make 
actual readers feel that they have ever been thrown into a state of mind in 
which they would even momentarily want to crush a kitten, a duckling, or a 
baby with whom they could "never be angry"? "Unless you have seen" 
someone like Hetty, the narrator despairs of being able to make "you" see 
Hetty herself. The narrator recognizes the ambivalence of her own attitude 
toward Hetty, and in that ambivalence recognizes that the actual readers' 
mental images of Hetty, not to mention their emotional response to her, are 
outside the narrator's firm control. 
This is inevitably true, of course, of the mental images and emotional 
responses that fiction evokes. A narrator's words can only begin to shape 
a readers experience of a book: imagination and emotion make every actual 
readers Prick and Prejudice or Moby-Dick different from any other actual 
reader's internalized versions of the novels.24 This poses a particular problem 
for George Eliot's attempts at realism, a problem that the narrative tech­
nique both reflects and essays to remedy. Eliot's narrator, speaking from the 
authors own experience, tries to create a world that is a mirror, like the 
sorcerers drop of ink, of a real, past world. She wants to distinguish it as 
much as possible from the "silly novels" that reflect only fantasy or other 
fiction, and she makes this desire explicit by mentioning the contrast 
between her homely characters and their fictional prototypes. She enlists 
the readers sympathy for Dinah and Seth with elaborate mock solemnity: 
"We can hardly think Dinah and Seth beneath our sympathy, accustomed as 
we may be to weep over the loftier sorrows of heroines in satin boots and 
crinoline, and of heroes riding fiery horses, themselves ridden by still more 
fiery passions" (82). Similarly, she praises Hetty's beauty in the context of 
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her oddly patched-together finery: "[Hetty's image in the mirror was} none 
the less lovely because Hetty's stays were not of white satin—such as I feel 
sure heroines must generally wear—but of a dark greenish cotton texture" 
(195). Such comments, particularly the reference to Hetty's lovely image in 
the mirror, should remind readers of the resemblance this mirror image of 
the Hayslope world is designed to bear to their own world. 
The reflection is distorted; it differs from that which it represents, if 
only in that it surrounds the original with a frame. Still, the mirror, like the 
novel, reflects a representation of objects in the nonfictional world, and the 
narrator is particularly concerned that readers, unlike Hetty, should recog­
nize the mundane reality of the originals. As a character, Hetty is not a 
representation of a real-world prototype, any more than she represents the 
idealized heroines in silly ladies' novels. The narratee, however, is meant to 
be a representation: in the mirror of "you" actual readers should see them­
selves, as in Hetty's mirror-image they should see resemblances to people 
they know. By mentioning the literary models she refuses to imitate, the 
narrator professes her unwillingness to idealize or to fantasize the way Hetty 
does, and requires actual readers to manifest their concurrence by becoming 
emotionally involved with these people whom they should see as so different 
from conventional literary figures, and so like themselves. 
To be sure, the narrator's realism has limits, which she acknowledges 
even when it means she must depart from engaging strategies. One limit is 
the difficulty discussed above, namely, the problem of making actual read­
ers visualize people or empathize with emotions for which they can find no 
parallels in their own experience. The narrator, sustaining her theme of the 
power of sympathy, would like to believe that a "realistic" emotional truth 
must be universal, until she tries to evoke an unconventional emotion— 
like the desire both to kiss and to crush Hetty—and must throw up her 
hands in defeat. Another acknowledged limit to her realism is the fact that 
though she claims that her characters are drawn from life, they nevertheless 
develop into extraordinary personalities. This comes to the surface of the 
narrative in one admonition to the narratee: 
Adam, you perceive, was by no means a marvellous man, nor, 
properly speaking, a genius, yet I will not pretend that his was 
an ordinary character among workmen; and it would not be at 
all a safe conclusion that the next best man you may happen to 
see with a basket of tools over his shoulder and a paper cap on his 
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head has the strong conscience and the strong sense, the blended 
susceptibility and self-command of our friend Adam. He was 
not an average man. (258) 
The narrator proceeds to explain that some men like Adam do exist, but 
they are rare. The passage suggests the narrators doubts that actual readers, 
unlikely as they are ever to have known or even heard of a man as admirable 
as Adam, may feel themselves to be in as remote a fantasy world as that of a 
silly novel while reading Adam Bede. For all her disclaimers of fantasy, the 
narrator is still creating a world where extremes do exist: Hetty's exagger­
ated attractiveness and selfishness, Dinahs limitless desire to give of her­
self, Adam's heroic emotional strength and capacity to learn forgiveness. 
The novel does operate on a more ideal plane than that of day-to-day 
occurrences, and such an intervention is tantamount to the narrators ad­
mitting that fiction has to be more exceptional, less "average" than reality. 
The narrator's most engaging stroke consists of her two strategies in dealing 
with actual readers' potential doubt: first, by admitting openly that her 
characters and events might not always accord with the actual readers 
experience, and second, by always keeping in mind the individual reader's 
capacity for disbelief. She keeps that awareness close to the surface of the 
narrative by addressing her arguments and advice personally to "you." 
WHILE "THE STORY PAUSES, " THE DISCOURSE 
CROSSES GENDER 
For the narrator intent on reinforcing her readers belief in the "real­
ity" of the world she mirrors, nothing could be more audacious than to 
insert into the novel an extended commentary like chapter 17, "In Which 
the Story Pauses a Little." Opening the second book of the novel with 
an exclamation from "one of my lady readers" demanding that she make 
Mr. Irwine a more "edifying" example of a perfect minister, the narrator 
retorts, "Certainly I could, my fair critic, if I were . . . able to represent 
things as they never have been and never will be" (221). The chapter goes on 
to present the ostensible thesis of this novel: one can learn more of the 
deepest passions by close, sympathetic contact with real, lowly people than 
one can ever absorb from fantasy visions in life or in literature. The narrator 
claims "to give no more than a faithful account of men and things as they 
have mirrored themselves in my mind. The mirror is doubtless defective; 
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the outlines will sometimes be disturbed" but she feels "bound to tell you, 
as precisely as I can, what that reflection is" (221). 
The chapter-long essay has become famous as a manifesto for all the 
points of realism that Eliot had earlier set forth in the Westminster Reviewand 
in her letters to Blackwood. It fills all the purposes that an authors theoreti­
cal preface or afterword to a novel could fill, while going one step farther. 
Not only does it force the actual reader to stand back from the fiction and 
consider its relation to reality, it makes him or her do so at a moment when 
the fictional world has already begun to be mirrored in meticulous detail. 
The chapter strives for a wrenching effect, analogous to the distancing effect 
of any metafictional narrative intervention, but multiplied in its intensity 
as it is in its length. The essay resembles the prefatory chapters in Tom Jones, 
except for one essential difference. Fielding's little essays occur regularly, at 
predictable intervals, and begin each of many books in the novel; they are 
only one part of an elaborate structure that works consistently to distance 
the actual reader from the fictional world. Eliot's chapter 17, appearing so 
unprecedentedly and unexpectedly at the beginning of only one of the six 
books in the novel, provides a jolt for any actual reader who does not skip it, 
a jolt the novel does not repeat. 
What, then, could be the purpose of this jolt? Why would Eliot's 
narrator require her actual reader to abandon, if only momentarily, the 
illusion that the reasonably recognizable world she has begun to evoke is in 
some sense real? Why would she want the actual reader to remember that 
her characters' personalities are not fixed in reality, but are entirely the 
products of one person's authorial choices? Why, in other words, would she 
abandon the feminine novelistic project established by her engaging nar­
rative techniques in the first sixteen chapters to signal a masculine, distanc­
ing acknowledgment that the fiction is really only fictional? 
The answer, I think, is that this narrator—and by extension George 
Eliot—has tested the limits of the feminine, earnest stance and found them 
inadequate to her project. The pretense that the story is real can go only so 
far. After all, this narrator wants her actual readers to remember that they 
are merely reading, that the sympathy they are expending on Adam and 
Hetty, Dinah and Seth is only a model for what the actual reader could and 
should feel for real-world sufferers. Chapter 17, so personally and intently 
directed at "you" after its distancing first address, is explicit about 
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the purpose of writing fiction that is realistic, but nevertheless admittedly 
not real: 
And I would not, even if I had the choice, be the clever novelist 
who could create a world so much better than this, in which we 
get up in the morning to do our daily work, that you would be 
likely to turn a harder, colder eye on the dusty streets and the 
common green fields—on the real breathing men and women, 
who can be chilled by your indifference or injured by your 
prejudice; who can be cheered and helped onward by your 
fellow-feeling, your forbearance, your outspoken, brave justice. 
(222) 
If empathy for her characters helps develop the actual readers capacity for 
sympathy, so be it, but reading the novel should, according to the narrator, 
be only an exercise for strengthening that capacity in the readers life.25 
Whenever Eliot's narrator addresses a remark to "you," she is gradually 
building up her readers' awareness of their presence in the act of reading, of 
their actual relation to the characters, the narrator, and the author. With 
this chapter, she is expanding that awareness to force readers to recognize 
their necessary relation to characters that appear in their own real lives. 
In this light, then, the Adam Beck narrators shifting emphasis upon 
engaging and distancing techniques is not entirely paradoxical. The femi­
nine insistence that the story is real works in tandem with the masculine 
acknowledgment that it is really a story. The combined narrative stances 
operate to redirect the actual reader's response to the fiction away from the 
text and into the extra-textual world. W. J. Harvey (who stops short of 
wholeheartedly endorsing intervention in Eliot's novels) has described this 
effect; "We do not leave the 'real' world behind when we are confronted with 
the world of [Eliot's] novels; in fact, George Eliot compels us to keep both 
worlds and their interrelationships firmly in our minds" {Art of George Eliot 
79). The combination of engaging and distancing stances leads, however, 
to two slippery narrative moves that persistently point to paradoxes at the 
heart of any realist narrative text. 
The first of these two moves is the narrators insistence in chapter 17 
that Adam Bede is a real person she knows. In the midst of defending the 
verisimilitude of her portrait of Pastor Irwine, the narrator quotes Adam's 
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opinions on the minister, dramatizing a scene in which Adam and the 
narrator hold a conversation many years after the novel's main action 
(225-228). The device is blatantly inconsistent with the chapters rhetoric. 
If, on the one hand, the narrator is supposed to be an individual capable of 
conversing with Adam, then the narrators assertions about characters' 
thoughts and emotions must be subjective, conjectural; they must be the 
projections of one persons imagination onto other persons whose real feel­
ings she could not know. If, on the other hand, the narrator is not supposed 
to be a person in the story—if her status is heterodiegetic, not homo-
diegetic—then her discussion of the choices she has made in creating Pastor 
Irwine s character is consistent with her status, but her claim to have met 
Adam makes no sense at all. 
Chapter 17 confuses the issue of the narrator's presence: she is present 
in a latter-day Hayslope, conversing with Adam, but she is also present in 
the extradiegetic situation in which she invents characters (such as Irwine) 
and tells "you" about them. The presence of the reader, too, becomes 
confused: the chapter presents the actual reader with both the distancing 
figure of a "lady reader" and the engaging "you" whom the narrator is so 
earnestly attempting to convert. The narrators stance, then, oscillates 
between distance and engagement for the duration of the chapter. 
The problem of the narrators and the actual reader's position in 
chapter 17 finds a parallel in the second slippery move, another form of 
metalepsis. In two early passages of direct address the narrator places "you" 
upon the fictional scene. The conventional device of metalepsis is unusual 
for Eliot; its playful stance contrasts with the sober urgency of most of her 
interventions. In the tradition of Fielding's pretense that his narrator could 
"endanger the Reader's Neck" by picturing a reader-figure in a precarious 
position, the narrator positions "you" on the scene in two episodes, the 
introduction to Mr. Irwine's family and the first glimpse of the Poysers' 
home. In the latter passage, the narrator places "you" outside a window at 
the Hall Farm. "Put your face to one of the glass panes in the right-hand 
window," she urges, "What do you see?" (116). Under the influence of the 
repeated engaging interventions, the continual presence of "you" in this 
text, actual readers may find themselves simutaneously distanced and en­
gaged by this maneuver. Sense tells them they are not at the Hall Farm: they 
are seated somewhere with a book in their hands, reading. And yet, the 
appeal to visual imagination, to the internal sensory experience of par­
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ticipating in the creation of a fictional world, directs the actual readers 
attention to the physical, emotional reality of response. As the narrator puts 
it, "imagination is a licensed trespasser: it has no fear of dogs, but may 
climb over walls and peep in at windows with impunity" (i 15 -116) . The 
question to the narratee—"What do you see?"—brings the narrative focus 
back to sensation. It asks the actual reader to defy sense, to overlook the 
ontological paradoxes of a realist fiction, and to "feel" the story "to be true." 
Adam Beck's narrative discourse, then, represents an intermittent tug-
of-war between sense and sensation, between engaging insistence upon the 
story's reality and distancing acknowledgments of its fictionality, between 
urgent feminine earnestness and metaliterary masculine playfulness. Con­
sidering George Eliot's position in the canon and her personal attempts to 
mask her gender in her public writing, the struggle is not surprising. Long 
considered among the great Victorian novels, her oeuvre has always been 
rated as comparable to the works of her male contemporaries. Eliot's reputa­
tion for brilliant, sophisticated manipulation of narrative technique is 
doubtless partly attributable to her willingness to incorporate the mas­
culine effects of distancing narration into her novels. The flicker of mas­
culinity that surfaces at those distancing moments in Adam Bede is 
congruent with the male pseudonym, the anxious desire not to be recog­
nized by her Victorian audience as the "fallen" Marian Evans, and the wish 
to be taken seriously as an antitype of the Lady Novelist. 
The fluctuation of gender in the novel's interventions resembles the 
apparent shift in the gender of the writers first-person pronouns at the end 
of her essay on "Silly Novels." In the final paragraph, the referent of "we" 
oscillates between the masculine reviewer's editorial "we" and the "we" that 
speaks for women novelists.26 The gender-versatility of George Eliot's writ­
ten voice must be partly responsible for her high status in an androcentric 
canon. We would be underrating her centrality to women's novels and to the 
feminine Victorian tradition, however, if we were to overlook her novels' 
insistent reliance upon the engaging narrator. 
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Men's Narrators Who Cross 
Gender: 
Can You Forgive Her? and Bleak House 
BECAUSE they have pleased so many readers so well for so long a time, 
Trollope and Dickens can be said to have engaged many readers, but still 
their novelistic practices mainly fall under the matrix of distancing narra­
tion. To hold Bleak House (1853) and Can You Forgive Her? (1864) up 
against the models of engaging and distancing techniques is to recognize 
that Dickens and Trollope for the most part resisted the intimate relation 
between the narrative "I" and "you," the implied dynamic of actual readers' 
presence, the insistent and earnest "special pleading" that constitute the 
engaging narrator's characteristic moves. By inscribing distinctions be­
tween their narratees and actual readers, by pointing—subtly and explic-
itly—to the literary nature of their texts, both Dickens and Trollope 
participated in the masculine tradition of the distancing narrator. And yet 
each of them, at certain narrative moments and for reasons of his own, 
"borrows" the woman's move, direct address. 
Without wishing to psychoanalyze either author (Dickens, at least, 
has already attracted plenty of attention along those lines), I want to point 
to signs in their texts that indicate a certain flexibility, a willingness to let 
their rhetoric be temporarily invaded by a trope that was encoded in their 
era as a feminine one. If they did not write earnest, engaging realist novels 
in the tradition of Gaskell and Eliot, it was because for both Dickens and 
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Trollope, the novels status as aesthetic artifact took precedence over its 
rhetorical function. Their texts evince a preoccupation with the novel as an 
artifact, a literary construct taking its place among the productions of men 
of letters. Within the texts, this preoccupation finds expression in a self-
consciousness about the process of novel writing. 
In Trollopes case, the self-consciousness can be explicit, as in the 
passages in Barchester Towers where the narrator frets aloud over the fatigu­
ing necessity of filling out a triple-decker novel to the end, or where the 
narrator promises the reader that Elinor Bold will not marry Mr. Slope, 
justifying the disclosure with a disquisition on the appropriate level of trust 
that should operate between a "novelist" and his "reader." Or, as we shall 
see in Can You Forgive Her?, Trollopes metaliterary musings can take a more 
implicit form, expressed in the story's structure through the playing off of 
one subgenre against another. In both respects, Trollopes expression of 
concern for literary questions closely resembles George Eliot's in Adam 
Beck; unlike Eliot, however, Trollope does not insist upon offsetting the 
metafictional features of his text by relying consistently on direct address. 
"WE ARE ALWAYS WEAVING NOVELS ": 
TROLLOPES METALEPSES 
Can You Forgive Her? Is there, in the history of the English novel, a 
title more engaging—in my technical sense of the word—than this one? 
Read earnestly, it seems a sincere appeal to the individual reader's sympathy, 
a challenge that announces, even before one opens the book, a female 
character whose actions may or may not be forgiven, but whose plight will 
command "your" attention. This title is a bold stroke, because it insists 
upon addressing the actual reader, the person whose gaze falls upon the 
book's cover. Since the title is part of what Genette calls the "paratext," the 
apparatus that surrounds and defines the parameters of the text proper, its 
addressee cannot be located within the text.' The title in the form of a 
question enlists "you" immediately as its addressee, casting any casual 
consumer who happens to see the book (or one of its parts, in the original 
serial publication) in the role of reader. It draws you in. 
And yet, as the text itself unfolds, the earnest applicability of the title 
seems to dissolve. Is the "her" whom we are to forgive—as the opening 
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sentence of the first chapter asserts—Alice Vavasor, the young woman who 
throws over a seemingly ideal fiance to accept a renewed marriage proposal 
from her cousin, a former lover whose inappropriateness as a mate is obvious 
even to Alice from the start? Or is it one, or both, of the women who form 
the apex of parallel love triangles in the novel's triple plot, Lady Glencora 
and/or Mrs. Greenow? If it is a generalized question—that is, can you 
forgive the female jilt, the flirt?—can the answer be the same for three such 
diverse women, who act from such completely different motives? Focusing 
on the acts of forgiveness dramatized in the story can only complicate the 
matter. Alice, for instance, is continually irritated by her relatives' gra­
tuitous forgiveness for her refusal to bend to their collective and individual 
wills; after her worthy fiance and friends have put Alice's mistakes behind 
them, the question seems to turn upon Alice, demanding of her whether 
she can forgive herself. Who, then, is the "you"; who is the "her"? 
As one reaches the novel's conclusion, with its happy-ending resolu­
tion of the marriage plot it had exploded in its opening chapters, the titles 
question takes on even more complicated resonances. The narrative has so 
conscientiously depicted Alice's frustrated rage over being allowed to "do 
nothing" in politics, and has detailed with such precision the likelihood 
that as John Grey's wife, Alice can have little hope of exerting direct action 
on her own, that the question seems to stand upon its head: can you forgive 
Alice for marrying John Grey, which seemed at first to be the right thing, 
but which must in the end only exacerbate her frustration? (As is typical of 
Trollope, the proliferation of events and attitudes in the novel makes arrival 
at a definitive interpretation difficult if not impossible. John Greys election 
to Parliament gives Alice the opportunity for the indirect political involve­
ment she had hoped to gain, but had lost, through her cousin; still, John's 
dismissal of Alices original anguish as symptoms of "illness" does not bode 
particularly well for her autonomous existence after she has become his 
wife.) The titular question is much less direct, and more ironic and per­
plexed, than at first it appeared to be. 
So, too, is the relation that Trollope establishes between the narrators 
"readers" and the actual reader. The title invites us to expect a recurring 
pattern of direct address; indeed, the title itself returns, refrain-like, in two 
passages where the narrator enlists his "readers" sympathy for Alice. The 
second of these—"Oh! reader, can you forgive her in that she had sinned 
against the softness of her feminine nature?"—begins as an engaging ap­
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peal, but gets deflected into a passive construction that lets "you" off the 
hook: "I think that she may be forgiven, in that she had never brought 
herself to think lightly of her own fault" (730). The other repetition of the 
title phrase occurs in a frankly self-reflexive passage that points relentlessly 
to the fictional frame, even while pleading Alice s case before the potentially 
hard-hearted narratee: 
But can you forgive her, delicate reader? Or am I asking the 
question too early in my story? For myself, I have forgiven her. 
The story of her struggle has been present to my mind for many 
years,—and I have learned to think that even this offence 
against womanhood may, with deep repentance, be forgiven. 
And you also must forgive her before we close the book, or else 
my story will have been told amiss. (398) 
Despite its direct-address structure, the intervention is distancing in two 
ways: first, by evoking a "delicate reader" who is prejudiced, quick to 
judge, and reluctant to sympathize (and then by professing his own convic­
tion that such an attitude is not merited by Alices "offence") the narrator 
creates a narratee with whom he implies the actual reader should not wish to 
identify; second, his references to the "story" (repeated three times in the 
passage), the "book," and his own responsibility for telling the reader about 
Alice all enforce a self-consciousness about the narratives textual, fictional 
nature. These two interventions that repeat the title are not more straight­
forward instances of engaging direct address than the title itself, but models 
for the distancing moves Trollopes narrator typically makes. 
As we have seen, a hallmark of the distancing narrator is to refer 
obliquely in the third-person to "the reader" or "my reader" rather than to 
"you," as though the figure being named were not present at the moment of 
the narrative transaction. Trollopes narrator refers so often to "the reader" 
in this novel that he seems to have been talking to himself while he 
composed, wondering aloud about what the future audience's reaction 
would be. In Can You Forgive Her? there are at least twenty-one such 
references to the reader. As he introduces his characters, for instance, the 
narrator seems to be making mental notes to himself: "Such had been Mr. 
Vavasors pursuits and pleasures in life up to the time at which my story 
commences. But I must not allow the reader to suppose that he was a 
man without good qualities" (42), or "for Alice Vavasor when she will be 
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introduced to the reader had already passed her twenty-fourth birthday" 
(43). This mode, quite distinct in its stance from conversational address, 
persists throughout the text, as in "the attentive reader will remember" 
(403), "It is hardly necessary to tell the reader that" (443), or "The reader is 
not to suppose . .  . it need hardly be explained to the reader" (632). 
Granted, third-person references to "the reader" are a firmly entrenched 
convention of nineteenth-century prose style, but we need only contrast the 
preponderance of these references in Trollope s novel with their scarcity in 
Adam Bede (which refers to "the reader" only twice) to recognize a signifi­
cant difference in stance. 
Trollope—who claims in his Autobiography not to have planned his 
novels in advance, but to have composed rapidly and revised very little— 
falls into certain formulas in his prose style, as several critics in his time and 
ours have noted.2 His notes to himself about "the reader" may be one such 
tic; another is an interesting pattern by which his narrator constructs 
passive sentences in order to avoid speaking directly to "you." I have already 
mentioned a few of these passive constructions, for example, "I think that 
she may be forgiven" (730) and "It need hardly be explained to the reader" 
(632). Translated into the engaging mode of Gaskell or Eliot, these pas­
sages might read "I think you may forgive her" and "I hardly need to explain 
to you." Trollope goes to some stylistic length to avoid this kind of direct 
address, however. He writes the reader out of many remarks by inscribing 
the figure within passive constructions, as in these examples: "Poor Alice! I 
hope that she may be forgiven" (177); "It will be remembered" (600, 602); 
"it must be owned" (537); "I beg that it may be also remembered" (490). 
Despite the titles insistence upon evoking a present "you" before the text 
begins, the novel suppresses "you" within the text; Can You Forgive Her? 
contains approximately seventeen passages that describe the readers poten­
tial actions and reactions in this passive mode. 
By contrast, I have been able to find only five passages (in addition to 
the title and its two refrains) that directly accost "you." In one case, the 
narrator narrows the reference of "you" by endowing the narratee with a 
gender: "Ah, my male friend and reader, who earnest thy bread, perhaps, as 
a country vicar . . . hast thou never confessed . . . that Fate has been 
unkind to thee in denying thee the one thing that thou has wanted?" (479). 
That "one thing" is a seat in Parliament, a thing denied categorically to 
women and specifically—it seems—to Trollope himself (of which I will say 
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more later in this chapter). Like the "delicate reader" whose exaggerated 
concern for offences "against womanhood" suggests that she is probably 
female, the "male reader" can stand in for only part of the actual audience, a 
part that is further circumscribed by the subsequent relative phrases, "who 
earnest thy bread . .  . as a country vicar," "or sittest . .  . at some weary 
desk in Somerset House," "or . . . rulest the yard behind the Cheapside 
counter." Only a few actual readers could answer this invocation. 
The remaining four addresses to "you" are not limited in this way; by 
virtue of their general applicability and their scarcity within the text, their 
engaging impact is, I would argue, exceptionally strong. At the end of 
chapter i, for example, as the narrator concludes his description of Alice, he 
seems to forget the aloof position he has adopted vis-a-vis his narratee, as 
though suddenly seized by the urgency of communicating his affection for 
his heroine: "I beg you, in taking her for all in all, to admit that she was a 
fine, handsome, high-spirited young woman" (45). The plea suggests an 
unusually antagonistic relation between the "you" and the "I" (since we are 
entirely dependent on the narrator for any opinion we can have of Alice at 
this point, why would we be unwilling to "admit" that she is what he 
describes her to be?). Still, for the moment, the "you" flashes onto the 
scene, and the narrator's concern that the actual reader should admire his 
heroine evokes the actual readers presence as the story gets underway. 
Appropriately enough, the first appearance of "you" within the text is 
on the first page, where the narrator refers directly to "your" role in the title: 
"Whether or no, she, whom you are to forgive, if you can, did or did not 
belong to the Upper Ten Thousand . .  . I am not prepared to say. . . . 
Alice Vavasor, whose offence against the world I am to tell you, and if 
possible to excuse, was the daughter of [a} younger son" (39). Like the title, 
this opening sentence ushers "you" into the narrative. A definitive, if 
probably unintentional, symmetry contributes to the novels closure, as the 
engaged "you" who enters the text departs in the distanced form of "my 
readers": "Probably my readers may agree with Alice. . . . But as [her 
friends] have all forgiven her . .  . I hope that they who have followed her 
story to its close will not be less generous" (830). 
In the juxtaposition of the first and final paragraphs of the novel, 
then, the opposition of distancing and engaging narrative breaks down. 
"My readers," they who "have followed [Alice's] story," are figures outside 
the narrative conversation, more distant from its contents than the initially 
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(and thereafter occasionally) present "you." And yet, the final paragraph 
suggests, they occupy the same plane of existence as Alice's friends: their 
activity in forgiving Alice is exactly parallel to the characters' activity. The 
novel ends on a moment of metalepsis, in which the narrator is suggesting 
either that the "readers" are as fictional as the characters, or that the 
characters are as real as are the "readers," who, despite all the distancing 
strategies in the novel, have been established as figures for the rarely but 
pointedly present "you." By Trollopes own report, his characters were as 
real to him as his readers were. For him, the rhetorical issue of involving a 
real audience in the comings and goings of a fictional world was compli­
cated by his passionate involvement in the imaginary world of his novels. 
According to his Autobiography, Trollope "lived with [his] characters" 
(233). He asserts that the successful novelist "desires to make his readers so 
intimately acquainted with his characters that the creations of his brain 
should be to them speaking, moving, living, human creatures" (232): 
This he can never do unless he know those fictitious personages 
himself, and he can never know them well unless he can live 
with them in the full reality of established intimacy. They must 
be with him as he lies down to sleep, and as he wakes from his 
dreams. He must learn to hate them and to love them. He must 
argue with them, quarrel with them, forgive them, and even 
submit to them. (232-233). 
For evidence that he took this attitude toward his own creations, Trollope 
cites his practice of returning to the same cast of characters over the course of 
many years of writing. "So much of my inner life was passed in their 
company," he says, that he could not resist being "allured back to [his] old 
friends" (319). Even after they had died in their fictional worlds, they lived 
on in his imagination; witness Trollopes legendary assertion that "I have 
never dissevered myself from Mrs. Proudie, and still live much in company 
with her ghost" (276). 
According to Trollope, the process of conceiving narratives in fiction 
and the process of keeping track of the actual details of life were for him 
practically the same activity. On the subject of whether it would be more 
difficult to work simultaneously on two separate novels (as he once did) than 
to keep in mind the separate life stories of one s country friends and one s 
city friends, Trollope observes: "In our lives we are always weaving novels, 
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and we manage to keep the different tales distinct" (155). From his perspec­
tive, the world of lived experience was in some respects as fictional as his 
novels, and the novels were nearly as real as his life. If we are to take his 
assertions about his own writing seriously, we must deduce that in his mind 
the line between the two worlds was deliberately and frankly blurred. 
Small wonder, then, that his text blurs the lines as well. At different 
narrative moments, Trollope's narrator is equally capable of treating his 
characters and events as "real" and of reminding his "reader" that the same 
characters and events are fictional. (In this respect his practice resembles 
that of Thackeray, the contemporary novelist Trollope avowedly revered 
most highly.) Trollope's most persistently engaging strategy—that is, the 
technique his narrator most often uses to suggest the authenticity of his 
story—is a pretense that the narrator's information is imperfect. As in Mary 
Barton, the pose is not at all consistent: the narrator chooses seemingly 
arbitrary moments to suspend his omniscience and to claim that he does not 
have all the details. Frequently he repeats the phrases "I cannot say" or "I 
am not in a position to determine" (as on pages 46, 48, 52, 139, 140, 158), 
and he disavows knowledge of events, as well as of characters' motives. On 
the subject of what characters are thinking, he often raises questions rather 
than providing definitive information, characteristically introducing the 
questions with "I wonder" (pages 40, 73, 281, 604, 681, 685). These 
open-ended musings tend to militate against the closure of the text by 
suggesting that the narrator did not have complete access to all the "facts," 
and hence, that he did not invent the information he does report. 
Similarly, the narrator opens out the text to invite the "readers" 
participation in judging the characters' actions. Having detailed the awk­
wardness of Alice's decision to tour Switzerland, while still affianced to John 
Grey, with his rival, her cousin, the narrator turns to a narratee at the end 
of the paragraph to inquire, "Under these circumstances was not Lady 
Macleod right in saying that George Vavasor should not have been accepted 
as a companion for the Swiss tour?" (66). Much later in the novel, after 
examining Alices assumptions about the gaming tables that have lured 
Lady Glencora, the narrator remarks, "Of course, she did not sift her 
suspicions. Who does at such moments?" (713). In the same vein, after 
narrating Kate's attempts to get the old Squire to listen to Bible chapters in 
the evening, the narrator appends a comment: "There may have been good 
produced by the small quantity to which he listened, as there is good from 
141 
Testing the Model 
the physic which children take with wry faces, most unwillingly. Who can 
say?" (564). Who, indeed? When Trollopes narrator abdicates his claim to 
complete, definitive knowledge he takes a most engaging stance: he is not 
simply asking rhetorical questions, but genuine questions that enlist the 
actual readers participation in rilling out the narrative commentary. 
And yet, despite his pretense of periodically allowing his characters 
to shield private thoughts from him, and despite his willingness to cede 
final judgments to the narratee, Trollopes narrator is far from consistently 
engaging in his stance toward the text itself. He continually alternates his 
claims for the narratives reality with reminders of its fictive nature. When 
the Swiss tour takes place, for instance, the narrator suddenly foregrounds 
Trollopes authorial role: 
I am not going to describe the Vavasors' Swiss tour. It would 
not be fair on my readers. . . . and I should consider myself to 
be dishonest if I attempt to palm off such matter on the public 
in the pages of a novel. It is true that I have just returned from 
Switzerland, and should find such a course of writing very 
convenient. But I dismiss the temptation, strong as it is. Re­
tro age, Satanas. (78) 
Although this intervention somewhat audaciously focuses the nar­
rative for the moment upon the way it is being written, it does not sug­
gest that the narrator has invented the story. Other interventions are even 
more candid, however. One comes in the form of a footnote acknowledg­
ing that a character has been "borrowed" from a novel of Thackeray's 
(192). Another comes in the passage I have already cited, where the nar­
rator wonders aloud about the possibility of adequately analyzing Alices 
mind, in order to prompt his readers to forgiveness by telling the "story" 
well (397 — 398). Resembling the famous interventions in Barchester Tow­
ers, these spotlights on the narrator-as-creator recall the distancing effects 
of Thackeray's and Kingsley's metafictional meditations.3 
PLAYING OFF THREE GENRES: THE METAFICTIONAL 
STORY 
In Can You Forgive Her? Trollopes metafictional inclinations come 
across in the story, as well as in the discourse. As I have mentioned, the 
novel's pages are divided among three distinct plots, each one involving a 
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woman with two rival suitors.4 The two secondary plots are linked to the 
main plot by friendships among the characters: Alice Vavasor becomes 
intimate with Lady Glencora, the heroine of one subplot, and Alice's cousin 
Kate (who is closely involved in Alices own story) spends much of her time 
with her aunt, Mrs. Greenow, the center of the second subplot. In addition 
to helping to vary the action and fill out the volumes of the novel, the two 
subplots operate as mirror images of the main plot. The mirrors reflect 
distortions of the main story, however; each of the three belongs to a 
separate subgenre of fiction, though all three find their comic/realistic 
resolutions in the end. By playing three kinds of story off against each other, 
and by privileging Alices story as the focal point, the novelist implicitly 
raises the question: What kind of a novel will this be? 
The subplots present two alternative fictional modes that contrast 
with the main plot, even as their action parallels its own. Trollope sets up 
the matrix for the plots in the titles for two of the chapters that deal with 
Alices story, "John Grey, the Worthy Man" and "George Vavasor, the Wild 
Man." The terms are not applied in the text to the other two pairs of rivals, 
but their applicability is evident: Plantagenet Palliser is obviously the 
worthy man and Burgo Fitzgerald the wild man; Mr. Cheeseacre, ludicrous 
though he may be, earns the title of "worthy man" by being a substantial 
householder, while the freeloading Captain Bellfield aspires (through his 
shameless flirting and notorious irresponsibility) to the title of wild man. 
The resolution of each of the three stories depends upon the story's genre. In 
Glencora s story the worthy man wins the woman, but in Mrs. Greenow s, 
the wild man prevails. Both subplots are resolved far enough in advance of 
the novel's end to promote some suspense about which one Alice's story will 
imitate, or whether Alice might be the heroine to end up with no man 
at all. 
Lady Glencora is at the center of a potentially tragic "silver spoon" 
novel, a story of romance among people with money and position, a situa­
tion whose potential consequences could affect many characters beyond the 
principals involved—indeed, could (and does) change the course of the 
(fictionalized) British Parliament. If Glencora were to abandon Plantagenet 
for Burgo, thus staining her husbands reputation, breaking his heart, and 
altering the course of his career, his prospects would be ruined, and he 
would never rise to become the prime minister. As it happens, Plantagenet s 
decision to accompany his wife to Europe has serious consequences, in that 
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it postpones his promotion to chancellor of the exchequer. When Glencora 
wavers from her commitment to the "worthy man," she positions herself for 
a serious fall from her social position as well as her virtue, and threatens 
to join the ranks of tragic, sensational heroines along the lines of Mary 
Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley. 
If Mrs. Greenow is not exactly low enough to be the heroine of a 
Newgate novel, she is enough lower than Glencora, socially speaking, to 
provide a sharply contrasting setting for the parallel plot. Mrs. Greenow s 
financial self-sufficiency and bourgeois self-satisfaction render her invul­
nerable to anything like a tragic fall. Her crocodile tears for her "dear 
departed Greenow" and her repeated assertion that the passionate part of 
her life is over, are—as the narrator likes to remind us—partly sincere. She 
has come too far in her life to be able to make any choices now that would 
have tragic consequences, even on a small scale. The subplot she dominates 
is a comic parody of the tragic plot concerning Glencora: Mrs. Greenow s 
story inverts the terms of Lady Glencora s, so that the "right" decision for 
her is to marry the attractive Captain Bellfield, the wild man, and to 
reject Mr. Cheeseacre, the ostensibly worthy man. The contrasts and simi­
larities between these two plots provide a fertile ground for interpretation of 
Trollope's message, but that is not my present concern. What interests me 
here is the way the potentially tragic high-life plot and the relentlessly 
comic low-life plot point to the plot in between them, thus focusing 
attention on the nature of that main story. 
Obviously, Alice is the heroine of a "realistic" novel, but her story 
plays with the conventional shape of such novels. Like Jane Austens Persua­
sion, the novel begins at a moment somewhat later than the/moment where 
realist novels typically end: with the heroines engagement. Like Anne 
Elliott, Alice breaks off her commitment to her lover, but unlike Anne, 
Alice goes through the agonizing process of decision under the reader's eye, 
in the narrative present. As the story progresses and Alice experiences 
increasing panic at the thought of honoring her subsequent engagement to 
George, the novel turns its genre inside-out: whereas the conventional 
comic-realist novel (on the Evelina-model, for instance) traces the efforts of 
a heroine to get married, Alices story follows her increasingly frustrating 
and painful attempts not to get married, first to John, then to George, then 
again to John (because she cannot forgive herself for having left him the first 
time). When, in the end, she consents to marry John, her plot aligns itself 
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with the happy-ending closure of the other two—this is, after all, a comic 
novel. But in the contours of its story/ies, it is a novel that refuses to follow 
comfortably the shape that convention prescribes for its genre. In so doing, 
it draws attention to the question of genre itself, and becomes—on the level 
of its structure—a novel about novels, a work of subtly self-reflexive meta­
fiction. Trollope's concern for literary questions—questions about what 
kind of novel to write and how best to write it—shows itself, then, in his 
novel's structure, as well as in the worries his narrator periodically expresses 
in interventions. 
As I have argued, this self-conscious concern for the novel's liter­
ariness is a sign of masculinity in a narrator's stance (even, or should I say 
especially, when it surfaces in George Eliot's novels). In Trollopes case I 
think it signals his narrator's (as well as his own) identification with the 
tradition of male novelists, especially his beloved Thackeray. Alongside his 
predominantly distancing attitudes toward his fiction, however, a strain of 
engaging approaches—the few, potent examples of direct address and the 
implications that his characters are "real," which I have outlined above— 
persists. Other critics have argued that Trollope's "androgyny" surfaces in 
his treatment of women characters.5 Looking to the realm of discourse 
rather than story, I see the rare but pointed engaging interventions as signs 
of "femininity" that enter Trollope's text; furthermore, I see parallel signs of 
feminine identification in Trollope's own account of his novel-writing ac­
tivity in his Autobiography. 
"IMPREGNATED WIT H MY OW N CREATIONS'  : 
THE FEMININE TROLLOPE 
First, let us look more closely at the terms in which Trollope frames 
his confession that he lived with his characters and thought of them as real. 
Describing the process by which he produced what he considered to be his 
best work, he says he would isolate himself from the responsibilities of his 
post-office job and his "household duties," in "some quiet spot among the 
mountains." "At such times I have been able to imbue myself thoroughly 
with the characters I have had in mind. I have wandered alone among the 
rocks and woods, crying at their grief, laughing at their absurdities, and 
thoroughly enjoying their joy. I have been impregnated with my own 
creations" (176). To be "impregnated with [his] own creations" is to take a 
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decidedly feminine position in regard to their creation. Trollopes passion­
ate emotional involvement with his characters, who moved him even to the 
point of "crying," also carries powerfully feminine connotations for a Vic­
torian man. 
For Trollope, creation itself, the process of bringing people—even 
fictional people—to life, is a female activity. The metaphor he uses clashes 
strikingly with Gilbert and Gubars beautifully illustrated contention that 
the pen, for male writers, has usually been "a metaphorical penis" (3). The 
stance toward characters that Gilbert and Gubar describe as typically mas­
culine applies to the distancing narrator: "Precisely because a writer 'fa­
thers' his text, his literary creations . .  . are his possession, his property. 
Having defined them in language and thus generated them, he owns them, 
controls them, and encloses them on the printed page" (12). Trollope, who 
(according to his own metaphor) saw himself as mothering his own text, is 
surely an exception to Gilbert and Gubars rule. His engaging narrative 
attitude toward his characters' existence, which is not at all consistent, but 
nevertheless present in his text, acknowledges his feminine concept of the 
novelist's activity. Trollope departs the company of masculine artists who 
conceive of writing as a virile act. 
I argue at length in Chapter 7 that a motivating force behind the 
engaging narrator's presence in female texts was the ban on women's public 
speech in the nineteenth century. I would not want to conclude this discus­
sion of Trollope without noting that men, too, could feel publicly silenced, 
and could experience the urgency of expressing "real" sentiments through 
fictional texts. Trollopes narrator, addressing the male narratee of Can You 
Forgive Her? in a passage I mentioned above, refers to membership in 
Parliament as "the one thing that thou hast wanted" which Fate has denied. 
The Autobiography is very explicit about the novelists own desire to sit in 
Parliament and his disappointment at finding he could not prove wrong the 
uncle who had taunted him for his boyhood ambition to be elected to the 
House of Commons. Trollope attributes his failure partly to his weakness as 
a public speaker: "I had no special gifts that way, and had not studied the art 
early enough in life to overcome natural difficulties" (296). 
Whether or not his lack of success in his brief political campaign was 
entirely due to his difficulties with speaking, Trollope felt himself effec­
tively silenced by his defeat. Twice in his Autobiography he asserts that his 
novels became the channel by which he made public statements about his 
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private convictions: "As I was debarred from expressing my opinions in the 
House of Commons, I took this method of declaring myself" (that is, 
writing Phineas Finn) (317). Of Plantagenet and Lady Glencora, he writes, 
By no amount of description or asseveration could I succeed in 
making any reader understand how much these characters with 
their belongings have been to me in my latter life; or how 
frequently I have used them for the expression of my political 
and social convictions. They have been as real to me as free trade 
was to Mr. Cobden, or the dominion of a party to Mr. Disraeli; 
and as I have not been able to speak from the benches of the 
House of Commons, or to thunder from platforms, or to be 
efficacious as a lecturer, they have served me as safety-valves by 
which to deliver my soul. (180) 
Evidently Trollope felt himself to be specifically barred from the locations of 
public expression—the M. P. s bench, the lecturer's platform—that were 
theoretically available to men but generally forbidden to women. Unlike 
his female contemporaries, he focuses in his account of his frustration upon 
his own need to speak (as "a safety-valve by which to deliver my soul"), 
rather than on a desire to communicate a message to an audience, to effect 
some influence upon the world. Still, I think that his recourse to earnest, 
direct address in novels whose story and discourse are primarily distancing 
is a sign of his partial identification with all of the female voices that, like 
his own, could speak only through texts. 
DICKENS AN D THE POLYVOCAL NARRATOR 
Anthony Trollopes access to the public ear, then, was confined to the 
utterances he made in his official capacity at the Post Office or in written 
texts. To find a contemporary whose standing as a public celebrity placed 
him in a contrasting situation, we need look no further than Charles 
Dickens. Dickenss passion and talent for oratory, public reading, and 
acting in melodramas are legendary; his own access to being heard in public 
was nearly unlimited.6 His personal fame attests to a difference between his 
status and Trollope s. When Trollope visited the United States and called on 
Brigham Young, having "been vain enough to conceive that he would have 
heard my name," he was "properly punished" by the "great polygamist's" 
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turning him away from the door and insisting that Trollope must be a 
"miner" {Autobiography 350). By contrast, when Dickens and his wife came 
to America for a tour of public readings, they were swamped with invita­
tions and surrounded by adoring crowds who tried to touch the author or to 
take away souvenirs from among his clothes. Phyllis Rose has remarked that 
"in the annals of contemporary literary celebrity, there is nothing to which 
one can compare Dickens s reception in America in 1842"; his public 
reception resembled nothing so much as Americas hysterical welcome to 
the Beatles in the early 1960s (157). 
As his biographers have established, Dickens was extremely sensitive 
about his standing in the public regard.7 He sometimes went to absurd 
lengths to maintain credibility in his relations with his audience—witness 
the preface he appended to Bleak House, arguing for the scientific reality of 
death by spontaneous combustion, after the serialized version of the novel 
raised controversy over the circumstances of Krook's demise. Dickens was 
a public figure; his opinions, his imagination, and even his body were re­
garded by his admirers and himself as public property. 
In this respect, Dickens stands apart from all of the other authors in 
this study except (in her later life and in a comparatively modest way) 
Stowe. Kingsley, Thackeray, Gaskell, Eliot, and Trollope all enjoyed liter­
ary reputations of varying degrees of exaltation, and each of them (with the 
possible exception of Kingsley) was "lionized" in the middle of the nine­
teenth century as their works have been canonized since. But as Trollope 
ruefully acknowledges in his autobiography, no one else achieved the fame 
and popularity that Dickens did. 
If we think about novels' narrative discourse in relation to their 
authors' historical situations, we can find significance in Dickenss sin­
gularity: the most publicly present of all these novelists, he was also the 
least given to using address to a "reader" in heterodiegetically narrated 
novels. The moments in Dickens s novels where an uncharacterized narrator 
addresses an audience directly as "you" are rare: one occurs in Little Dorritt 
(300), where the narrator advises the reader to have patience in waiting to 
hear of a character's fate; several mock-formal addresses to "my Lords and 
Gentlemen and Honourable Boards" appear in Our Mutual Friend during 
scenes concerning Betty Higdon; significantly, these distancing interven­
tions include no engaging appeals to "you." The ending of Hard Times, 
which has frequently been compared to a sermon, is framed as direct 
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exhortation to the audience: "Dear reader! It rests with you and me, 
whether, in our two fields of action, similar things shall be or not. Let them 
be!" (227).8 But the most well known and most frequently discussed in­
stances of direct address in Dickens s work is the scene in Bleak House where 
Jo, the illiterate crossing-sweep, dies. 
Because of that scenes prominence, and because of the novel's chrono­
logical proximity to the others in this study, I choose Bleak House as my 
example of Dickens s narrative practice, even though its unique structure 
makes it atypical of Dickens s work. Everyone who has read Bleak House 
remembers the scene of Jos death; the climactic moment of authorial 
address is often seen as prototypically "Dickensian" in terms of its exploita­
tion of melodramatic, emotional impact. How strange, then, that Dickens 
at his most Dickensian—Dickens in an engaging intervention—is actually 
Dickens taking an uncharacteristic narrative stance. 
In terms of narrative perspective, Bleak House is highly experimental 
for its era. The basic pattern of alternating narrators between Esthers 
homodiegetic viewpoint and the other, unnamed narrators heterodiegetic 
perspective is complex in the first place. The multiplicity of voices within 
that "other narrators" utterances complicates the structure even further.9 It 
is not possible to determine who is speaking in Bleak House without first 
asking, When? In what chapter, what paragraph, what line? The inter­
weaving of free indirect discourse with several recurring voices—among 
them a voice for the Fashionable Intelligence, and another voice that reports 
public occurrences at Tom-All-Alone's—produces a genuinely polyvocal 
novel that explodes the idea of an omniscient narrator-as-person. The nar­
rative voice that alternates with Esthers is never a "who," but is rather a 
conglomeration of disparate languages and perspectives: it is, as Elizabeth 
Ermarth has called the realist narrators, "Nobody." The voice is bodiless, 
the perspectives are multiple, the strategies diverse. When the narrator 
suddenly asserts an intense personal presence through direct address during 
the scene of Jos death, the moments sharp contrast with the rest of the text 
draws special attention to the interventions strategy. 
Generally speaking, Dickens creates in Bleak House neither a distanc­
ing narrator nor an engaging narrator. It is not a "narrator" at all, in the 
sense that I have been using the term: a narrative voice representing a 
personal perspective that claims to parallel that of the novelist and that 
addresses an audience/auditor. To be sure, my concern here is not primarily 
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with the dialogic discourse that Dickens produced in Bleak House. Before 
looking in detail at the scene of Jo's death, therefore, I will briefly illustrate 
the variety among the heterodiegetic narrative voices. In that the experi­
mental nature of the text necessarily calls attention to its nature as text—for 
readers today as well as Dickens s contemporary audience—Bleak House is a 
self-reflexive, metafictional novel. Its narrative interventions do not evoke a 
personally present narrator, nor do they insist upon an identity between 
narratee and actual reader. In these respects, it is primarily distancing, 
rather than engaging, according to the models I am using. As such, the text 
is consistent with Dickens s identity as a man whose voice had extra-literary 
access to public attention. He could (and did) reach his audience from stages 
and lecterns, and thus was at leisure to use literary texts for other purposes. 
Within its context, the one passage of direct address—which W. J. Harvey 
has called the "controlled crescendo" of Bleak House {Character and the Novel 
963-964)—is a shimmering example of the power this feminine trope 
could wield within a predominantly masculine narrative situation. 
Let us look, then, at some of the variations in voice that Dickens's 
heterodiegetic narrator undergoes in Bleak House. The narrative stance 
moves freely among the thoughts and words of both major and minor 
characters, resulting in drastic stylistic shifts from one scene (or one part of a 
scene) to another. Some passages resemble pages from a reporter s notebook, 
as for example the scene in the street in front of Krooks shop after the death 
of Nemo. A beadle arrives, seeking information and witnesses for the 
inquest: 
Is immediately referred to innumerable people who can tell 
nothing whatever. Is made more imbecile by being constantly 
informed that Mrs. Green's son "was a law-writer his-self, and 
knowed him better than anybody"—which son of Mrs. Greens 
appears, on inquiry, to be at the present time aboard a vessel 
bound for China, three months out, but considered accessible 
by telegraph, on application to the Lords of the Admiralty. 
Beadle goes into various shops and parlours, examining the 
inhabitants; always shutting the door first, and by exclusion, 
delay, and general idiotcy, exasperating the public. Policeman 
seen to smile to potboy. Public loses interest, and undergoes 
reaction. Taunts the beadle, in shrill youthful voices, with 
having boiled a boy; choruses fragments of a popular song to 
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that effect, and importing that the boy was made into soup 
for the workhouse. Policeman at last finds it necessary to support 
the law, and seize a vocalist; who is released upon the flight of 
the rest, on condition of his getting out of this then, come! and 
cutting it—a condition he immediately observes. (195 — 196) 
This short excerpt from the scene is narrated from a fairly consistent view­
point, by an educated speaker whose evident contempt for the beadle comes 
across in such terms as "imbecile" and "idiotcy"; like all the hetero­
diegetically narrated chapters in Bleak House, it casts its verbs in the present 
tense. The speakers relative sophistication can be inferred from the distance 
he establishes between his perspective and the antics of beadle, crowd, and 
policeman. Although he has access to words such as "exasperating," "in­
numerable," and "vocalist," his language is often invaded by that of the 
crowd. He can render their discourse directly (" 'was a law-writer his-self'") 
or indirectly ("getting out of this then, come! and cutting it"), which blurs 
the margins between his own language and the crowds. The ungram­
matical sentences rely on predicates without subjects ("Taunts the beadle"), 
dangling participles ("choruses fragments of a popular song to that effect, 
and importing"), and misplaced relative pronouns ("which son of Mrs. 
Greens appears") to suggest the loose style of the speakers on the street and/ 
or of someone noting their words and actions rapidly. Casual language 
mingles with terms from "officialese," perhaps the language of the beadle, 
or of the newspaper or institution for whom the reporter is taking notes 
("appears, on inquiry, to be at the present time," "who is released upon the 
flight of the rest, on condition"). The resulting polyvocal rendition of the 
scene is presented to the narratee of Bleak House almost as though it were 
some kind of document. This is not a mimetic representation of a speakers 
remarks to a personal addressee or even to a collective audience. 
The narration of Bleak House continually shifts in style and perspec­
tive. The chapter following the one in which Nemo's death occurs depicts 
the Dedlocks in Paris. Here the narrators voice undergoes appropriate 
alterations, exaggerating the superficial differences between the world of 
Lady Dedlock and that of her former lover: 
Sooth to say, they cannot go away too fast; for, even here, my 
Lady Dedlock has been bored to death. Concert, assembly, 
opera, theatre, drive, nothing is new to my Lady, under the 
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worn-out heavens. Only last Sunday, when poor wretches were 
gay—within the walls, playing with children among the clipped 
trees and the statues in the Palace Garden; walking, a score 
abreast, in the Elysian Fields, made more Elysian by performing 
dogs and wooden horses; between whiles filtering (a few) 
through the gloomy Cathedral of Our Lady, to say a word or two 
at the base of a pillar, within flare of a rusty little gridiron full 
of gusty little tapers—without the walls, encompassing Paris 
with dancing, love-making, wine-drinking, tobacco-smoking, 
tomb-visiting, billiard card and domino playing, quack-
doctoring, and much murderous refuse, animate and inani-
mate—only last Sunday, my Lady, in the desolation of Boredom 
and the clutch of Giant Despair, almost hated her own maid for 
being in spirits. 
She cannot, therefore, go too fast from Paris. Weariness of 
soul lies before her, as it lies behind—her Ariel has put a girdle 
of it round the whole earth, and it cannot be unclasped. 
(204-205) 
Here, the elaborately literary diction contrasts with the casual language of 
the previous chapter. "Sooth to say," "poor wretches," "she cannot, there­
fore, go too fast"—the formal locutions align themselves with cliches 
("bored to death," "under the worn-out heavens") to mimic the artificial 
stiffness of Lady Dedlock's existence. The literary allusions (to Ariel and to 
Giant Despair) and the use of personification (Boredom) combine with 
sardonic wordplay (the Elysian Fields "made more Elysian") to elevate the 
tone of the language. And yet even this passage is mixed in its voices. The 
long aside that occurs between dashes to depict "low-life" on a Sunday in 
Paris interrupts Lady Dedlock's insipid existence with a vivid string of 
activities. Dickens s famous penchant for list making comes into play, as the 
narrative voice contrasts Lady Dedlock's static list of occupations, all named 
by nouns ("Concert, assembly, opera, theatre, drive") with the life going on 
around her in exuberant participles and gerunds ("dancing, love-making, 
wine-drinking," etc.) The voice of the Fashionable Intelligence which re­
ports on the Dedlocks' movements (56) gets interrupted and thrown off 
course by the voice of street life, even as Lady Dedlock s own world is soon to 
be thus disturbed.10 
To look at every passage in Bleak Houses present-tense chapters in this 
much detail would obviously be to undertake a monumental task—and yet 
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even this level of detail cannot begin to describe all the complexities with 
which the narrative voice plays off one kind of discourse with another. 
Without attempting to describe the subtleties of every passage or, indeed, 
of the novel as a whole, I want simply to emphasize that such narration does 
not mimic conversation, for the speakers identity is constantly shifting, 
and the narratees position is questionable and problematic. If we cannot 
establish who is speaking, how can we hope to know "to whom"? Unlike 
Esthers narrative, which manifests a strong awareness of a potential reading 
audience, the present-tense sections seem to be addressed to nobody in 
particular, to "nemo." The narratee, like the narrator, is "Nobody." 
' A N  D DYING THUS AROUND US EVERY DAY": THE 
ENGAGING MOMENT 
This shifting conglomeration of narrative voices and stances is what 
renders the moment of direct address at Jos deathbed so memorable. All the 
force of the chameleon narrator suddenly consolidates into a voice that 
focuses itself outside the text for a unique moment of discursive contact 
between narrator and readers. The placement of the address at the end of a 
chapter seems to suspend narrative time, thus emphasizing the effect of 
extending the passage s point of reference outside the text. (Had the passage 
occurred at the end of a "number" in serial publication, the suspension of 
narrative time would have been even more strongly enforced, but as it 
happened, Dickens placed this chapter at the beginning of the fortieth 
installment of Bleak House [947-948].) 
The chapter ends with Allan Woodcourt leading the dying boy in the 
Lords Prayer, which Jo continually interrupts to ask "is the light a-comiri, 
sir?" (705). Jo stumbles through the prayers third line and expires: 
"Hallowed be—thy—" 
The light is come upon the dark benighted way. Dead! 
Dead, your Majesty. Dead, my lords and gentlemen. 
Dead, Right Reverends and Wrong Reverends of every order. 
Dead, men and women, born with Heavenly compassion in 
your hearts. And dying thus around us every day. (705) 
Coming in the context of Bleak Houses narrative indeterminacy and rela­
tivity, this unabashedly didactic address has a peculiar power." It begins in 
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the distancing mode, addressing a narratee with whom very few people can 
identify, "Your Majesty." This is not the first appearance of that narratee in 
the novel: the voice of the Fashionable Intelligence directs one snide remark 
to "Your Majesty" much earlier (55). This time, though, the voice moves 
on, to address the increasingly comprehensive groups of Parliament ("my 
lords and gentlemen") and Christian ministers ("Right Reverends"). The 
stance is still distancing, because only a minority of readers can answer 
personally to these addresses, and because the narrator ensures that many of 
them will refuse to identify with the next appellation he chooses, "Wrong 
Reverends of every order." The distancing stance implicitly places the 
blame for Jo's death on all of these public figures, with whom most readers 
would not identify themselves. 
But then, in the modulation to "men and women, born with Heav­
enly compassion in your hearts," the narratee is suddenly transformed into 
"you" (through the phrase, "your hearts"): no adult reader can escape the 
address, or the implication of culpability. The final coda, "and dying thus 
around us every day," takes the ultimately engaging step of unifying the 
narrative "I" with "you" into the figure of "us"—this narrator, who up to 
now has had no unified voice, no identity to tie him to any personal 
perspective, is momentarily revealed to all of his readers as one of them, one 
of the "men and women" who are bound to take some action on behalf of Jo's 
memory. The action the narrator takes—of course—is to speak for the 
inarticulate Jo and to enlist the sympathy of actual readers for actual deaths. 
Dickens s strategy at such a moment is melodramatic, sensational, 
sentimental. It is also engaging in the technical sense. For one instant in a 
very long novel it evokes the presence of actual readers, and it requires those 
readers to consider the relation of the book in their hands to the world they 
inhabit. Barbara Hardy says of the moment that "Dickens at last finds a 
perfect voice for death," in which "the individual experience is given a 
resonance and intensity, the readers sympathy engaged through ritual or 
ritualistic appeals" {Forms of Feeling 73). Hardy attributes the passages 
affective impact to "the generalization which attaches the emotion drama­
tized inside the book to a broader emotional experience": the experience, 
that is, of "you" and "us." The highly self-conscious literary frame that 
surrounds the moment is technically distancing. Still, in allowing his 
slippery narrator one personal manifestation, one instance of intimate con­
tact with actual readers, Dickens was borrowing an engaging technique. 
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What did it mean for a Victorian male novelist to borrow a feminine 
narrative gesture? Women novelists had, after all, appropriated earnest 
direct address from the rhetoric of male preachers and politicians, trans­
porting it from the public realm into the pages of their fiction. For women, 
this formed the most direct means of access to real-world political influence. 
Through women's novels, it also came to form part of the feminine literary 
tradition of manipulating literary rhetoric in order to effect real-world 
change. Dickens had more access than most men to the publics attention, 
because he could speak in his own voice and be assured of an attentive 
audience. (His famous public readings were to attest to his pleasure in 
commanding that public eye and ear.) As we have seen, the metaliterary 
structure of a novel such as Bleak House demonstrates the male novelist s 
resulting leisure to cavort through a text, to be—as S. J. Newman puts it, 
in reference to Dickens—"at play." When a male novelist felt a need to "get 
serious," if only momentarily, he could reach across the gap in gendered 
interventions to grasp the technique that women were devising for the 
purpose. 
Cross-influence among male and female novelists has long com­
manded the attention of critics and reviewers. Dickens himself thought 
that Stowe, for example, borrowed too much from fellow novelists. In an 
1852 letter, he wrote of his reaction to Uncle Tom's Cabin: 
She (I mean Mrs. Stowe) is a leetle unscrupulous in the appro­
priatin' way. I seem to see a writer with whom I am very inti­
mate (and whom nobody can possibly admire more than myself) 
peeping very often through the thinness of the paper. Further I 
descry the ghost of Mary Barton. . . . [B}ut in spite of this, I 
consider the book a fine one. (quoted in Leavis 166) 
The "writer with whom I am very intimate" must be Dickens himself. 
Playfully, he appropriate s Stowe s American dialect to frame the very phrase 
in which he accuses her of unscrupulously borrowing material from him. 
The timing of this letter suggests, however, that he may have been protest­
ing too much: indeed, he may have borrowed from the intervention strate­
gies of Uncle Tom and Mary Barton while composing the scene of Jo's death. 
Bleak House was written in installments, beginning in November 
r851 and ending in August 1853.u Dickens did not write the chapter 
containing Jo's death until the summer of 1853, after he had written the 
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1852 letter about Uncle Tom. The "ghost of Mary Barton" he saw in Uncle 
Tom could have been the spectre of presence evoked by the repeated passages 
of earnest direct address so characteristic of both women's texts. That 
ghost—the feminine presence that speaks earnestly to "you"—may have 
risen again for Dickens as he composed a scene whose purposes had so much 
in common with the two women's novels. When he needed to appeal to 
preachers and politicians and to the "men and women" who formed their 
audiences, he borrowed from the women novlists the technique that they 
had adapted from public speakers. 
Critics have come to see Esthers narrative as the location of femininity 
in Bleak House.B The engaging moment after Jo's death, however, shows 
signs of the feminine carrying over into the heterodiegetically narrated 
parts of the novel, enabling Dickens to achieve his sentimental effects even 
within this multivalent, metaliterary structure. Like his female contempo­
raries, Dickens did not disdain the rhetoric of sensation: the power and 
popularity of his novels attest to the potential effectiveness of crossing the 
gendered boundaries of narrative intervention. 
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Reflecting upon the Model: 
Gendered Interventions 
in History 

7 
The Victorian Place of Enunciation: 
Gender and the Chance to Speak 
FOR THE nineteenth-century woman who had something to say, finding a 
safe space in which to say it was not easy. If she restricted herself to 
addressing her own domestic circle, her "true womanhood" could remain 
intact, but she would have to be content with the rather abstract prospect of 
influencing the public world indirectly through her personal impact on her 
husband, brothers, and sons.1 If she tried instead to speak in public—as the 
American socialist reformer Fanny Wright began to do in the 1830s—she 
might extend her range of influence. She ran the risk, however, of endan­
gering not only her feminine reputation, but also the public perception of 
her female sexuality. 
Women were fully aware of the danger of speaking before a sexually 
mixed audience, or what journalists of the period liked to call a "promis­
cuous" gathering. Even in places where women were openly encouraged to 
speak, as in meetings of the American socialist movement, they suppressed 
themselves. One Owenite woman, trying to explain her silence, asked: "It 
being so novel a thing for females to speak in public assemblies, and the idea 
of all eyes being, at once, directed toward them, is it all that marvellous 
that . .  . a sufficiency of courage is wanting to speak their sentiments?"2 
The woman's anxiety peeps through the shifting syntax of her question. The 
phrase "and the idea of all eyes being, at once, directed toward them" is 
grammatically unconnected to the first part of the sentence; it is a subject 
without any predicate, a state of "being" for which the consequences remain 
unspoken. What she cannot say is that the nineteenth-century female body 
toward which "all eyes [are] at once directed" must surrender its femininity. 
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Catharine Beecher, the elder sister of Harriet Beecher Stowe, dedi­
cated her life to didactic writings and lectures on domestic science. She 
knew all about the immasculating potential of a woman's speech before a 
promiscuous audience. Teaching by word, if not by example, that women 
must devote themselves exclusively to their domestic responsibilities, 
Beecher covered the paradox of her own public activity by addressing chiefly 
female audiences and by attacking women who compromised their femi­
ninity by daring to speak before men. Consider her 1836 portrait of Fanny 
Wright: 
Who can look without disgust and abhorrence upon such an one 
as Fanny Wright, with her great masculine person, her loud 
voice, her untasteful attire, going about unprotected and feel­
ing no need of protection, mingling with men in stormy de­
bate, and standing up with bare-faced impudence, to lecture to 
a public assembly. . . . There she stands, with brazen front and 
brawny arms, attacking the safeguards of all that is venerable 
and sacred in religion, all that is safe and wise in law, all that is 
pure and lovely in domestic virtue. Her talents only make her 
the more conspicuous and offensive, her amiable disposition and 
sincerity, only make her folly and want of common sense the 
more pitiable, her freedom from private vices, if she is free, only 
indicates, that without delicacy, and without principles, she has 
so thrown off all feminine attractions, that freedom from temp­
tation is her only, and shameful palladium. I cannot conceive 
any thing in the shape of a woman, more intolerably offensive 
and disgusting.3 
Beechers description transforms the woman orator into a thing, not just an 
object of derision, but also the object of the looks that Beecher beckons her 
readers to direct at Wright. The conservative political agenda of the attack 
is evident; Wright's socialist ideas threaten "all that is venerable and sa­
cred . . . safe and wise . . . pure and lovely." But Beecher is careful neither 
to quote nor to allude to those ideas: they never take shape in her text. What 
emerges instead is Wrights "great masculine person"—Wright was un­
commonly tall—"her untasteful attire," her "brazen front and brawny 
arms." If Wrights clothes are "untasteful," then she has abandoned the 
feminine duties and values of her middle-class status and has given the 
promiscuous audience licence to undress her; the body they find beneath 
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the attire is "masculine" and "brawny." The placement of Wright s figure— 
"standing up with bare-faced impudence, to lecture to a public assembly," 
"unprotected and feeling no need of protection, mingling with men"— 
further accentuates the vision of the nakedly masculine stance Wright 
automatically adopts by mounting the stage. 
Perhaps the most revealing move in Beecher's characterization of 
Wright, though, is her handling of Wrights personal virtues. Conceding 
the lecturers "amiable disposition and sincerity," she demurs over Wrights 
"freedom from private vices, if she is free." Beecher reasons that so immas­
culated a woman could not have avoided vicious sexual entanglements 
through anything so feminine as "delicacy and principles." Instead, she has 
"so thrown off all feminine attractions" that no man would want her. What 
is "shameful" about Wright s "freedom from temptation" is that a feminine 
Victorian woman, while she must repulse sexual overtures from men, is also 
required to inspire them. 
This vision of the incompatibility of public speaking with not only 
feminine propriety, but also female sexuality, would surely have presented a 
daunting picture to any "respectable" woman with ambitions of exerting a 
public influence. To speak in public, Beecher implies, is to become a "thing 
in the shape of a woman": to lose one's intrinsic sexuality as well as ones 
outward gender, and worse, to become the object of the public regard. 
Beechers position is a startling one, given its context: she was herself 
making a public utterance when she wrote the sketch of Wright for publica­
tion in her Letters on the Difficulties ofReligion (1836). And Beecher did give 
lectures on domestic economy—but not, if she could help it, to "promis­
cuous" audiences. The position from which Beecher writes is the ambitious 
bourgeois matrons (or spinsters) compromise with the prevailing ideology 
of domestic influence. She will speak to women of women's concerns, but 
she will insist on remaining "in her place," out of that frightfully objectify­
ing public view.4 
Catharine Beechers verbal cartoon of Frances Wright recalls the gen­
der arrangements in nineteenth-century caricatures of women orators. 
Women speaking to groups of mixed or uncertain gender get stripped of 
their femininity in Victorian-era cartoons, while women speaking to 
women are marked as feminine, even if they are made to look foolish. The 
French caricature on the frontispiece of this book shows a coarse-featured, 
open-mouthed woman addressing amused women and distressed men from 
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The woman orator who speaks to women, thus maintaining 
her femininity. (Courtesy of Harvard College Library.) 
a pulpit (1871). The 1842 cartoon from Punch {facing page) makes an even 
more masculinized thing of its subject, the "female Chartist," Mary Anne 
Walker. Flat-chested, sharp-featured, wild-eyed, and speaking, the cari­
cature of Walker is accompanied by Punch's comments on her gender-
identity. "Miss Walker," Punch reports, "gave indications at a very early age 
of a turn for public life, and from her decidedly masculine predilections, she 
acquired the appellation of Tom-boy in her own immediate neighborhood" 
(192). By contrast, the 1848 drawing of a woman addressing a working 
women's club {above, attributed to "Beaumont" in Fuchs, 472) shows an 
exaggeratedly feminine form, a delicately featured face, and an arm at­
tached to a hand by a decidedly limp wrist. Evidently, to speak to a group of 
women was one thing; to speak to a "promiscuous" gathering was quite 
another matter. 
162 
"Portrait of a Female Politician" from Punch. The female Chartist 
with the "masculine predilection" for public speaking. (Courtesy of 
Harvard College Library.) 
Buried in these visual strategies for depriving women orators of their 
gender is the attribute of the lecturer that poses the greatest threat to the 
idea of true womanhood that Catharine Beecher shared with fellow domes­
tic ideologues: "her loud voice." Against the background of the ban on 
public self-expression, a woman with something to say was better off re­
stricting her voice to the comparative silence of print. Indeed, by the 
1870s, when Harriet Beecher Stowe toured New England and the Midwest, 
reading her fiction aloud in an unsuccessful attempt to earn large sums of 
money, a woman could appear on a stage without repercussions. Though 
some reviews of Stowes readings disparaged her voice for being weaker 
than, for example, Dickens's (one review pointedly put her in her place, 
remarking that "as a parlour reader Mrs. Stowe may be pleasant enough, 
but as a public reader she furnishes forth dull entertainment"), no one 
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challenged the right of America's most famous woman author to read her 
work before a mixed audience.5 
Nevertheless, Stowe herself cherished an idea, very similar to her 
sister Catharine's, about the gendered implications of addressing an audi­
ence from a stage. In Annie Fieldss memoir of Stowe, she tells of the 
novelists preparations before her first public reading in Boston. Fields 
reports that Stowe 
called me into her bedroom, where she stood before the mirror, 
with her short gray hair, which usually lay in soft curls around 
her brow, brushed erect and standing stiffly, "Look here, my 
dear," she said: "now I am exactly like my father, Dr. Lyman 
Beecher, when he was going to preach," and she held up her 
forefinger warningly. It was easy to see that the spirit of the old 
preacher was revived in her veins, and the afternoon would show 
something of his power. (299) 
Granted, the phallic imagery of this description—the usually soft hair 
"erect and standing stiffly," the admonitory forefinger "held up," the fa­
thers spirit engorging the woman's veins with power—belongs to Fields, 
not to Stowe. But the fantasy of resembling the powerful male preacher is 
Stowe s, and Fields s avid participation in the fantasy shows that this woman 
of the 1870s had not strayed far from the ideas that Catharine Beecher had 
expressed forty years earlier about the immasculating potential of public 
speaking. To "preach" on stage was automatically to cross-dress. 
Surprisingly enough, for some women, even to write for publication 
was to cross-dress. In spite of the firmly established tradition of eighteenth-
century literary women, appearing in print in early nineteenth-century 
America was tantamount to appearing in drag. Mary Kelley relates a telling 
anecdote about Caroline Howard Gilman, who remembered in her old age 
that as a teenager she had been overcome with shame in 1810 when one of 
her poems (which a relative had secretly submitted for publication) was 
accepted. Gilman said she had "wept bitterly" and been "alarmed" to see 
herself in print—it was "as if I had been detected in a man's apparel" (180). 
What is interesting about Gilman's reaction is not just her youthful sup­
pression of the generations of women who had written and published before 
her, but her intense identification of her poem with her own body. She 
explained the shame of publication as though it meant exposure of a hidden 
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predilection: for the public to see her manuscript clothed, as it were, in 
print was the same for her as if they had seen her own female body clothed in 
a man's garb. The key word in her reflection on the experience is "detected": 
the shame was not in the writing or the cross-dressing, but in having been 
caught in the act. 
Gilmans confession suggests that occupying herself with literary 
writing was still a transgression of gender roles, even for a woman of 
Gaskells, Stowe's, and Eliot's generation. Public speaking and preaching, 
too, were off limits for the woman who was anxious not to transgress gender 
lines. What the women novelists did was to take two modes of potentially 
dangerous expression and combine them, forming a mode through which 
they could "speak" without exposing themselves. By taking up the strate­
gies that men used in real-world discourse—the earnest exhortation, the 
personalized direct address to an audience, the insistence on speaking a 
truth—the women transformed those rhetorical moves into feminine codes 
in literary discourse. By moving preacherly rhetoric into print, they created 
a literary space where they could "speak" in relative safety. To write fiction 
with engaging narrative strategies was, for the mid-nineteenth century, to 
write as a woman: when Dickens or Trollope sometimes borrowed them, 
they, too, were cross-dressing. And yet for the men, novel-writing repre­
sented such a different choice in the realm of public utterances from what it 
meant for the women: it is not really surprising that feminine, engaging 
moves are more difficult to find in men's texts than are masculine, distanc­
ing moves in women's novels. Men had so many other public places in which 
they could, if they chose to, say something. 
The difficulty, then, for the Victorian woman who wished to speak 
was to find the space where she could speak safely, the place of enunciation 
she could occupy without the humiliation of transforming herself into a 
"thing in the shape of a woman," or even a figure "exactly like [her] father." 
She could, if she would, speak up at an Owenite meeting, in a Quaker 
church, before a group of women students, at a religious revival, or as an 
evangelist buttonholing individual sinners: each of these alternatives, 
though, had the double disadvantage of giving the speaker access to only a 
small (and usually already converted) audience, and of requiring the 
woman's physical presence in a public arena.6 If she was torn between 
ambition and the fear of immasculation and humiliation, if she wanted to 
reach large numbers with her voice without exposing her body to the 
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general view, her only option was to write. The challenge was to find a mode 
of writing that could wield the kind of power that public speaking repre­
sented for men. Realistic fiction became that mode. 
MAINTAINING A GOO D NAME: AUTHORIAL PRIORITIES 
IN THE FEMININE REALM 
The fact that writing was the respectable middle-class woman's single 
opportunity for public self-expression has been firmly established in studies 
of genders relation to authorship. Ellen Moers, for example, says that "the 
novel and the poem were women's only instruments of social action in the 
early nineteenth century: literature was their pulpit, tribune, academy, 
commission, and parliament all in one. 'I want to be doing something with 
the pen,' said Harriet Martineau, 'since no other means of action in politics 
are in a woman's power'" {Literary Women 20). Of American society, Kelley 
writes that "women were isolated from and generally denied participation 
in their country's public life. They were not statesmen or politicians, judges 
or legislators, entrepreneurs or merchants, or in any way simply prominent, 
public citizens" ( i n )  . And Vineta Colby writes of British women that 
"forbidden the pulpit, the university lecture platform, the seat in Parlia­
ment, they turned to an outlet in which they were welcome and through 
which they could express their ideas and wield an influence otherwise 
denied them" (6).7 On both sides of the Atlantic, the ground where the 
respectable woman could speak authoritatively in public was strictly lim­
ited to the space within the covers of a book. 
Under the circumstances, women who wrote were likely to regard 
their activity as being different from that of literary men. Robert A. Colby 
has said that when George Eliot referred "to herself in late career as an 
'aesthetic teacher,' she was simply articulating what writers and readers had 
long accepted as the function of the man (or woman) of letters in society" 
(18). But did this parenthetical woman of letters necessarily regard her own 
function as identical to that of the man? And was the teaching that George 
Eliot's early novels tried to accomplish strictly of an "aesthetic" nature? (In 
the context of the letter where she uses the phrase, Eliot distinguishes 
between "aesthetic" and "doctrinal" teaching, in order to dissociate herself 
from novelists who concentrate on theological or political current events.) I 
think that Eliot's claim to be participating in the masculine tradition of 
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aesthetic teaching, like her pseudonym and her use of distancing techniques 
in Adam Bede, is a sign of her self-conscious appropriation of a male role. 
Men, after all, could exert moral and political influence directly from 
pulpits, lecture halls, or parliamentary seats if they chose to. For them, 
literature was primarily an aesthetic realm, a space where texts and tradi­
tions could be played off against one another in an admittedly artificial 
form. Literature could serve the same purpose for women, but from the 
perspective of the female writer, literature also had to be the space of action 
and of public influence, difficult if not impossible for her to achieve in other 
spheres. 
Women of the period certainly could recognize the potential for 
power that writing fiction represented. Dinah Mulock Craik is often quoted 
on this subject, for her striking boast that the novel is "one of the most 
important moral agents of the community. The essayist may write for his 
hundreds, the preacher preach for his thousands; but the novelist counts his 
audience by millions. His power is three-fold—over heart, reason, and 
fancy."8 The novelists power, then, is to be reckoned by the numbers he 
reaches as well as by the strategies—emotional, intellectual, and imagina-
tive—he uses to move his enormous audience. What is odd about Craik s 
assertion, though, is the elision of gender that leads her to call the novelist, 
along with the essayist and preacher, "he." Whereas the essayist and the 
preacher would almost invariably be male, the novelist in Craik s day would 
have a fair chance of being female. Though a novelist herself, Craik seems to 
hesitate to claim publicly the novelist's power for her own sex. The implicit 
claim is there (along with the ironic fact that she is also for the moment 
included among the masculine group of "essayists"), but Craik's hesitation 
to overtly assign female gender to these groups of writers supports Kelley s 
contention that any mid-nineteenth-century woman who wrote for publica­
tion would have had to see herself as filling a male role.9 
By taking on a public identity, by earning money, and by participat­
ing in the creation of culture, the woman writer, Kelley explains, assumed 
a "semblance of male status" ( i n )  . What Mary Poovey says of an earlier 
generation of English women writers was still largely true at mid-century: 
"The cultural pressure to conform to the image of proper (or innate) femi­
ninity directly contradicted the demands of professional authorship" (241). 
To be sure, authorship itself was not seen as intrinsically masculine. Caro­
line Howard Gilman, for example, expressed no sense of shame for having 
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written a poem, but she agonized over being "detected" at it. It was the 
professional aspect of writing for publication—transporting a woman's 
words outside the domestic sphere—that endangered her feminine reputa­
tion in the publics view and in her own. 
That Gaskell, Stowe, and Eliot—like the less celebrated "literary 
domestics" of their era—wished, at least at some level, to maintain their 
respectability has been well established by their various biographers. One 
sign of that desire was their reluctance to attach their names to their earliest 
work. Gaskell published Mary Barton anonymously; Eliot invented for 
herself a male pen name. And although Stowe did not suppress the fact that 
Uncle Tom's Cabin was her work, she did try to disavow responsibility for it 
(with her infamous claim that "God wrote it"). Almost perversely, Stowe 
adopted a masculine pseudonym, "Christopher Crowfield," for her most 
domestically oriented books, House and Home Papers (1865) and Little Foxes, 
or the Little Failings which Mar Domestic Happiness (1866). Perhaps Stowe felt 
that her fame as the author of Uncle Tom disqualified her from making 
feminine pronouncements in her own female name. 
Both Gaskells and Stowes feminine "good names" were damaged by 
the reforming thrust of their literary efforts. For Gaskell, the temporary loss 
of her reputation as a proper woman came, as I have mentioned, with the 
publication of Ruth. For Stowe, the writing of Uncle Tom's Cabin precipi­
tated attacks on her womanhood as virulent as the attacks on her artistry, 
especially from Southern reviewers. In a particularly memorable example, 
George F. Holmes in the Southern Literary Messenger made "a distinction 
between lady writers and female writers" to justify the vehemence of his 
condemnation of Stowes novel: 
We could not find it in our hearts to visit the dulness or igno­
rance of a well-meaning lady with the vigorous discipline which 
it is necessary to inflict upon male dunces and blockheads. But 
where a writer of the softer sex manifests, in her productions, a 
shameless disregard of truth and of those amenities which so 
peculiarly belong to her sphere of life, we hold that she has 
forfeited her claim to be considered a lady, and with that claim 
all exemption from the utmost stringency of critical punish­
ment. (Ammons 7) 
Ironically, although Holmes s reasons for denuding Stowe of the privileges 
of her sex are not intentionally complimentary, his action has the effect of 
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distinguishing her work as deserving serious (albeit negative) attention. 
Stowes use of the novel to extend her influence beyond "her sphere of life" 
meant that she gave up some of the feminine respectability due to a "lady 
writer," but it also meant she could be taken seriously. Stowes family name 
was already a liability among Southern anti-abolitionists; in a flippant 
attack on Dred for its "profanity," the Messenger (speaking through an 
ostensibly female persona, a "young lady of New England") says of Stowe: 
"Were she a woman, we should blush for the sex—luckily she is only a 
Beecher" (Ammons 48). (I imagine this imputation would have nettled 
Catharine at least as much as it could bother her sister.) 
For Eliot, too, a "good name" was a constantly nagging problem. 
Before she published her first novel, Eliot had already sacrificed her own 
feminine reputation to her relationship with George Lewes, not to mention 
having supported herself with professional, intellectual, literary work. On 
both counts, she "was no lady," and even after her fiction had been exposed 
as the work of a female writer, she was inevitably taken more seriously than 
any "lady writer" could be. Her insistence upon calling herself "Mrs. 
Lewes" throughout the twenty-two years that she lived out of wedlock with 
the man whose first name she borrowed for her pen name is a poignant sign 
of her desire to frame her personal life in terms of conventionally approved 
female roles. Biographers have speculated that Eliot's becoming "Mrs. 
Cross" so soon after Lewes's death signaled her eagerness to embrace that 
feminine role officially. 
The personal positions Gaskell, Stowe, and Eliot took on female 
roles, then, were not particularly revolutionary. Indeed, critics who look 
through the plots of their novels in the hope of finding proto-feminist 
assertions of female power and subversiveness are, as often as not, disap-
pointed.10 Nevertheless, when these women wrote their first fictions, they 
embarked on the literary project in a distinctly feminine way, a way that was 
shaped by and appropriate to the positions they occupied as middle-class 
women torn between the irreconcilable desires to be publicly influential 
and to be irreproachably respectable. The narrative stance in their realist 
fictions is one sign of their feminine strategy for coping with the restrictions 
on their real-world discourse. By rejecting the model of self-referential 
narrative reflexiveness presented by the work of their male predecessors 
and contemporaries, and by using direct address to bridge the gap be­
tween strictly literary utterances and serious statements, they adapted the 
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novelist's art to women's purposes. Engaging address to the reader is a sign 
of these women's conceptions of the purpose of art; as such, it signifies a 
gendered gesture. 
The mid-nineteenth-century "feminine" idea of art is that fiction 
should be didactic in a particular way, with moral conversion as the novel's 
central goal. Men's novels of the period are also didactic, and their stories 
can trace the moral evolution of a central character (as in Yeast, Great 
Expectations, and Phineas Finn, for instance). The gendered difference, as I 
have argued for individual novels, is not one of story, but of discourse: 
feminine strategies for shaping the conversation between the narrator and 
narratee rely on the earnest mode of evangelical exhortation, while mas­
culine strategies maintain a more conventionally literary structure of 
ironic, self-reflexive fictionality. Later in this chapter, I compare the femi­
nine use of direct address in fiction to the rhetoric that nineteenth-century 
male writers use when they are speaking "in earnest," especially in sermons. 
First, though, I want to examine the idea of fiction's purpose that these 
female writers held when they began their novel-writing careers. 
A perceived difference between the aims of Victorian men and women 
in writing novels already lurks behind critical summaries of the period, 
though the difference is not always explicitly announced as one of gender. 
To cite one prominent example: in his classic study of the genre of didactic 
novels, Robert A. Colby correctly assumes that "fiction with a purpose" had 
roughly the same purpose for male and female authors: to teach. If we look 
at Colby's characterizations of male and female novelists' purposes, though, 
we can detect signs of the gendered difference in his own descriptions. 
Colby quotes at length from Dinah Mulock Craiks essay on the novelist's 
power, remarking that Craik's declarations (for example, "Fiction forsooth! 
It is the core of all the truths of this world; for it is the truth of life itself. He 
who dares to reproduce it is a Prometheus who has stolen celestial fire; let 
him take care that he uses it for the benefit of his fellow mortals") "might 
have been written by George Eliot" (19). Thus yoking the purposes of two 
women writers, Colby adds Charlotte Bronte to their company, comment­
ing that as novelists, Bronte and Eliot "enter not only their readers' homes 
but their minds and consciences. Miss Bronte, through Lucy Snowe, minis­
ters to the soul in anguish. George Eliot, from a more detached viewpoint, 
becomes a guide to the perplexed in matters of faith and morality" (19). 
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Colby uses the same metaphor to describe the activity of male and 
female Victorian novelists: they penetrate the domestic circles of strangers 
to speak to their readers. Within his argument, though, Colby shows no 
sign of recognizing the distinction he is making between the women's 
purposes and the men's in entering readers' homes. Immediately preceding 
his characterization of Bronte and Eliot is a comment on one of their male 
contemporaries: "Dickens, as reporter turned novelist, exposes hidden 
shame and tries to shock his more affluent readers out of their smugness. 
Thackeray enters his readers' homes, bringing them cultural 'news,' advis­
ing the young on love and their parents on education and marriage pros­
pects" (19). Colby's own phrasing points to a difference: the woman novelist 
"ministers to the soul," guides readers "in matters of faith and morality"; 
the man "exposes hidden shame and tries to shock," or dispenses advice on 
social relations and practical matters. The women's purpose is more per­
sonal, more individualized, more spiritual than the men's. When, in the 
same context, he quotes Trollope s remarks about "the low-heeled buskin of 
modern fiction" (18), which Trollope saw as filling a cultural need for 
"rational amusement" (17), Colby unintentionally emphasizes the gen­
dered difference. The "low-heeled buskin" image draws attention to the 
artificial, staged nature of fiction, or its value as "amusement." Perfectly 
appropriate for the masculine literary pursuits of Trollope, Thackeray, 
Kingsley, and even (when he is "at play") Dickens, the formula seems oddly 
inapplicable to the feminine projects of Gaskell, Stowe, or Eliot. 
Of the three women writers, Eliot was the one most concerned at the 
beginning of her career about the status of her work as art; she was, in this 
sense, the most "masculine." As we have seen, her preoccupation with 
aesthetic standards dominates her pseudonymous correspondence with her 
publisher on Scenes of Clerical Life, surfaces in her reviews of other writers' 
fiction (especially "Silly Novels by Lady Novelists"), and pervades the 
narrative interventions in Adam Bede. We should not forget that the letters, 
reviews, and even the novels were ostensibly signed by a man and contain 
textual codes to support the signature—her "readers," from John Black­
wood to the Westminster Review s audience to the narratees oi Scenes of Clerical 
Life, were supposed to assume that they were being addressed by a man. 
(Blackwood apparently did assume it; his letters to Lewes about Scenes 
solemnly refer to the novelist as "he.")" Eliot was not scrupulously careful 
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to gender all her published narrative "Is" as masculine: though many critics 
still assume that the Adam Bede narrator is a man, some contemporary 
readers found evidence that a woman must have written Eliot's first two 
novels, including, by their own report, Dickens and Stowe.12 
In an even more revealing instance, Eliot shifts the gendered refer­
ences of the pronouns in her essayist personas impassioned call to "Lady 
Novelists" to stop writing silly novels. The essays concluding paragraph 
begins with the "we" that stands for the essayist s masculine mask: "Hap­
pily, we are not dependent on argument to prove that fiction is a depart­
ment of literature in which women can, after their kind, fully equal men." 
This "editorial we," the name of the presumably male reviewer, recedes 
later in the paragraph, as the writer includes herself among the ranks of 
potentially serious women novelists: "No educational requirements can 
shut women out from the materials of fiction, and there is no species of art 
which is so free from rigid requirements. Like crystalline masses, it may 
take any form, and yet be beautiful; we have only to pour in the right 
elements—genuine observation, humor, and passion" {Essays 324, empha­
sis added). Eliot's female identity, then, can slip through the male persona 
of her "editorial we" or her pen name. She flashed her adopted male name 
(or, alternatively, the anonymity of the reviewer) as though it were a license 
to write about aesthetic matters. 
Nevertheless, in each of these fictional and nonfictional forums, the 
terms in which she writes about aesthetics place her in a feminine-gendered 
position in relation to art. Her interest in aesthetic form always comes back 
to questioning the artifacts relation to reality; for her, as for Gaskell and 
Stowe, that relation is only partly one of representation, of depicting a 
recognizable mirror of "truth" in the fictional world. Their novels' most 
intimate relation to the extratextual world inheres in their rhetoric—in the 
always complex, often contradictory messages about the world that the 
texts transmit, but even more in the appeal to actual readers to recognize 
themselves as the figures to whom those messages are addressed. The 
specific messages about social, political, or moral "realities" are less impor­
tant than the medium, the interventions in these realist texts. 
Eliot expressed this point directly in a late letter when she explained 
what it meant to her to be a novelist, in the famous passage that I men­
tioned above: "My function is that of the aesthetic not doctrinal teacher— 
the rousing of the nobler emotions, which make mankind desire the social 
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right, not the prescribing of social measures, concerning which the artistic 
mind, however strongly moved by social sympathy, is often not the best 
judge." (Letters VII 44). For Eliot, the job of the aesthetic teacher is not so 
much to instruct an audience in the appreciation of art, as it is to "rouse the 
nobler emotions" of actual readers. As Stowe put it, the feminine novelists 
function is to inspire readers "to see to it that theyfeel right" (Uncle Tom 624). 
And if a novel happened, as Gaskell expressed it, to "put the small edge of 
the wedge in" to a reader's consciousness of the problems it depicts, if it 
should manage to "make people talk and discuss the subject a little more 
than they did" (Letters 226), then that would be a sign that the text was 
serving its desired function. As we have seen, neither Stowe nor Gaskell is 
much more concerned than Eliot with "the prescribing of social measures," 
and their first novels propose no practical answers to the social dilemmas 
they raise. Like Eliot, Gaskell and Stowe use their first novels as a means 
to "make mankind desire the social right"—in other words, to do what 
preachers and politicians ostensibly tried to do.13 Except in evangelical 
circumstances, earnest public exhortation was a masculine prerogative. To 
use fiction for the same ends was a feminine alternative. 
Clearly, these women exploited the novel's moral potential self­
consciously. Stowe wrote in a newspaper column that the novel's "con­
centration on 'the great question of moral life' was becoming 'one of the 
features of the age,'" and emphasized a change from a literary past she 
imagined, when "the only object of fictitious writing was to amuse" 
(quoted in Kelley 250). In picturing such a past, Stowe was suppressing the 
entire tradition that had come into the history of the novel through Cer­
vantes and Fielding from Horace, the tradition which claimed that the 
function of imaginative writing was always "to instruct and delight." The 
fact that Stowe was wrong about the past "object of fictitious writing" is less 
important, however, than her statement's implication that she saw herself 
and her contemporaries as using the novel toward new and unusual ends. 
SEEING THE VOICE IN THE FACE: 
THE PRESENCE OF THE WOMAN WRITER 
Although Gaskell and Eliot might not have endorsed Stowe s vision of 
literatures past, the three women apparently saw themselves as constitut­
ing a literary community. Their earliest correspondence with one another 
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(and their public and private remarks upon one another's novels and person­
alities) reveal each woman's desire to emulate the other two. Their com­
ments also show that each of them was "taken in" by the others' engaging 
narrators. They all tended to conflate the narrative persona of a novel with 
its author's identity, a tendency which hints at their own desire to project 
their personalities—in some important sense, their selves, their pres-
ences—through the narrative voice of a novel into the readers world. Each 
claimed an intimate acquaintance with the others through having read their 
novels, and each appears to have believed that the narrator was identical to 
the woman who created it, and that novels of the earnestly engaging type 
genuinely expressed their authors' individual subjectivity. 
Since neither Stowe nor Gaskell ever met Eliot (whose living arrange­
ments made her an unsuitable acquaintance for respectable married ladies), 
and since Stowe and Gaskell (who did meet) lived on different conti­
nents, their community existed only metaphorically. Established originally 
through their novels, the relationships developed in letters that expressed 
the women's sense of affinity with one another. Certainly, ambivalence 
entered into their expressed feelings: for example, Gaskell could not resist 
alluding to her disapproval of Eliot's unmarried liaison with Lewes, and 
Eliot's first outbursts of warmth in her correspondence with Stowe cooled 
somewhat in later years. But their respective epistolary friendships repre­
sent a literary subset of what Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has called "the 
female world of love and ritual. . . . [A] world built around a generic and 
unself-conscious pattern of single-sex or homosocial networks" (60). Soli­
darity among women was not to be taken for granted—for evidence we 
need only look to Catharine Beecher's position on Fanny Wright, or to the 
outspoken criticism of women to be found in the writings of Eliza Lynn 
Linton and Dinah Mulock Craik. But the novelistic goals of Gaskell, 
Stowe, and Eliot bound them into a verbal version of the "community of 
women" that Nina Auerbach has described, one that "freely offers the work 
that must be wrenched grudgingly out of the 'real' world of Victorian 
patriarchy" (21). In the present case the "real" world is not only the public 
world of men's work and men's discourse, but literally the real world, that is, 
the world outside the fictional texts: the three women shared a belief in the 
genuine work they could accomplish through their fictions. 
Though each of the women held specific reservations about some 
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features of the others' lives, all three publicly and privately admired one 
another's work. As I have mentioned, their comments in letters and mem­
oirs reveal evidence that each identified the other two authors with the 
narrators of their respective novels. I think, too, that their relations with 
one another suggest "influence" in the traditional literary-critical sense: 
admiring one another's books, seeing their personal concerns reflected in 
their own and the others' narrative voices, they made their mutual affinities 
explicit in both public and private statements. 
Stowe's memoirs show that she had probably read Mary Barton before 
she wrote Uncle Tom's Cabin in 1851. During her 1853 visit to London, 
when Uncle Tom's phenomenal success ensured Stowe's reception into British 
literary circles, she met Gaskell at a party. Stowe's later account of the 
meeting implies previous familiarity with Gaskell's novels: "Mrs. Gaskell 
[was there], authoress of Mary Barton and Ruth. She has a very lovely, 
gentle face, and looks capable of all the pathos that her writings show" 
(Sunny Memories 224). The "pathos" in those two novels is largely a function 
of the earnest narrator's voice; Stowe read the narrator's voice into the 
author's face. 
In fact, when Stowe met her, Gaskell was no longer writing novels 
with engaging narrators. Perhaps reading Uncle Tom's Cabin, with its ener­
getic crossings from feminine earnestness to masculine irony, as well as its 
dire consequences for its author's feminine reputation, reinforced the effect 
of Ruth's reception on Gaskell's narrative technique. In any case, after 1852 
she abandoned direct address in novels altogether. Gaskell liked Stowe 
personally, and entertained her for several days in Manchester in 1856 
(Forrest Wilson 432). After their first meeting in London, Gaskell wrote of 
Stowe to a friend, "I was 4 or 5 hours with her, and liked her very much 
indeed. She is short and American in her manner, but very true and simple 
and thoroughly unspoiled and unspoilable" (Letters 237). From Gaskell, 
who was concerned on her own account about the dangers of being spoiled 
by those who "lionized" her after Mary Barton's popular success, this is a 
compliment to Stowe's feminine integrity. Whether Gaskell meant to im­
ply that Stowe was short in her manner as well as short in person (the 
American author was diminutive) is not easy to determine; clearly, though, 
she honored the woman she could call "true and simple." 
Though Gaskell left no written record of her reaction to Stowe's 
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novels, she did write letters praising Scenes of Clerical Life and Adam Bede to 
George Eliot, whom she never met in person. The correspondence between 
Gaskell and Eliot emphasizes the interests and approaches that the two 
novelists had in common. Not surprisingly, during the period after Adam 
Bede's publication, when one of literary London's favorite pastimes was 
guessing the identity of "George Eliot," Elizabeth Gaskell s name came up. 
Gaskell herself had been among the early supporters of a Mr. Liggins s claim 
to have based George Eliot's first two novels on his experiences in the 
Coventry neighborhood where Mary Ann Evans grew up. At the time when 
her own name was proposed, however, Gaskell seems to have believed that 
the Dean of Bristol, Gilbert Elliot, was the actual author (Haight, George 
Eliot 287). 
The addressee of Gaskell's first letter to Eliot is, then, male: she sent it 
to "Gilbert Elliot" and signed it "Gilbert Elliot," playfully offering to take 
the credit for having written the novels. Gaskell frames her compliment to 
the novels in almost flirtatious language. She begins the letter, "Since I 
came from Manchester to London I have had the greatest compliment paid 
me I ever had in my life. I have been suspected of having written 'Adam 
Bede.' . . . [I}t would be very pleasant for me to blush acquiescence." 
Going on in the same vein, she exclaims, "Well! If I had written Amos 
Barton, Janet's Repentance, and Adam Bede I should neither be to have nor 
to hold with pride and delight in myself—so I think it is very well I have 
not" (Eliot, Letters III 74). Gaskell's adaptation of the phrasing of the 
marriage ceremony (each spouse takes the other "to have and to hold") is 
interesting. If she had written those books, she seems to be saying, she 
would be too proud and delighted with herself to remain a married woman, 
or at least to go on behaving as a respectable married woman should behave. 
The feminine modesty implicit in this declaration (and in her expressed 
pleasure at the thought of "blushing acquiescence") suggests Gaskell's 
assumption that she is writing to a man. 
Gaskell's surprise at learning that the author was Marian Evans did 
not diminish her admiration for the novels, though it did color her next 
letter to George Eliot. In a more serious mode, she wrote in 1859 to the 
woman novelist, declaring of Eliot's first two novels, "how earnestly fully, 
and how humbly I admire them. I never read anything so complete, and 
beautiful in fiction, in my whole life before." She tempers her praise with a 
frank but forgiving allusion to Eliot's personal life: 
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Perhaps you may have heard that I upheld Mr. Liggins as the 
author for long. . . . But I never was such a goose as to believe 
that such books as yours could be a mosaic of real and ideal. I 
should not be quite true in my ending, if I did not say before I 
concluded that I wish you were Mrs. Lewes. However, that can't 
be helped, as far as I can see, and one must not judge others. 
(Gaskell, Letters, 586-587) 
To say that "one must not judge others" is certainly not the same as saying "I 
accept your having chosen the life you have"—the gesture at the end of 
Gaskell s letter falls somewhat short of an embrace. And yet, Gaskell s letter 
apparently pleased George Eliot, who was very sensitive to adverse criti­
cism but usually indifferent to kind words from enthusiastic readers. Eliot's 
reaction suggests that she respected Gaskell s feminine preoccupation with 
propriety enough to overlook it in her answer. 
In 1856 Eliot had written respectfully (though anonymously) in 
"Silly Novels" of Gaskell s status as a serious writer. Accordingly, Eliot was 
fervent in her personal thanks for Gaskell s letter and for the influence that 
Gaskells first two novels had held over her while she wrote her own first 
two books: 
I shall always love to think that one woman wrote to another 
such sweet encouraging words—still more to think that you 
were the writer and I the receiver. 
I had indulged the idea that if my books turned out to be 
worth much, you would be among my willing readers; for I was 
conscious, while the question of my power was still undecided 
for me, that my feeling towards Life and Art had some affinity 
with the feeling which had inspired "Cranford" and the earlier 
chapters of "Mary Barton." That idea was brought the nearer to 
me, because I had the pleasure of reading Cranford for the first 
time in 1857, when I was writing the "Scenes of Clerical Life," 
and going up the Rhine one dim wet day in the spring of the 
next year, when I was writing "Adam Bede," I satisfied myself 
for the lack of a prospect by reading over again those earlier 
chapters of "Mary Barton." I like to tell you these slight de­
tails because they will prove to you that your letter must have 
a peculiar value for me, and that I am not expressing vague 
gratitude towards a writer whom I only remember as one who 
charmed me in the past. (Eliot, Letters III 198-199) 
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Evidently Eliot did not focus on the personal allusions in Gaskell s letter, 
but was drawn instead to the "sweet encouraging words" about her work. 
She makes it clear, furthermore, that the words' having come from Gaskell 
made them more valuable; the letter implies that she thought of Gaskell as a 
literary mentor. 
Pauline Nestor puzzles over the appeal that Gaskell s Cranford would 
have held for Eliot, "since as {Eliot} made clear in 'Woman in France' 
and . .  . in the priorities in her fiction, the prospect of a community of 
women without men held little charm for her" (147). Similarly, Barbara 
Hardy has remarked that what Eliot meant by the "feeling towards Life and 
Art" she shared with Gaskell "is a matter for guessing" ("Mrs. Gaskell and 
George Eliot" 182). Comparing the narrative stances of Eliot s first two 
novels with Gaskell s (as I have done elsewhere) can help solve part of the 
puzzle: Eliot's eye may have been drawn to the discourse, more than the 
story, of Gaskell s fiction. Just as the nameless male narrator of Scenes and 
Mary Smith of Cranford occupy parallel textual positions as minimally 
characterized, homodiegetic narrators, some of the similarities between 
the engaging narrators in Mary Barton and Adam Bede can probably be 
attributed to Eliot's having reread Gaskell's novel while working on 
her own.14 
George Eliot and Harriet Beecher Stowe also enjoyed mutual profes­
sional admiration and carried on a long, warm correspondence on literary 
and personal matters, although they were never to meet. Eliot reviewed 
Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp for the Westminster Review in the fall 
of 1856, and though by that time she no longer shared the Christian faith 
that motivates so much of Stowe s fictional vision, she nevertheless ap­
proved of Stowe s exalted tone. Eliot's review praises Stowe for having 
"invented the Negro novel," and points to the source of its power: "She 
seems for the moment to glow with all the passion, to quiver with all the 
fun, and to be inspired with all the trust that belong to her different 
characters; she attains her finest dramatic effects by means of her energetic 
sympathy, and not by conscious artifice" {Essays 326, 329). The referent of 
"she" in this statement is Stowe the novelist, but the "glow," the "quiver," 
the inspiration describe the narrator's voice. By setting Stowe s "energetic 
sympathy" off against "conscious artifice," Eliot conflates the narrator and 
the novelist. 
The review of Dm/does criticize Stowe for oversimplifying the com­
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plexities of slavery by idealizing her black characters. Eliot's first letter to 
Stowe, written in 1869 to answer an unexpected fan letter from the Ameri­
can novelist, does not mention artistic differences, however; it stresses 
instead the spiritual purpose that the two novelists held in common: 
I believe that religion too has to be modified—"developed," 
according to the dominant phrase—and that a religion more 
perfect than any yet prevalent, must express less care for per­
sonal consolation, and a more deeply-awing sense of responsibil­
ity to man, springing from sympathy with that which of all 
things is most certainly known to us, the difficulty of the human 
lot. 
The letter acknowledges the risk of being misunderstood when writing on 
such "wide subjects," but Eliot confidently concludes, "I trust your quick 
and long-taught mind as an interpreter little liable to mistake me" (Eliot, 
Letters V 29—31). Of course, Eliot's familiarity with Stowes mind was 
limited to what she had seen in one letter and in Stowes novels. In the 
narrative voices of those texts she had recognized the concepts of sympathy, 
of a sense of responsibility to others, and of an awareness of "the difficulty of 
the human lot" that informed her own novels. This striving to achieve 
sympathy, to turn away from the pursuit of "personal consolation," and to 
inspire readers to widen their circle of personal responsibility is, of course, 
the impetus behind the engaging authorial address that both authors prac­
tise in their first full-length fictions. 
Of the three novelists Stowe is the one who came closest to expressing 
the bond of narrative technique that connects them. When Eliot wrote her 
congratulations to Stowe on the success of Oldtown Folks (1869), Stowe 
responded with thanks, and asked Eliot in passing, "Is it not true that what 
we authors want is not praise so much as sympathy?" Kelley (who quotes the 
letter from Stowes unpublished correspondence) interprets the remark in 
the context of the literary domestic's conflict-ridden life. She says Stowes 
impulse "was to focus on the quandary of the person rather than the quality 
of the book; regarding the latter as a genus [Stowe] said, 'A book is a hand 
stretched forth in the dark passage of life to see if there is another hand to 
meet it'" (283-284). 
Perhaps Kelley is right. In their correspondence, both Eliot and 
Stowe often turned to each other for personal comfort. But if, in writing a 
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book, a novelist stretches forth a hand to meet the hand of a sympathiz­
ing reader, the engaging narrator—extending her appeals for sympathy 
through direct address to a narratee—reproduces that metaphorical gesture 
within the text. The "sympathy" that "we authors want" is only partly 
personal: the authors of Mary Barton, Uncle Tom, and Adam Bede may have 
craved sympathy for themselves, but the novels operate to inspire a more 
generalized sympathy that would originate in egocentric self-involvement 
("how fast could you walk?") and would spiral outward to engulf fictional 
protagonists, their antagonists, the narrators who tell their stories, the real 
world the stories are meant to resemble, and finally (but by no means 
exclusively) the authors who created them. They wanted readers' sympathy, 
and they wanted that sympathy to spill over from the realm of the fiction 
and transform the world through the same kind of feminine "influence" that 
domestic ideology promoted. 
In this respect, Gaskell, Stowe, and Eliot were emulating evangelical 
techniques of "buttonholing" sinners, singling out individual members of 
an audience and attempting to work on their feelings. All three had experi­
enced such techniques in revivalist circumstances, and all three had been 
exposed to and influenced by more formal Protestant sermonizers. Daugh­
ter of Lyman Beecher, sister of Henry Ward Beecher, and wife of Calvin 
Stowe, Harriet Beecher Stowe lived a life suffused with powerful preaching 
and lecturing. Gaskell s husband was a Unitarian minister. And, as a young 
girl, Mary Ann Evans had been moved to imitate the evangelical examples 
of her schoolmistress-friend Maria Lewis and her Methodist aunt, Mrs. 
Samuel Evans. Though Eliot renounced her Christian faith in her early 
twenties, and though Stowe converted her allegiance to Episcopalianism 
from the sterner Calvinism her father represented, both of them shared with 
Gaskell the memory of the powerful influence of preachers. They all were 
familiar with the strategies and cadences that mid-nineteenth-century men 
used in speaking publicly and urgently. 
BEING "UP TO PAR IN MANLINESS": THE PRESENCE 
OF THE PREACHER 
"If you are not a man, what business have you in the ministry?" 
Speaking in 1871 to a group of male seminarians at Yale Divinity School, 
Henry Ward Beecher uttered this question in the context of the increasing 
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female influence upon churches that Ann Douglas has described as part of 
the "feminization of American culture." The clergy's growing dependence 
upon influential female parishioners and the pastors inevitable collabora­
tion with the woman whose primary responsibility was her family's moral 
education contributed to the emasculation of religious institutions. As if in 
defense against this feminine onslaught, Beecher seized upon the immas­
culating power of public speaking to bring "manliness" more squarely into 
the center of the minister's identity. If you are not a man and you wish to be a 
preacher, he warned the seminarians, "You have mistaken your vocation. 
You may do to make some other things, but you will not be a maker of men. 
It takes a man to refashion men. You cannot do it unless you have some sort 
of vigor, vitality, versatility, moral impulse, and social power in you" 
{Lectures 192). A woman might have a hand in the physically procreative 
process of making men in the first place, but only a man can spiritually 
"refashion men." 
And what of the woman who felt herself sufficiently in possession of 
the qualities of "vigor, vitality, versatility, moral impulse, and social 
power" to be a preacher? She was doomed. George Eliot's fictional Dinah 
Morris has a relatively easy time of it, gradually moving out of the fields 
where she preaches and into interior, personalized spaces such as the prison 
cell where she comforts Hetty, or the Bedes' home where she ministers first 
to Lisbeth by sweeping the floors and later to Adam by becoming his wife. 
The treatment Dinah received from nineteenth-century illustrators of 
Adam Bede suggests that the image of an attractive, feminine, woman orator 
in the act of preaching was to some degree unimaginable. Queen Victoria 
commissioned Edward-Henry Corbould in 1861 to depict the scene of 
Dinahs preaching from the second chapter of the novel. In the resulting 
painting (reproduced in Laski, 60), Dinah stands elevated among her audi­
ence, arms and hands open to the crowd of men and women, and mouth 
firmly shut. The line drawing that serves as frontispiece to the nineteenth-
century illustrated edition of Adam Bede follows Corbould s precedent (Fig­
ure 3). Whereas Dinah s sermon takes up nine full pages of text and serves as 
the first dramatic action in the novel, F. T. Merrill's frontispiece shows her 
as she is described before she begins to speak ("with an egg-like line of cheek 
and chin, a full but firm mouth, a delicate nostril, and a low perpendicular 
brow" [67}). Dinahs primary role in the first part of the novel is to preach, 
unabashedly, unselfconsciously, powerfully, and publicly. But Dinah is to 
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become the novel's heroine, and the femininity of her ultimate image 
required that she be drawn as silent. Real women who insisted on public 
ministries fared much less well than Dinah. According to historian Leonard 
Sweet, American "women preachers in the first half of the nineteenth 
century paid an incredible price in tattered nerves, shattered reputations, 
and psychosomatic ailments. Their autobiographies are tortured testaments 
to the psychological abuse heaped on women who dared to preach" (143). 
Preaching, more than any other kind of public speaking, was perceived as 
an inalienable right of men. 
Henry Ward Beechers advice to aspiring ministers, collected in his 
Lectures on Preaching, can help illuminate the assumptions that operated to 
bar women from Victorian pulpits. In accord with Victorian theological 
views of "Christian manliness," Beecher sees preaching as a function of a 
man's body, as much as a product of his mind and heart.15 For Beecher, a 
preacher's appearance and physical stance are as essential to his effectiveness 
as his enthusiasm and earnest faith. A truly manly minister enters into a 
frankly physical relation with his audience when he mounts the pulpit. His 
primary responsibility to his congregation is to serve as the physical pres­
ence, the literal embodiment, of Christian faith: his body must be an 
appropriate object for the audiences observation, and it must become their 
source of inspiration. When a sermon works, the preachers own joy is 
orgasmic: 
I have had youth and middle age, and now I am an old man. I 
have seen it all, and I bear witness that, while there are single 
moments of joy in other matters that, perhaps, carry a man up 
to the summit of feeling, yet for steadfast and repetitious expe­
rience there is no pleasure in this world comparable to that 
which a man has who habitually stands before an audience with 
an errand of truth, which he feels in every corner of his soul and 
in every fiber of his body, and to whom the Lord has given 
liberty of utterance, so that he is pouring out the whole man­
hood in him upon his congregation. (192—193) 
How could any respectable Victorian woman hope to emulate the habitual, 
public, and promiscuous act of ejaculation that Beecher evokes with that 
suggestive phrase, "pouring out the whole manhood in him upon his 
congregation"? No wonder Beechers sister Harriet transformed herself into 
their father before she tried to face that Boston audience. 
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F. T. Merrill's frontispiece for Adam Bede: Dinah at the scene of the 
preaching, with her mouth firmly closed. (Courtesy of Harvard 
College Library.) 
Beechers Yale lectures cover the material one might expect in an 
experienced preacher's advice to beginners.16 In addition to many practical, 
professionally specific disquisitions, one of his ten lectures is devoted to the 
preachers body, or "Health, as Related to Preaching." He provides "prac­
tical hints" on "the art" of eating, sleeping, regulating one's work, and 
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getting enough exercise, though he cautions against the excessive emphasis 
on sports training characteristic of the "muscular Christians": "Now if you 
undertake, as scholars, very violent exercise, according to the exaggerated 
idea of muscular Christianity, you will very soon use up all the vitality of 
your system in the bone-and-muscle development, and it will leave you, not 
better, but less fitted for intellectual exertion" (194). The preacher must 
conserve the "vitality of his system" in order to maintain his ecstatic 
experiences in the pulpit, but "you cannot expect either these exceptional, 
higher consummations, or the strong, steady flow of a joyful relish for your 
work, unless you cultivate a robust and healthful manhood" (193). The 
man's drive to preach is like an extension of his virility: it results, as does his 
sexual drive, from the proper care of his masculine body.17 
His healthy body is more to the preacher than the source of his 
sermons' power: it is also the locus of his relation to his audience. Beecher 
objects to "barrelled pulpits" that obscure the preacher's body from the 
public view, for "a mans whole form is part of his public speaking. His feet 
speak and so do his hands" {Lectures 71). So, too, do the parts of his body 
that Beecher leaves unnamed. The speaker who would move his auditors 
must be visibly and even physically accessible to them, close enough to 
allow his "magnetic influence" to reach them (71). "There is a force—call it 
magnetism or electricity, or what you will—in a man, which is a personal 
element, and which flows from a speaker who is en rapport with his audience. 
This principle should be utilized in the work of preaching" (73). The 
phrasing suggests that the preacher must exploit animal magnetism, a 
"personal element" inextricably bound up with sexuality. And Beechers 
suggestion for exploiting the physical connections between speaker and 
audience hints at the forbidden implications of a "promiscuous" gathering. 
Literal, physical contact among the listeners will heighten the effect of the 
electrical magnetism emanating from the speaker: "I can speak just as well 
to twelve persons as to a thousand, provided those twelve are crowded 
around me and close together, so that they touch each other. . . . [Qrowd 
your audiences together, and you will set them off with not half the effort" 
(73). As performer, as orchestrator of his own and his audiences visceral 
experience of the sermon, and as the one who must "set them off," inflame 
and excite them, the preacher is in the position of sexual aggressor. 
The line between religious and sexual ecstasy has always been a 
blurred one, and the resemblance of revivals to orgies is obvious enough to 
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any post-Freudian observer. And, too, the preacher who carries the role of 
seducer out from the pulpit and into his personal life is treading on danger­
ous territory. American culture is full of fictive and historical emblems of 
such scandal, working back in time from Jim Bakker to Elmer Gantry to 
Henry Ward Beecher himself. What is remarkable about Beecher s charac­
terization of the preachers task is not his equation of preaching with 
masculine sexuality, but the unselfconscious way in which he makes that 
equation so explicit while firmly restricting the ministers seductive powers 
to the pulpit. 
Beechers vision of the virile ministers relation to his congregation 
recalls the astonishing sketches Charles Kingsley made before his marriage, 
as a wedding present for his fiancee (Chitty 64ff). The drawings, made 
during the period when Kingsley was most absorbed in his own rigorous 
training for "muscular Christianity," show the young minister and his bride 
nude, copulating in postures suggesting the consummation of Christian 
suffering and joy. In one of Kingsley s sketches the two bodies are bound 
together on a cross tossed by a turbulent sea, in another they ascend to 
heaven on the strength of the man's broad, muscular wings. In Kingsley s 
fantasies, all the energy of the ecstatic experience inheres in the man; the 
woman is limp, passive, even unresponsive. The drawing of their joint 
ascension is a particularly apt example. His eagle-wings contrast with her 
transparent ones, which resemble those of an inert moth; he supports her 
body with his strong hands, arms, thighs, and phallus, while her smooth, 
flaccid form hangs from him in a posture that suggests death. In an era when 
(as Douglas has shown) Protestantism was unquestionably undergoing 
"feminization," when the success of congregations and of individual pastors 
depended vitally on the support of female parishioners, and when women 
were increasingly taking on the responsibility for moral reform toward a 
more Christian culture, Beechers and Kingsleys equation of religious 
leadership with virility is significant—and also a bit sad. It suggests a self-
protective defensiveness in the ministers conception of his own function. In 
the drawing, the man's body is all that prevents the woman from falling; in 
the pulpit, the man's body should support his congregation in their efforts 
to avoid a Fall from grace. 
Beecher undoubtedly felt that his body provided his congregations 
access to grace, especially when he stood before them, speaking extempo­
raneously. Invariably he ranks spontaneous, enthusiastic speech over read­
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ing written words, whether the written texts are biblical or generated by 
the preacher.18 As Beecher puts it in his Lectures, "every preacher should be 
able to speak, whether with or without notes. Christ 'spake'" (214). Speech 
is preferable to reading aloud, because "a written sermon is apt to reach out 
to people like a gloved hand. An unwritten sermon reaches out like the 
warm and glowing palm, bared to the touch" (215)—again, the electricity 
of physical contact is invoked. Speech is present the way a living body is 
present: in Beecher's view, that presence is the essence of a ministers 
calling. The effective preacher must deliver original, orally composed inter­
pretations of biblical verses: "The reason why reading the truths that are 
just as plainly stated there [in the text] has sometimes so much less effect 
than stating them in your own way, is that the truth will gain a force when it 
becomes part of you that it would not have when merely read as a text" (7). 
That force is entirely a product of presence: 
A preacher is in some degree a reproduction of the truth in 
personal form. The truth must exist in him as a living experi­
ence, a glowing enthusiasm, an intense reality. The Word of 
God in the Book is a dead letter. It is paper, type, and ink. In 
the preacher that word becomes again as it was when first spoken 
by prophet, priest, or apostle. It springs up in him as if it were 
first kindled in his heart, and he were moved by the Holy Ghost 
to give it forth. He is so moved. (3) 
Transcending textuality—the inertia of the "dead letter," the "paper, 
type, and ink"—is a resolvable problem for the preacher. In personally 
delivering the word, he reenacts the origination of the word, and the truth 
to which it refers is reincarnated in him. In voice and person, he becomes 
the embodiment of the truth he speaks, and re-creates divine presence in 
mortal form. As in the crucifixion and resurrection fantasies of Kingsleys 
drawings, the preacher steps in for Christ: he becomes the Word made 
Flesh. Beecher's preference for speech over text, his faith in spontaneous oral 
expression as the unmediated means of access to thought, and his conviction 
that divine truth could be made manifest in a preachers words beautifully 
exemplify the logocentrism that Derrida has identified as the heart of any 
Western "metaphysics of presence." Beecher, along with the world to 
whom and for whom he spoke, participated fully in the fantasy of presence, 
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unsuspecting of the moves that philosophers were soon to take toward 
dismantling the tenets of his faith. 
The ministers corporeal, gendered presence, then, was the sine qua 
non of Victorian preaching. In this respect, the male body played a similar 
role for political public speakers. If the ministers body gave corporeal form 
to Gods word, the body of the Chartist agitator, for instance, was the 
vehicle that carried the word of the people. Martha Vicinus reports that 
"Thomas Cooper described himself as 'the peoples instrument, rather than 
their director,' claiming a leader to be one whose 'temperament, nature and 
powers fit him by quick sympathy, and strong, energetic will, to become 
the peoples mouthpiece, hand, or arm, either for good or evil'" (489—490). 
The speakers body becomes a location for the voice of something larger than 
himself, whether that voice is God's or the people's. To become the "mouth­
piece, hand, or arm" the body has to be positioned publicly, in close 
proximity to the audience to whom and for whom the voice speaks. Only a 
male body could be so publicly displayed with impunity; saying something 
in public was therefore both an expression and a function of the speaker's 
masculinity. 
The speakers virility extended beyond his appearance and stance, to 
include his rhetorical strategies for wooing his audience, for trying to "set 
them off." Vicinus has detailed the strategies that the speakers for the three 
Chartist factions exploited toward this end (490-500). As for the minis-
ter's tactics, I will turn again to Beecher's own report for suggestions that he 
saw his relation to his audience in terms of his gender. In describing his 
preaching strategies, Beecher frequently employs similies comparing 
preaching to hunting, fishing, or warfare. As in poetic conventions that pit 
man against woman in venal pursuit, Beecher's tropes place the preacher in 
the role of aggressor and the congregation in the role of prey. As far as 
rhetorical ethics are concerned, Beecher's attitude might be summarized as 
"all's fair in love and war—and preaching." 
Eschewing "mere trickery," Beecher nevertheless endorses "preaching 
which produces a sensation," because "the legitimate use of real truth is all 
right, no matter how much people get stirred up; the more the better. In 
this matter you will not err if you are up to par in manliness, neither above it 
nor below" {Lectures 237). Being "up to par" may mean feigning the pas­
sions one is hoping to induce: "In addressing a congregation, a man may use 
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the language of a feeling for the sake of getting and propagating the feeling. 
Indeed, when it comes to preaching, I think it would be a great deal better 
to act as though you had the feeling, even if you had not, for its effect in 
carrying your audience whither you wish to carry them" (126). Faking 
arousal, then, is an acceptable act if it leads to consummation. "Getting and 
propagating the feeling" is another of the preachers masculine sexual du­
ties; as long as he believes his rhetoric is motivated by enthusiasm for the 
truth, he is free to use any tactics that will work to move his listeners. 
The preachers primary vehicle for encouraging individual listeners to 
participate in this process is, not surprisingly, direct address. Beecher calls 
the tactic "taking aim," and recalls anecdotally how he developed the 
strategy by studying the apostles' sermons when he was trying to hit upon 
an effective preaching style. He subjected each of the biblical sermons to 
rhetorical analysis, asking himself What were the circumstances? who were 
the people? what did he [the preacher} do? {Lectures 11). Concluding that 
the apostles typically made an appeal to common knowledge before apply­
ing its implications to their message, Beecher worked out a model of 
sermonic direct address: 
First, I sketched out the things we all know. "You all know you 
are living in a world perishing under your feet. You all know 
that time is extremely uncertain; that you cannot tell whether 
you will live another month or week . . . ." and in that way I 
went on with my "You all knows" until I had about forty of 
them. When I had got through that, I turned round and 
brought it to bear upon them with all my might; and there were 
seventeen men awakened under that sermon. I never felt so 
triumphant in my life. I cried all the way home. I said to myself: 
"Now I know how to preach." (Lectures 11 -12  ) 
Taking aim at attitudes and experiences he presumed his audience could 
recognize and acknowledge, Beecher thus drew them in. Later, he reports, 
he learned to aim at individuals, or at specific faculties within an individ­
ual, by addressing the audience in general and avoiding the eye of the 
intended receiver of the message. Direct address to the crowd works in these 
instances, he explains, because his unsuspecting prey do not realize that he 
is shooting at them, but lower their defenses. Reflecting on the sermon 
later, "They take it to heart, and it is blessed unto them" (Lectures 168). 
188

THE VICTORIAN PLACE OF ENUNCIATION 
In Beechers lectures as in his sermons, direct address pervades the 
rhetoric. Lectures and sermons alike were originally delivered extempo­
raneously, as Beecher—true to his tenets—preferred to speak from notes, 
rather than to read. When he spoke, his frequent references to "you" drew 
continual attention to the situation in which he was speaking. In the Yale 
lectures, the youthful, eager, doubting, earnest male audiences presence in 
the "you" is as manifest as the preacher/lecturer's presence is in the "I." In 
the original delivery of the lectures, this was as literally true as it can ever be 
in matters of language: preacher and audience were really there. In the 
printed transcripts of the sermons and lectures, the recurring "you's" evoke 
a shadow of the historical audiences presence. As Beecher himself was so 
quick to point out, the text is only "paper, type, and ink," and can provide 
only a pale imitation of the truth it seeks to represent—in this case, the 
actuality of the speakers interaction with his listeners. 
Beechers reliance on direct address was by no means idiosyncratic, nor 
was it restricted to preaching in the revivalist mode. Charles Kingsleys 
sermons, written in a staunchly Anglican vein, frequently and repeatedly 
speak to "you." Typically, Kingsley begins his discourses by establishing 
the situation in which he speaks. He may introduce part of his sermon by 
justifying its relevance to his audience: 
Before I can explain what this text has to do with the Church 
Catechism, I must say to you a little about what it means. 
Now if I asked you what "salvation" was, you would 
probably answer, "Eternal life." 
And you would answer rightly. (15) 
Or he might begin with exhortation, then support his demands upon the 
congregation by means of illustration and reasoning throughout the rest of 
the sermon: "Have any of you here ever stood godfather or godmother to any 
young person in this parish who is not yet confirmed? If you have, now is the 
time for you to fulfill your parts as sponsors. . .  . It really is your duty. It 
will be better for you if you fulfill it. . .  . Let me try to show you what I 
mean" (59). Such introductory addresses establish the presence of speaker 
and audience and cement the relation in which they are to stand to each 
other: the paternal, authoritative speaker has access to the truth, which he 
undertakes to transmit to his auditors. 
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Within the body of each sermon, Kingsley uses "you" to stand for the 
receiver of rhetorical questions, the actor in hypothetical situations, and the 
subject of such reassuring phrases as "you know," "you see," "you under­
stand." In the sermons, the "you" is continually present, always there to be 
buoyed up by the preachers spiritual, intellectual, and physical strength, 
and thus to take the minister's message to heart. 
When novelists import earnest, exhortative direct address from 
preaching techniques into fictional discourse, they are employing the idiom 
of the minister. Just as the minister seeks to convert sinners by evoking 
memories and emotions they can recognize as their own, the novelist tries to 
transform readers' attitudes through the same technique. The "you" in the 
sermon is, strictly speaking, an "addressee," a figure the speaker creates and 
projects through his sermons language; similarly, the "you" in the novel is a 
narratee, a textual construct. But when the minister "takes aim" at a living 
audience by addressing them directly, he hopes that individual listeners 
will take the address personally and seriously. He believes that his words can 
work real change, and that "his people" can experience spiritual transforma­
tion through his presence. The engaging narrator is the sign that some 
novelists believed that their words could have a similar effect. 
Evidently Gaskell, Stowe, and Eliot felt that they were present in 
their fictional texts. When they looked at one another, they saw their 
novels' narrators: to identify another woman with her narrative voice was to 
declare one's identification with the narrators in one's own novels. Their 
strategies show a desire to accomplish the kind of moral and spiritual 
influence that preachers claimed to wield from the pulpit, but they wished, 
too, for feminine respectability. They could not afford the price that Fanny 
Wright (or even Catharine Beecher) paid for becoming a public presence; 
their feminine bodies could not occupy the space a public speaker stands in 
without undergoing immasculation in the public view as well as in their 
own. They relied instead on the influence of their narrative "I" over the 
"you" invoked in their texts, and they counted on the conventions of 
verisimilitude to lend the aura of truth to the "dead letter" that they found 
themselves producing when they conceded to men the privilege of speaking 
aloud in public. 
The postmodern philosopher might reflect that the project of these 
Victorian women novelists was impossible to achieve, that the "I" and the 
"you" of realist fiction can never really refer to individual subjects, that they 
19  0 
THE VICTORIAN PLACE OF ENUNCIATION 
are only the products of "differance" among signifiers in these and other 
texts, that the authors and readers themselves are merely constructs born of 
reading. And yet, the postmodern perspective would also see the preachers 
faith in presence and in the manifestation of truth as a nostalgic illusion, a 
project just as doomed as that of the earnest women writers. The preachers 
presence is, after all, only a substitute for the divine reality he hopes to 
transmit to his listeners: his body, like the fictional narrators voice, is only a 
signifier standing in for the presence of the Real Thing.19 What links the 
feminine realist novelist and the masculine preacher is their shared hope 
that the signifier might be enough, that it might enable them to convey 
truth by hitting ones audience "below the fifth rib." For both kinds of 
speakers, the audiences emotional reaction metaphorically represents a 
moment of physical contact. Both preacher and novelist want to "touch" 
the audience. The Victorian male preacher does so by using his voice as an 
extension of his body; the Victorian female novelist shields her body by 
placing her voice in a text. Whether or not it could ever be possible to make 
real contact with an audience through a fictional text, that was what 
novelists who used engaging strategies were earnestly trying to do. 
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Direct Address and 
the Critics: 
What's the Matter with "You"? 
W H A  T IS IT about "you" that literary critics and theorists find so embarrass­
ing? Commentators on texts can manifest embarrassment in diverse ways: 
we can express irritation or impatience, make apologies and excuses, or rise 
above the source of our discomfort by denying it, ignoring it, or imagining 
it to be something other than the thing we find so problematic. Earnest 
direct address has been both vilified and defended in commentaries on 
particular realist novels, but in theories of literature and theories of reading 
it has, for the most part, been suppressed. 
To examine in detail all of the reasons for each literary theory's means 
of avoiding this trope would require writing another book. In this conclud­
ing chapter, then, I simply sketch out some possible sources for the critical 
discomfort over earnest direct address in literary texts. I situate the problem 
at the intersection of three locations of anxiety. The first source of anxiety 
centers on literary-theoretical disagreements about whether "literary" and 
"nonliterary" language must necessarily occupy separate realms. The sec­
ond producer of anxiety is the discomfort critics and theorists seem to 
experience when they are confronted with texts that gesture toward mo­
ments of intensified presence. And finally, I look at the way these anxieties 
are aggravated when that presence is coded as feminine. 
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"IT SHOULD DO N O T H I N G "  : 
MODERN PROBLEMS W I T  H VICTORIAN ART 
The problem of "you" begins, I think, with the tradition of distin­
guishing between literary and nonliterary language. The differentiation of 
two distinct kinds of language, functioning independently and uniquely, 
propels twentieth-century critical practices as diverse as Russian for­
malism, New Criticism, and narratology. Most modern literary criticism 
operates on the assumption that the two kinds of language, poetic and 
nonpoetic, are distinct from each other in terms of their "truth-status"; the 
two categories are supposed to function differently in that nonpoetic, non­
literary language presents itself as referential—claiming to be related to the 
real world—whereas poetic, literary language makes no such claims. Ac­
cording to this line of thinking, literary writing does aspire to a "higher" 
truth, transcending the mundane limits of the nonpoetic. 
Stanley Fish has ingeniously exploded the opposition between literary 
and nonliterary language by arguing that there is nothing ordinary about 
"ordinary language" at all. Distinguishing literary language from ordinary 
language defies reason, he points out, since "ordinary" (that is, "literal," 
"scientific," "prepositional," "logical," "denotative," "neutral," "mathe­
matical," "serious [as opposed to fictional}," "metaphorical," "representa­
tional," "message-bearing," "referential," "descriptive," or "objective") 
language does not exist (97). No use of language enjoys the direct, un­
problematically representational relation to reality that nonliterary lan­
guage has been presumed to have: " There is no such thing as ordinary language, 
at least in the naive sense often intended by that term" (106). 
Fish rightly points out that literature is not distinguished by intrinsic 
formal or linguistic properties. On the contrary, "literature" is always that 
subset of writing which the dominant culture agrees to call "literature"— 
and nothing more. "The one disadvantage in all of this," Fish observes, "is 
that literature is no longer granted a special status, but since that special 
status has always been implicitly degrading, this disadvantage is finally 
literature's greatest gain" (108). 
Literature, then, stands to gain from its reintegration into the realm 
of ordinary language; surely we cannot harm literature by broadening our 
understanding of the ways that literary texts can work. For the literary/ 
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nonliterary opposition necessarily breaks down in specific applications to 
certain fictional genres that gesture toward (limited) referentiality, such as 
the realist novel. Under the modernist rubric, any text that is "referential," 
"ordinary," or "serious" in its use of language must be nonliterary: it must 
not be literature. But surely, when some aspects of a realist novel are 
presented as referential(such as place names, for instance, or dates, which 
may be rendered in full or "disguised," as in "the city of L , in the year 
183—") the critic cannot in good faith approach every detail of the novel as 
though it could not be referential, as though it were absolutely without 
connections to the "real world."l One possibility for such a connection in 
realist fiction is the implication that the pronoun "you" might sometimes 
be as referential—as "serious," in John Searles sense of the word, as "Lon­
don" or "1836." Of course, as Fish reminds us, the words referentiality is 
problematic, like that of any word: its relation to "the world" is not as 
simple as Searles system would make it out to be. Nevertheless, in engag­
ing texts, the pronouns relation to the world—its claim for reference—is 
different from that of the distancing "you," or of such signifiers as "Doro­
thea Brooke" and "Yoknapatawpha County." 
The possibility that a fictive text might be seriously addressed to an 
audience it calls "you" raises another difficulty, closely related to anxieties 
over the poetic or nonpoetic functions of language. Many theories of litera­
ture take for granted a split between genuine "literature" and "rhetoric"— 
the first being language that functions entirely for art's sake, the second 
being language with designs upon the extratextual world. In earlier peri­
ods, when formal distinctions between literature and rhetoric were less 
strictly drawn than they have been since the early nineteenth century, an 
address from within a text could be taken for granted as one of the many 
means a writer could use to gain access to an audiences emotional or 
intellectual response. For the past two centuries, however, idealist literary 
theory has been devising ways to separate authorial address to readers from 
actual communication.2 
How has this happened? Lionel Gossman hypothesizes that the di­
vorce between literature and rhetoric can be traced to the mystification of 
poetry that began during "the final phase of neoclassicism" in the eigh­
teenth century: 
The term "literature" gradually became more closely associated 
with poetry, or at least with poetic and figurative writing, and, 
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especially among the Romantics and their successors, took on 
the meaning of a corpus of privileged or sacred texts, a treasury 
in which value, truth, and beauty had been piously stored, and 
which could be opposed to the world of historical reality. (5—6) 
According to Gossman, "literature thus ceased to be thought of as an art by 
which ideas could be conveyed effectively and elegantly, and which could be 
pursued with varying degrees of skill and success by all people" (6). This 
"fetishizing" (as Gossman calls it) of the literary work entails a belief that a 
poem should never accomplish ulterior goals, because it must exist as art for 
its own sake. Culminating in the late Victorian and fin de siecle emphasis 
upon the uniquely "real" quality of the work of art, this idealist, aestheticist 
line of thinking suppresses the manipulative, transactional, or rhetorical 
potential inherent in "literary" writing, as in all writing. Jane Tompkins 
has amplified the implications of this attitude for contemporary criticism: 
"The imputation that a poem might break out of its self-containment and 
perform a service would disqualify it immediately from consideration as a 
work of art. The first requirement of a work of art in the twentieth century is 
that it should do nothing" {Reader-Response Criticism 210).3 Tompkins sug­
gests that recent critics have perpetuated this assumption by treating liter­
ary texts as repositories of meaning waiting for interpretation, rather than 
viewing them as authors' instruments for provoking real-world action.4 
If the split between literature and rhetoric originated with Coleridge 
and Kant, then Victorian novelists were working in a post-"divorce" era; 
still, as we have seen, they tended to view their activity as an act of com­
munication between themselves and a living, breathing audience. Novel­
ists who relied heavily upon the engaging narrator to persuade audiences on 
matters of morality and politics would have been horrified at the thought 
that a novel should "do nothing" in order to aspire to the status of art. The 
renewed emphasis on "art for art's sake" at the beginning of the modern 
period is, to some extent, a reaction against the eagerness of earnest Vic­
torians to promote a remarriage between literature and rhetoric. Accord­
ingly, modern criticism of Victorian fiction has frequently operated to 
suppress, denigrate, or deflect the properties of the novels that try to do 
something, including exhortative passages of direct address. 
One way to express discomfort with Victorian novels' attempts to "do 
something" has been simply to object, as did the majority of British and 
American nineteenth-century reviewers, to the didactic, preachy, or conde­
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scending tone of a narrators accosting a reader as "you."5 Another way has 
been to assume—with Percy Lubbock, his Impressionist contemporaries, 
and his New Critical heirs—that authorial "intrusions" are flaws in the 
fabric of the fictional illusion, and hence are offensive on aesthetic grounds. 
In defense of the Victorian novels they unblushingly admire, more rhetori-
cally-minded Anglo-American critics such as W. J. Harvey, Barbara 
Hardy, and Wayne Booth have rehabilitated authorial intervention as essen­
tial to certain novelists' "art," but they, too, treat authorial address as 
something the novelist must regulate, something that can hurt a text if it is 
allowed to get out of control. Each of these generations of critics has turned 
its collective back upon the implied presence of actual readers in authorial 
intrusions. They all presumably consider such a presence inappropriate in a 
text that could be upheld as belonging to the category of literature. 
From the point of view of the literary critic eager to defend a work's 
position in the canon, direct address bears a damaged reputation, attribut­
able to the rhetorical company it keeps: the trope has been tainted by its 
wide use in advertising, television, and journalism. Commentators anxious 
to maintain distinctions between "legitimate art" and other, more overtly 
manipulative or rhetorical forms of discourse tend to view direct address 
with exaggerated suspicion. Barbara Kruger, writing in Artforum, decries 
television's dominance of the American consciousness in the 1980s, declar­
ing that "television, perching in our living rooms like a babbling, over-
controlling guest, is deeply embroiled in the authoritative declarations and 
confessionals of'direct address.'" Particularly conscious of its use in adver­
tising and in "nonfiction" broadcast genres such as news and talk shows, 
Kruger maintains that "direct address dominates and lets the viewers think 
they know who's doing the talking and to whom" (7). Direct address on 
television is misleading, she implies, because the talking head belonging to 
the news anchor does not originate the words that issue from his or her 
mouth; when distraught people tell the "hidden camera" their troubles 
with headache, dandruff, or fabric softener, the individual viewer finds 
him- or herself Actively placed in the position of addressee. Viewers less 
astute than Kruger are presumably fooled into accepting a mock communi­
cation as a genuine one. 
Bruce Morrissette, the only critic who has attempted to survey the 
modes of "narrative you," is even more insistent that direct address can be 
misleading or harmful in nonliterary applications. After quoting advertis­
196

DIRECT ADDRESS AND THE CRITICS 
ing copy that relies heavily on personal pronouns, Morrissette warns "that 
'you'. . . can be a dangerous pronoun that advertising and journalism may 
corrupt so badly as to render it virtually useless to 'literature'" (112). 
Making no distinction between lyric poetry's uses of "you" in apostrophe 
and in direct address, Morrissette is much stricter in his definition of 
appropriate prose examples for his analysis: "Obviously, we must eliminate 
all uses of 'you' in oratory or elsewhere that are addressed frankly to an 
audience" (115). This restriction passes without further remark, showing 
Morrissette to be among the critics who separate literary and rhetorical 
writing in the way that Gossman has identified. 
What evidently distinguishes the "you" in advertising and oratory 
from the literary use of "narrative you" is that the more manipulative mode 
of direct address requires the addressee to take the pronoun personally. 
When a McDonald's ad says "you deserve a break today," when a public 
broadcasting auctioneer pleads, "you must call and make your pledge if you 
value the quality programming we are bringing you," when a preacher 
warns "you will go to hell if you disobey the word of God," each listener is 
meant to apply the statement to his or her own situation. When an utter­
ance is "addressed frankly to an audience," the referent of its second-person 
pronoun is both plural and singular: "you" stands for the group and for each 
member of the group who could conceivably take the utterance to heart. 
Some advertisements inscribe their "you" more narrowly than others: an ad 
for a "gentle laxative" begins, "As a woman, you do so much for so many 
people. You don't have time for irregularity." Many viewers (female and 
male) will fail to see themselves in that "you," but any woman who is 
prompted, consciously or unconsciously, by that ad to buy that product will 
have at least momentarily identified that "you" as herself. A statement 
containing "you" that really means you has the potential power to make 
something happen. And if "legitimate art" must be kept separate from 
discourse that attempts to spark action—advertisement, oratory, propa­
ganda, or preaching—one way to maintain that separation is to insist that 
the "you" in truly literary texts has no extra-literary referent. 
By transforming the reader who is hailed in literature into a fictional 
construct, something whose existence is strictly circumscribed within art, 
reader-centered critics and structuralists—from Booth to Iser to Genette to 
Riffaterre—have developed sophisticated ways of talking about the "you" 
in texts by deflecting any implication that the pronoun might ever be a 
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signifier for real persons. The race of "readers" they have spawned serve 
as models for the way actual people might read, but in the critical dis­
course where they are born, they do not represent actual readers. The 
textual reader may be conceived as an Implied Reader (Booth and Iser), a 
Model Reader (Eco), an Average Reader/Superreader (Riffaterre), an In­
formed Reader (Fish), a Competent Reader (Culler), a Strong Reader/Mis-
Reader (Bloom), a Perverse Reader (Barthes), a Deconstructive Reader 
(Derrida), a Feasting Reader (Hartman), a Resisting Reader (Fetterley), a 
Created Reader (Preston), a Determined Reader (Peterson), or, as Robert 
Rogers (whose witty list of "readers" I have incorporated into this cata­
logue) calls it, the Amazing Reader. Whatever the term (and whatever its 
longevity—theorists are nearly as prone to disavowing their "readers" as to 
creating them), it never stands for the person who holds the book and reads. 
A notable exception is Peter J. Rabinowitzs essay, "Truth in Fiction: 
A Re-Examination of Audiences," which moves beyond theories that posit a 
single "reader" to propose four separate roles that readers play. Rabinowitz 
suggests that when we read novels we must position ourselves in relation to 
four figures: the Actual Audience (real people who buy and read the book, 
in any era); the authorial audience (the group the author presumably had in 
mind while writing); the narrative audience (a conglomeration of character­
istics to be inferred from the narrators assumptions about the readers' 
knowledge and attitudes); and the ideal narrative audience (an entity de­
fined by its willingness to accept the authors evident intentions). The first 
three correspond to narratologists' distinctions among "the actual reader" 
(see Suleiman, OfReaders and Narratees), the "addressee," and the "narratee" 
(see Prince, "The Narratee Revisited"), respectively. Narratology has no 
term for the "ideal narrative audience," probably because, like the implied 
reader or the virtual reader, its existence depends entirely upon an act of 
interpretation that cannot always appeal to "empirical textual evidence" 
among the words on a page. 
According to Rabinowitz, "the narrative and authorial audiences are 
closer together in some novels than in others" and "the distance between 
these audiences is a major element in any novel's structure" (131). He points 
out that "the wider the gap, the greater the effort required to bridge it" 
(131-132); a great effort leads to emotional distance from the fiction. 
Rabinowitzs theory can help elucidate the distinction between Victorian 
realist texts with engaging and distancing narrators. Both kinds of novel 
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share the same actual and authorial audiences. Their narrative audiences 
diverge: whereas the engaging narrator's "you" is in complete sympathy 
with the characters and the narrator's assertions about them, the distancing 
narrators "you" (like Jones at the Club) demurs. Both narrators' ideal 
narrative audiences are the same: they sympathize unstintingly with the 
characters. The difference is one of irony. The distancing narrator distin­
guishes between the narrative audience and the ideal narrative audience, 
but for the engaging narrator, the two groups are identical. 
It seems to me that all of these critics (with the exception of 
Rabinowitz) share an implicit answer to a question they do not raise in any 
explicit form. That question is: "What is the referent of'you' in a literary 
text?" They have raised and answered the question about the literary "I," 
concluding through various lines of reasoning that it stands for the textual 
construct known as the narrator or the narrative voice. In novels where 
homodiegetic narrators speak to narratees who share their level of diegesis, 
the referents of "I" and "you" are hardly problematic. The "I" is the 
character-narrator and the "you" is a figure who is more or less explicitly 
inscribed in the text. (Wolfgang Miiller has taken significant steps toward 
outlining the possible identities for the "unbestimmtes Du"—the "unspeci­
fied you"—in such texts.) In texts with heterodiegetic narrators, as we have 
seen, the questions of reference become more complex. The speaker is a 
creature in and of the text. No "real person" speaks in such a literary 
transaction; in a serious sense, it is the text itself which speaks. But unless a 
real person picks the text up and reads it, no interaction can occur. Indeed, 
the texts themselves do not even minimally dramatize an interaction in the 
way that Miiller's study examples do. To assign every occurrence of the 
literary "you" a parallel function to that of the literary "I," to assume that 
every "you" is simply a textualized narratee just as every "I" is a narrator, is 
to overlook the complex differences between the two kinds of nineteenth-
century novels, those with intradiegetic situations of narration and those 
with heterodiegetic situations. Novels with engaging narrators point to a 
difference between two possible and distinct referents for "you": the "you" 
that is utterly the product of the text's internal structures, and that other 
"you," the one that is inextricably tied to systems of signification outside 
the text, to real persons who find their social beings engaged by the nar-
rator's address. 
As Emile Benveniste has painstakingly demonstrated, the personal 
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pronouns "I" and "you" are peculiar in their relationship to their referents. 
As "shifters," they have no fixed referents; they can be assigned meaning 
only in the context of the "present instance of discourse" (253). Unlike "he/ 
she/it," which substitute for entities and items existing outside the situa­
tion in which an utterance is being made, the first- and second-person 
pronouns refer only to a "reality of discourse." It is the act of speaking that 
assigns the value "speaker" to "I," and the value "addressee" to "you" 
(252-253).6 In each individual instance of literary discourse, the "I" stands 
for the addressor, the narrator, a function of the language on the page, 
a figure which may or may not correspond to the real-world author. (In 
the early novels of Elizabeth Gaskell and George Eliot, as we have seen, the 
narrators "I" evokes a strongly personal presence who closely resembles the 
authors expressed idea of her own best self.) But as the discursive event in 
certain novels requires the presence of an actual reader, the referent of "you" 
may change according to the circumstances of the "present instance of 
discourse." In some literary cases—notably, the case of the engaging nar-
rator—the "reality of discourse" determines that the referent of "you" is the 
actual reader him- or herself.7 
Indeed, I do not mean to undermine the importance of the rich and 
diverse reader-centered theories of the past two decades. Demonstrating 
theories of reading fiction always requires the theorist to create fictions of 
reading. The "reader" becomes the hero of their fictions: for example, Iser's 
implied reader, who bravely adjusts his idea of the "real" as he reads, or 
Fish's reader, who is continually experiencing the adventure of surprise 
when he encounters patterns that disrupt his experience of literary conven­
tions or his sense of "self." In narrating possible ways to receive narratives, 
these theorists self-consciously focus attention on the circularity of the 
theoretical enterprise, as well as on the subjective nature of the reading 
experience. And, too, for nineteenth-century novels with distancing nar­
rators, the various constructions of Readers have proven to be useful tools 
for describing fictional conventions, as well as for theorizing the process 
of literary reception. But they are not particularly helpful in accounting for 
the one convention of nineteenth-century realism with which I am most 
concerned: the engaging narrators use of "you" to stand for the actual 
reader. In the presence of earnest direct address, contemporary theorists 
avert their eyes, as though to avoid the sign of something shameful. 
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APOSTROPHE, EMBARRASSMENT, AN D DIRECT ADDRESS 
When I call the engaging use of "you" embarrassing, I borrow the 
adjective from Jonathan Cullers investigation into apostrophe in lyric po­
etry. Culler asserts—and Barbara Johnson concurs—that critics of lyric 
poetry are typically made so uncomfortable by apostrophe that they either 
ignore it or treat it in their criticism as though it were a mode of description 
(Pursuit of Signs 136). Although Johnson locates apostrophes discomfiting 
power in its self-contradictory claims to be able to breathe life, through 
poetry, into inanimate entities, Culler concentrates instead on the "mo­
ment of apostrophe" as an event. When a lyric poet invokes an abstract, 
inanimate, or absent figure, the poet invests that figure with being by 
naming it "you." As Johnson emphasizes, the subjectivity of the apos­
trophized being in romantic poetry is only an illusion, a product of the 
poem. But I think Culler is right to trace critical discomfort with the trope 
to doubts over "the power of poetry to make something happen" (140). 
As Culler explains, apostrophe differs from other rhetorical moves in 
that it "makes its point by troping not on the meaning of a word but on the 
circuit or situation of communication itself" (135). Apostrophe shifts the 
address of a text in such a way that the speaker stops talking to the reader/ 
listener, and turns to speak to an absent third party. To evoke and animate 
that other entity is to make something happen. What's more, that "some­
thing" happens in "real time" (as a computer scientist would call it), the 
time of writing and/or reading, Benveniste's "reality of discourse," rather 
than the lyric time or narrative time depicted in the text. Culler borrows the 
terms of narratology to explain the "now" that apostrophe brings to life: 
"This is the time of discourse rather than story" (149). He sums up the 
disconcerting power of the trope: "Apostrophe is not the representation of 
an event; if it works, it produces a fictive, discursive event" (153). 
The recent critical interest in apostrophe provides a useful context for 
looking into reasons why literary critics have so persistently evaded and 
avoided the related but different trope, direct address. First, this attention 
to apostrophe—as opposed to earnest, direct address—suggests that the 
new practitioners of poetics are still most comfortable concentrating on the 
literary, created figures in texts, rather than on the actual "circuit of com­
munication" an author might try to establish with a reader. Second, earnest 
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direct address exactly parallels apostrophe in its status as an event, a trope 
that "makes something happen" in real time. And finally, the issues of 
presence and absence that Culler identifies as the source of embarrassment 
over apostrophe are even more crucial in considerations of direct address, 
complicated as they are by the addressees literal presence in the act of 
reading. 
Even though both Culler and Johnson attend carefully to the poten­
tial impact of apostrophe upon a "reader," each of them concentrates on the 
tropes evocation of a third party whose existence depends entirely upon the 
text. The stress in Cullers formulation of apostrophe as "a fictive, discursive 
event" is on the "fictive." Johnson overtly distinguishes apostrophe from 
direct address: "Apostrophe is both direct and indirect: based etymologi­
cally on the notion of turning aside, of digressing from straight speech, it 
manipulates the I/Thou structure of direct address in an indirect, fic­
tionalized way" (30). True enough: this is precisely why I have placed 
apostrophe under the matrix of the distancing narrator. Apostrophe is a 
"fictive," "fictionalized" manipulation of address. The "you" to whom it 
speaks, whether the West Wind, the Muse, a deceased and honored poet, or 
the hero of Yeast, is indisputably a literary construct. 
But what about the other "you," the "you" that need not be named in 
situations of apostrophe but that must be present in any act of reading, the 
"you" that really means "you, reader"? In the disarming but revealing 
introduction to his essay, Culler plays with an example of apostrophe: 
If we posit for this essay, "Apostrophe," a communicative pro­
cess linking an "authorial voice" and the readers of The Pursuit of 
Signs, an apostrophe seems to mark a deflection of the message: 
O mysterious apostrophe, teach us to understand your work­
ings! Show us your varied talents here! 
Such apostrophes may complicate or disrupt the circuit of 
communication, raising questions about who is the addressee, 
but above all they are embarrassing: embarrassing to me and to 
you.(135) 
Here Culler illustrates his point about apostrophe s discomforts beautifully, 
but he raises one more question "about who is the addressee" than he 
answers. His essay questions the status of the apostrophes addressee, but 
remains silent about the identity of the second of those two pronouns, "to 
me and to you." If we simply plug into these variables the values (in the 
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algebraic sense) he supplies, that phrase would read, "embarrassing to {an 
authorial voice] and to [the readers of The Pursuit of Signs']." 
Such a statement would be within the etiquette prescribed by struc­
turalist and semiotic analysis, but does it really make any sense? Can an 
authorial voice experience embarrassment? Must I really conceive of myself 
as an anonymous member of a group of readers while I am working my way 
through Culler's essay? Or do the "me" and the "you" actually serve here as 
the personal pronouns they appear to be? I read the phrase, "embarrassing 
to me, {Jonathan Culler] and [I presume] to you, [Robyn Warhol or 
whoever you may be]." Since an expository essay is primarily an act of 
communication, there can be no grounds for shame over the texts attempt 
to "do something," in this case, to convey ideas persuasively. And yet, even 
here, the critic hesitates to acknowledge that the text represents his per­
sonal attempt to persuade individual readers to his position. 
When it is used earnestly and engagingly in fiction, direct address is, 
like apostrophe, "not the representation of an event." It "produces" an 
event, but the event is a genuine one, not a fictive one. When the distancing 
narrator sets up conversations between himself and "Miss Bullock," or 
when he addresses a narratee while taking pains to ensure that the actual 
reader will resist identifying with that narratee, he is representing a fictive 
event, an act of communication between one persona and another. When 
the engaging narrator speaks to a "you" that stands for the actual reader, 
however, the text produces a real event, an exchange of ideas that the 
novelist hopes will result in real consequences. 
In this respect, earnest, engaging direct address differs from apos­
trophe: the verbal exchange it instigates is "real," because the receiver of the 
message, the actual reader, is present at the moment of reading, not absent, 
as is the addressee of apostrophe. Culler points to the ways in which 
apostrophe is particularly appropriate to a lyric mode that operates outside 
of empirical time: "Apostrophe resists narrative because its now is not a 
moment in a temporal sequence but a now of discourse, of writing" (152). 
Apostrophe plays with the opposition of presence and absence by shifting 
the two terms away from the time of story and into the time of discourse; the 
dead poet invoked in an elegy, the abstraction apostrophized in an epic 
poem are "not there" on the level of story, but they achieve existence in the 
discourse. Hence, according to Culler, apostrophe represents "the attempt 
to produce in fiction an event by replacing a temporal presence and absence 
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with an apostrophic presence and absence": the poem "knows its apos­
trophic time and the indirectly invoked presence to be a fiction and says so 
but enforces it as event" (153-154). 
Culler's point is that apostrophe may be experienced as disruptive to 
narrative, since it produces a fictive, discursive event that competes with 
the fictive events depicted in a story. Direct address, like apostrophe, shifts 
a text's emphasis from the time of story to the time of discourse, if only 
momentarily. For the duration of a narrator's address to "you," be it a single 
phrase or several paragraphs long, the actual readers attention is necessarily 
drawn away from the fictive events being narrated and toward the real 
situation of narration. To be reminded that a given story is embedded in 
discourse is to be reminded that it is "only a story." What engaging direct 
address attempts to do that neither distancing address nor apostrophe can 
do is to insist that it is "only a {true) story" by alluding to the presence of the 
actual reader in the engaging "you," a presence that is literally real as long 
as someone is perusing the passage of address and receiving the message. As 
I have suggested in Chapter 7, the engaging narrator is also working to 
promote a sense of the authors own presence in the text, through the earnest 
"I" that parallels the engaged "you." And as my reading of Mary Barton, for 
example, demonstrates, the engaging narrator can use the author's and 
readers discursive "presence" to reinforce the narratives claim to being 
realistic, by implying or even asserting that author, reader, and characters 
are all present simultaneously on the same diegetic plane. 
Perhaps this is one source for our embarrassment about earnest, direct 
address: the engaging narrator's claim that the story is as real—not only as 
"realistic"—as the discourse that conveys it. The claim is absurd, naive, 
patently untrue, as Stowe's and Eliot's narrators emphasize when they com­
plicate their engaging methods with distancing ones. And yet, as actual 
readers' emotional reactions to Uncle Tom, for instance, attest, the strategy 
can nevertheless be an effective means of stirring up readerly sentiments. It 
works. The strategy's very effectiveness points to another potential source 
for embarrassment similar to one Culler proposes for apostrophe. If achiev­
ing powerful effects depends on something as mechanical and easily ma­
nipulated as addresses to "you," then the effects must be cheap ones—and 
can they have anything to do with legitimate art? Up to now, even the most 
progressive theorists and critics have replied, no. 
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THE INTRUSIO N OF THE FEMININE 
Another, and perhaps more profound, source for embarrassment 
about earnest direct address in literature is its association (for the nine-
teenth-century novel, at least) with femininity. Indeed, the implicit as­
sumption that it is a woman's strategy, to be applied at moments when a 
readers emotional receptivity should be most sensitive, and to be avoided 
by practitioners of self-referential "high art," must be at least partly respon­
sible for critics' assumption that direct address is somehow an illegitimate 
technique. Direct address is "sensational," lacks "genuineness," "holds a 
strong implication of judgment, of moral or didactic" aims, according to 
Morrissette's summary of twentieth-century critics' attitudes toward the 
trope (124, 132). In the hands of nineteenth-century female novelists who 
use it to emphasize a feminine presence behind the narrative "I" and to exert 
female influence over the moral condition of the reading audience, direct 
address does operate upon the sensations toward didactic ends. And if, in 
1929, Clifton Fadiman felt that rewriting a novel addressed to "you" into 
"the straightforward pattern of a direct third-person narrative" would help 
it "gain in genuineness" (Morrissette 124), who is to say whether or not his 
anxiety over the perceived deviousness of direct address could be traced to a 
distrust for feminine wiles? 
Throughout this study, I have tried to show that earnest, direct 
address came to function in Victorian novels as a sign of feminine presence 
and as a gesture of connection between the worlds inside and outside the 
text. If playing with presence and absence through rhetorical tropes inspires 
discomfort in the first place, that discomfort must only be aggravated for 
androcentric or more extremely misogynist critics when the authorial pres­
ence is coded as feminine. I think that this is one way to account for the 
traditional critical hesitation over whether George Eliot is really in control 
of her art, for the long-standing dismissal of Uncle Tom's Cabin as propa­
ganda too popular and too manipulative to be called art, for the placement 
of Gaskell on the margins of a canon she occupies more comfortably later 
in her career, when her techniques rely less heavily on direct address. It 
can account, too, for objections to signs of the feminine that surface in 
moments of direct address in men's texts: the oratorical sentimentality 
of Dickens and Thackeray, the "intrusive" chattiness of Kingsley and 
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Trollope. For each of the texts in this study, direct address has been a feature 
for critics to condemn, to ignore, to defend, or to apologize for. What 
attracts the critics' opprobrium—and what draws my own interest to the 
trope—is the resonance of gender that it evokes. 
Perhaps direct address in nineteenth-century novels is a subtle case of 
the phenomenon that Joanna Russ has outlined in How to Suppress Women's 
Writing: when it is not possible to deny a woman's agency behind a literary 
text, critics have simply devalued the features that the woman's text dis­
plays. Since a primary feature of Victorian novels by women is the urgent 
need for the novel to do something, to break the barrier between literature 
and rhetoric, to become a platform from which the woman could speak, 
women's novels may have been one inspiration for the perpetuation of the 
"divorce" Gossman and Tompkins describe. To use a Victorian novel as a 
vehicle for public speech is to write as a woman, and to write as a woman 
is—as Russ has so ably illustrated—to write substandard "art." Therefore, 
to rely on direct address is to produce illegitimate novels. The twentieth-
century appropriation of direct address by the media has only aggravated a 
bias that became entrenched before anyone had even imagined a television 
commercial. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. In her detailed discussion of the drawbacks inherent in structuralist and 
formalist systems which, like Genette's, omit "questions of value and context," 
Susan Sniader Lanser has pointed out "the complete disregard of gender in the 
formalist study of narrative voice" {The Narrative Act 39, 46). According to Lanser, 
"Nowhere in modern narrative theory is there mention of the authors or narrators 
gender as a significant variable . . . [but] surely the sex of a narrator is at least as 
significant a factor in literary communication as the narrator's grammatical person, 
the presence or absence of direct address to a reader, or narrative temporality" 
(46-47). In her more recent work, Lanser has begun to rectify the situation she 
describes, asking "whether feminist criticism, and particularly the study of nar­
ratives by women, might benefit from the methods and insights of narratology and 
whether narratology, in turn, might be altered by the understandings of feminist 
criticism and women's texts" ("Toward a Feminist Narratology" 342). Lansers 
article also addresses the reasons why feminists have avoided narratological research 
in the past. 
2. See, for instance, Bal's recent work on the Bible, e.g., "Sexuality, Sin, and 
Sorrow: The Emergence of Female Character (A Reading of Genesis 1—3)" and 
"The Rape of Narrative and the Narrative of Rape." 
3. Miller borrows the terms for her two types of novel—"euphoric" and 
"dysphoric"—from the work of male writers in French semiotics, particularly 
Greimas. Miller herself correctly observes, however, that the terms are not restric­
tive, but flexible in her hands: "This distinction {between "euphoric" and "dys­
phoric" texts] is primarily a heuristic device meant to serve as a frame of reference 
within which individual narratives can be delineated in their specificities" (xi). 
4. Meese outlines her position on Eagletons formulation of the relation be­
tween feminism and literary theory in her chapter "In/Conclusion" (136-140). 
5. According to Culler, "In recent French writing 'woman' has come to stand 
for any radical force that subverts the concepts, assumptions, and structures of 
traditional male discourse" {On Deconstruction 61). 
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6. Genette has acknowledged, for example, that the emphasis on temporal 
structures in his Narrative Discourse arises from Proust's preoccupation with time; he 
confesses, too, to being biased in that his "curiosity and predilection went regularly 
to the most deviant aspects of Proustian narrative, the specific transgressions or 
beginnings of a future development" (265). Suleiman recognizes that "the danger 
that the cases chosen may be too 'special' to be generalizable always haunts the 
enterprise of the structural anthropologist [and] . . . the theorist of genres who 
works on a limited corpus" {Authoritarian Fictions 16). Fish (who, like the struc­
turalists, insists that his methods are "oriented away from evaluation and toward 
description") admits that "this is not to say that I do not evaluate. The selection of 
texts for analysis is itself an indication of a hierarchy in my own tastes" (51). 
7. Genette illustrates this idea with reference to Proustian narrative's speci­
ficity (22—23). 
8. Brownmillers history of body hair occurs in her chapter on "Skin" 
(138-148); Ronald Pearsall, illustrating his assertion that "the Victorians were 
transfixed by feminine beauty" (141), mentions that William Etty (a "great and 
underestimated . . . painter of womanly flesh") "conformed to the unwritten code 
that specified no pubic hair . . . [the delineation of which} was the prerogative of 
the artists who specialized in pornography" (142). 
9. For linguistic studies of differences in men's and women's language, see 
Hiatt, Henley and Thorne, Thorne and Henley, and Jarrard and Randall. 
10. Lanser investigates gendered implications of "public" and "private" nar­
ration, proposing to add them to Genette's model for narrative situations. Her 
emphasis upon "the difference between purely formal and contextual approaches to 
meaning in narrative" ("Toward a Feminist Narratology" 354) points to the new 
emphasis on context in the recent work of narratologists such as Suleiman {Authori­
tarian Fictions) and Prince ("Narrative Pragmatics"). 
11. I borrow the sense of this phrase from Suleiman, who has used it to refer 
to acts of enunciation that make serious referential or didactic claims. 
12. As Culler points out, this kind of reading does not require biological 
womanhood, but rather what Showalter has called a "hypothesis of a female reader" 
{On Deconstruction 50). This approach has been pursued in recent studies of gender 
and reading; see especially Flynn and Schweikart. 
13. In addition to feminist studies of deconstruction's notion of differance, 
studies of sexual difference based in psychology have led to fruitful literary applica­
tions, e.g., Chodorow's theory of object relations, Dinnerstein's model of male and 
female children's relations to the mother, Gilligans distinctions between male and 
female constructions of morality and maturity, and Keller's recent moves toward 
transforming traditional gender categories. See also Miller {Poetics of Gender) 
and Abel. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1. Tompkins observes that "Reading, for [Prince]. . . consists of discovering 
what is already there on the page. His narratees, like Wayne Booths narrators, 
belong to the text" (Reader-Response Criticism xii). 
2. I am thinking of the kind of reading Barthes performs on brief literary 
passages in A Lover's Discourse, where he strikes a pose of personal response to the 
affective implications of texts. 
3. The assumption also pervades the Anglo-American tradition of rhetorical 
criticism, which treats "the reader" as a figure created by the text. As Walker 
Gibson put it in an influential 1955 essay, "There are two readers distinguishable in 
every literary experience. First, there is the "real" individual upon whose crossed 
knee rests the open volume, and whose personality is as complex and ultimately 
inexpressible as any dead poet's. Second, there is the fictitious reader—I shall call 
him the "mock reader"—whose mask and costume the individual takes on in order 
to experience the language. The mock reader is an artifact, controlled, simplified, 
abstracted out of the chaos of day-to-day sensation." (2) The idea of the mock reader 
survives in Booth's "implied reader" and in the reader that Ong asserts is "always a 
fiction," existing only as a persona that the writer imagines and the actual reader 
may or may not adopt. This critical tradition removes the "actual reader" from the 
discussion of literary works, avoiding the "affective fallacy" and focusing more or 
less exclusively on describing or interpreting the text. See Suleiman and Crosman; 
Tompkins, Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism; and W. Daniel Wilson. 
4. Direct address to a narratee in a text where the narrative situation is 
intradiegetic (e.g. Wuthering Heights) or where the narrator is homodiegetic, that 
is, a character within the narrative (e.g., Jane Eyre or Great Expectations) has a 
different rhetorical effect because it mirrors what speech-act theorists call "the 
natural narrative situation" (see Pratt 45). For an insightful analysis of direct 
address that fits this category, see Monod ("Charlotte Bronte and the Thirty 
'Readers'"). 
5. Distancing and engaging are my terms. Very few critics have analyzed the 
effects of engaging intervention in fictional texts. For a debate that focuses on 
engaging technique without using the term narratee, see Gmelins, Auerbach s, and 
Spitzer's arguments about Dante's use of direct address in the Divine Comedy. 
6. All three novelists make their intentions explicit, both within and outside 
their fictional texts. See Gaskell s Preface to Mary Barton (37); Stowes "Concluding 
Remarks," in Uncle Tom's Cabin (618-629); Stowes A Key; and Eliot's "In Which 
the Story Pauses a Little," Adam Bede (150). 
7. Stang has shown that many mid-nineteenth-century critics and reviewers 
in England disapproved of narrative intervention; Baym (Novels, Readers, and 
Reviewers) makes the same observation about American critics. Novelists of the 
period would have been aware of the theoretical objections to the convention. Eliot, 
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in particular, was self-conscious about typical attitudes toward authorial commen­
tary. See her observations on Sterne's narrative irregularities (Essays 446). 
8. Tompkins identifies similarities between the forms of address in Uncle Tom 
and the Old Testament models for the American jeremiad (Sensational Designs 
139-141). 
9. I am grateful to Cynthia Bernstein for suggesting this example in her 
response to the first published version of this study. 
10. Obviously not every reader can identify with the narratee. Evidence of the 
distanced response in hostile readers of Uncle Tom surfaces in reviews of the novel by 
Stowes contemporaries; see Ammons. 
11. See Conrad and Ford Madox Ford for further evidence that modern 
novelists, to avoid distancing effects, try to stay out of the text. As Ford puts it, 
they intend "to keep the reader entirely oblivious of the fact that the author 
exists—even of the fact that he is reading a book" (76). Ferguson demonstrates, 
however, that even the most scrupulous of the impressionists cannot avoid some 
narrative intervention. 
CHAPTER 3 
1. Wright, though eager to demonstrate that Gaskell "thought seriously 
about her work and was a conscious craftsman," nevertheless concedes that "she 
is not a literary critic, not much—in her surviving correspondence—of a self-
critic" (8). 
2. See Craik's assertion that in Gaskell s fiction "the circumstances and set­
tings and details that attend them are vividly actual because they are those common 
to their kind. Her success in combining historical fact and documentary detail with 
her invented story is virtually complete" (18). David Smith, by contrast, has 
challenged the notion that social-problem novels can be evaluated according to 
their "accuracy . .  . in particulars" (98). 
3. Jordan has demonstrated "the irruption into the text of discourses other 
than that of sympathetic observing realism" (48). Gallagher, too, sees competing 
literary modes at work in Mary Barton, which she attributes to "an ambivalence 
about causality that finds its way into Gaskell s tragedy and creates an irresolveable 
paradox there," resulting in the introduction of "other narrative forms, primarily 
melodrama and domestic fiction" (Industrial Reformation 67). Lucas sees the too-
easy solutions of the plot as interfering with the social-problem novel's goals; 
Ricchio has analyzed the role of Utopian mythic patterning in realist novels as 
central to the formal problems Mary Barton raises. 
4. Jordan points out that Gaskell s narrative is vague even about the details of 
Chartism (56). 
5. Gerin quotes A. W. Wards "Biographical Introduction" to the Knutsford 
edition of Mary Barton. See Gerin for an account of the birth and death of William 
Gaskell, Jr. (71-75). 
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6. This authorial insistence upon a personal, rather than an overtly political, 
interest in social unrest recalls the assertions of critics such as Tillotson and Wright 
who think of Gaskell as primarily a "Christian" novelist, proselytizing for a change 
of heart, a reborn sympathetic zeal, among her audience. See David Smiths refuta­
tion of Tillotsons suggestion that Mary Barton, in the universality of its theme, has 
no "social, extra-artistic purpose" (Tillotson 210, Smith 100); see also Wrights 
argument that the "particular aspect of the condition [she was] hoping to treat" was 
"the religious" (29). 
7. Wright has also noted that Gaskell's account of her decision shows that she 
"felt compelled to write of what was close to her and observable," which makes her 
"a social novelist" (11). 
8. See treatments of allusion, quotation, and intertextuality in Mary Barton 
by Jordan, Wheeler, and Easson. 
9. Whereas Lansbury argues that the narrative voice in Gaskells novels 
probably reflects a projected idea of the middle-class reader's opinions rather than 
Gaskells own, Fryckstedt identifies the narrator's views with those of Gaskell's 
Unitarian faith and shows the ways in which Gaskell's first two novels pose a 
challenge to received middle-class religious notions. 
10. Furbank s essay concentrates on the narration of North and South, in which 
"the author allows herself for certain purposes to be a false witness" (53). Citing a 
passage that depicts the heroines thoughts and behavior in one scene, Furbank 
remarks, "Now here we really cannot take Mrs. Gaskell literally, and must be 
meant to realise that she is telling a fib. Margaret s reason for standing still is clearly 
not just what we are told it is. What passes through her mind is something less 
simple, and more natural" (53). Furbank objects to Gaskell's "mendacity," at­
tributing it to an excessive identification between author and heroine (51). 
11. Wright points to Gaskell s "identifying herself with the reader, and both 
herself and the reader with humanity at large" as typifying the authorial stance in 
her "novels of religious and social purpose" (241). 
12. I borrow the phrase from Meese, who applies it to Celie's last letter in 
Alice Walker's The Color Purple. Like engaging interventions, Celie's address to 
"dear everything" "opens the significance of the novel as it closes this particular 
fiction" (127). 
13. Wright notes with particular relief the disappearance of direct address 
from Gaskell's later work. Listing some early examples in which Gaskell's narrative 
"I" addresses "you," Wright remarks, "This is probably the most naive form of 
narrative comment, and disappears from her work as she gains control of her 
medium" (242). In her enthusiastic defense of Gaskell's novels, Craik, too, con­
cedes that Gaskell "sometimes over-exerts herself to make the way plain for the 
reader. . . . [Sjometimes she feels compelled to state her position—a dispassion­
ate one . . . with unneeded emphasis" (10). Yet Craik concludes that Gaskell is 
"for her time and with her aims, very sparing of addresses to her reader." Given the 
sheer number of addresses to the reader in Mary Barton (of which I have quoted only 
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a portion), perhaps Craik s impression that Gaskell's narrator, "although not self-
effacing," is "unobtrusive" (29) could be attributed to the engaging nature (rather 
than the frequency) of the narrative interventions. 
CHAPTER 4 
1. The phrase comes from Justin McCarthy's description of Charles Kingsley, 
which is on the whole a sneering one, and probably not a fair characterization. I use 
it merely to evoke Kingsley s image, not his real personality. 
2. Gallagher links narrative technique in Alton Locke with Kingsley s "ambiv­
alence about causality" and says that the novel "undermines faith in the possibility 
of referential, realistic fiction" {Industrial Reformation of English Fiction 89). 
3. See, for example, Kestner, Cazamian, Hartley, and Uffelman. Recently, 
Alton Locke has been the subject of more literary consideration; see especially 
Gallagher's Industrial Reformation of English Fiction. 
4. See Chitty (111) for an account of the reaction to Yeast among Kingsley s 
friends. His honored mentors, Ludlow and Mansfield, detested it. His wife, 
however, was so fond of her husband s first novel that she requested that a copy of it 
be buried with her. The parts that appealed to her were apparently those treating 
the love affair of Lancelot and Argemone, which was loosely based on the Kingsley s 
courtship. She, too, disapproved of the novels political contents. 
5. I take up this point in Chapter 7, where I look in more detail at direct 
address in nineteenth-century sermons. 
6. Swanson locates the irony in a disjunction between the world the author 
has created and the comments the narrator makes on that world. He argues that 
Thackeray's irony can be decoded into a moral message: e.g., "It is the ambiguity of 
the narrator toward Becky that most clearly defines Thackeray's critical method: the 
narrator questions her innocence, but the author confirms her guilt, thereby con­
demning the narrator for judging by a false standard" (140). Rawlins, by contrast, 
sees no obvious way to decode the irony: "Thackeray undercuts his own rhetoric as 
well as the rhetoric of his characters, and in ways for which we cannot offer 
explanation except in the general terms of an habitual ironic perspective" (155). 
For other treatments of irony in Vanity Fair, see, for instance, Wilkinson, 
Mauskopf, and Sheets. 
7. Olmsted outlines this debate in the preface to his bibliography of twen-
tieth-century Thackeray criticism. Segel ("Thackeray's Journalism") mentions "the 
characteristic bugaboo of Thackeray's readers— . . . the tendency to simply miss 
the presence of the persona or mask and to attribute both commentary and its 
implied values directly to Thackeray the author" (25). 
8. This question arises particularly for Segel ("Thackeray s Journalism") and 
Mauskopf, who analyze Thackeray's early journalism for his position on fiction. 
9. The equation of Thackeray's techniques with realism can be traced back to 
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nineteenth-century critics of his novels (Flamm 3). As recently as 1983, Sinha was 
still arguing that Thackeray's "excellence," like Fielding's, depends on "the au­
thorial commentaries which go to establish an intimate relationship between the 
novelist and the reader" (233). Wilkinson sees the readers position as that of 
"accomplice" to the gossiping narrator (372-373). See also Polhemus on the 
intimacy between narrator and reader (152). Blodgett, in contrast, argues that 
"while Fielding's narrator may deepen in intimacy with his reader, Thackeray's 
narrator instead gives the sense of his own growth as he draws with anecdotal 
geniality . .  . on various parts of his own history in order to associate himself with 
the tale" (214). 
10. See Wilkenfeld for an analysis of "Before the Curtain" that differentiates 
some of the narrator's roles in the preface, particularly those of "Manager" and 
"Man" (314). See also Stevens for questions about the audiences position vis-a-vis 
the puppet stage, e.g., "Where, then, are we?" (394). 
11. Sheets has catalogued half a dozen instances where the narrator claims 
authentic sources for his information, counterbalancing them with an equally long 
list of passages in which the narrator claims not to have been able to ascertain the 
pertinent facts. Sheets concludes that these inconsistencies leave "us with the 
question, 'What after all, did happen?'" (426—427). Of course, literally nothing 
"didhappen": it is all invented, and—as Morton Bloomfield has pointed out—so 
many references to "authenticating devices" in the text merely call "attention to the 
need for authentication and hence to the inauthenticity of the work of art" (quoted 
in Segel, "Truth and Authenticity" 56). 
12. The impulse behind some critics' claims for Vanity Fair's realism comes 
from a New Critical desire to find coherence and unity in any great novel. See, for 
example, Blodgett s assertions that "Vanity Fair succeeds because of its narrator, 
not despite him" (211), that "the many roles of the narrator's 'pose' interact 
harmoniously, making the novel coherent" (215), and that "what he claims is right 
for the novel and what he demonstrates through his novel constitute a unity" (217). 
13. Praz treats Thackeray's narrator as a preacher, emphasizing that he has in 
mind a kind of preaching which operates upon logic, rather than emotional appeal 
(49). Carlisle insists that "no matter how indirect, the role of the preacher, a voice 
expounding on our fallen human nature, is central to Thackeray's fiction" (40). And 
Segel concludes her defense of Vanity Fair's seriousness by arguing for Thackeray's 
attempt "to bring together for the reader's instruction the real world and the 
fictional world, so widely separated in conventional novels of his time" ("Truth and 
Authenticity" 58). 
14. Ferris concludes that Thackeray "risks the entire narrative enterprise to 
assert—briefly and obliquely—a limited freedom for the human imagination" 
(303). Sheets says Thackeray came to realize that "the novelist can no longer be a 
historian or a preacher lecturing to his fellow citizens. He is a lonely man who sees 
himself in his novels, and he must therefore develop a subjective narrative tech­
nique that will acknowledge his imperfection and alienation" (430). Rawlins 
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decides that Thackeray "seems to have created a context for his fiction that allows 
the universal moral relevance that Richardson erroneously claims" (176). 
15. My description of Thackeray's project as "play" draws upon Huizingas 
definition of a "game," which Lynette Hunter summarizes: "First, it is a freedom 
and marked by voluntary activity; second, it lies outside real life in a disinterested 
world of its own; and third, it is secluded and limited, isolated from reality in fixed 
time and absolute order. Because of that isolation it denies any moral aspects, 
claiming neutrality not on the basis of truth but from its autonomy" (92-93). 
CHAPTER 5 
1. Traditional histories of the sentimental novel traced the genre s flowering 
to the romantic period; see Herbert Ross Brown, and Allen. 
2. "Sentimentality" is one element in the Victorian domestic feminine ideal; 
see Parker. In "The Silence is Broken," (McConnell-Ginet, et al.), Donovan ana­
lyzes the rhetoric of women's sentimental novels. Some critics defend Uncle Tom as a 
"serious" women's novel which is not "sentimental" (see Zeman), but Tompkins 
shows that even on the level of plot, "the tears . . . which we find easy to ridicule 
are the sign of redemption in Uncle Tom's Cabin; not words, but the emotions of the 
heart bespeak a state of grace" in the story {Sensational Designs 131). 
3. Gribble looks into the role of literary sentimentality in "the education of 
the emotions." Hardy {Forms of Feeling) discriminates among the particular emo­
tional lessons that classic Victorian novels were meant to transmit. 
4. See Hirsch's account of Uncle Toms public reception. For evidence of Eliot's 
unsentimental reputation, see Harvey's assertion in The Art of George Eliot that 
Eliot's "intrusive comments are generally neither dramatic gestures, {nor] rhetori­
cal embellishments demanding an overwrought emotional response from the 
reader" (82—83). Not all critics agree that Eliot always rises above sentimentality; 
see Oldfield and Oldfield on the "flaw of sentimentality" in Scenes of Clerical Life 
(9—14). See also Mann, for a detailed analysis of the figurative language Eliot's 
narrators use to generate "laughter and tears in the reader," excluding direct 
address (168-199). Benson has shown that Eliot valued more highly reviews that 
showed emotional receptivity to her work than those praising her technique, and he 
does not respect her for it: "It is tempting to say that this emotionalism is a lapse, 
and that George Eliot knows better, but to do so would be a falsification" (440). 
5. Hardy {Forms of Feeling) observes that Eliot's novels shift in their designs 
upon readers' sympathies, from a simple attempt to rouse pity in Scenes, to an effort 
to prompt readers to "particularize and analyze" their feelings (152). Later in her 
career Eliot was to become impatient "with the solicitations of text as well as the 
facile readiness of response" (155). Ermarth ("George Eliot's Conception of Sympa­
thy") and Doyle have further elucidated Eliot's position on sympathetic response. 
6. As Bell has argued, sentiment and realism are not mutually exclusive in 
nineteenth-century novels. 
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7. Ammons has collected some vehement examples: see "Anon." (1852), 
Holmes (1852), Thompson (1852), and Woodward (1853) in Critical Essays. 
8. Levin looks into the specific problems of trying to mine Uncle Tom for 
"historical evidence." 
9. Stowe s biographer specifies that Stowe "invented the text" of at least one 
slave-advertisement in the Key, though "she had seen similar ones in Cincinnati" 
(Forrest Wilson 333). 
10. Forrest Wilson lists half a dozen titles of these "counter propaganda" 
novels (325). 
11. Holmes (see Ammons) was only one of many who assumed that Stowe 
derived her ideas from other novelists: Dickens himself believed Stowe had "appro­
priated" material from his novels and Gaskell's (Leavis and Leavis 166). The 
persistence with which critics have always referred to "Little Eva," as if in imitation 
of "Little Nell" (though the narrator calls the character only "Eva" or "Evangeline") 
has perpetuated the idea that Stowe copied Dickens inordinately. 
12. See, for instance, Moers {Harriet Beecher Stowe), Adams, Gillian Brown, 
Crumpacker (in Fleischmann), Fiedler, Joswick, Tompkins {Sensational Designs), 
and the essays by Yarborough, Yellin, Halttunen, and Ammons in Sundquist. 
13. Tompkins has observed that Uncle Tom resembles an American jeremiad 
(Sensational Designs 139). Stowe was to break with Calvinist doctrine later in her life 
(Forrest Wilson 435, 621), and she developed a critique of the Presbyterian church 
as an institution (see Hovet). I am tracing the Edwardsian influence upon the 
rhetoric of Stowe's writing, rather than upon its theological content. 
14. The plot provides models for individual upper- and middle-class be­
reaved mothers to see as mirrors for themselves (for example, Mrs. Bird). 
15. Yellin (in Sundquist) emphasizes that Stowe seeks to inspire individual 
sympathetic responses to slaves, rather than collective public action (101). Alexan­
der makes a similar point about the primacy of individual moral action in George 
Eliot's fiction. 
16. The classic study of Eliot s early realism is Knoepflmacher's (George Eliot's 
Early Novels); Ermarth (Realism and Consensus) outlines the historical and philosoph­
ical "premises of realism" for Eliot and her contemporaries. Adam, Henberg, and 
Cottom each explicate Eliot's conception of realism; Wittig-Davis and Mansell 
compare Eliot's views with Ruskins. Examining limitations of and conflicts within 
Eliot's realism, Levine (The Realistic Imagination) compares her ideas with Ruskins 
and looks into the problems of combining artistic and scientific notions of reality 
(255-274). For studies of Eliot's changing conception of realism throughout her 
novelistic career, see Levine ("Realism, or in Praise of Lying") Laurence Lerner, 
McGowan, and Gallagher ("The Failure of Realism"). 
17. Critics generally assume that the narrator of Adam Bede, like that of 
Scenes, is male. Hardy (The Novels ofGeorge Eliot, 155-157) cites passages in which 
the Scenes narrator refers to having been a "boy," but gives no evidence for the Adam 
Bede narrator's masculinity except that "he—though the sexual reminders have 
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ceased to be persistent—holds a conversation with Adam Bede about Mr. Irwine" 
(157). I see no reason to doubt that a female narrator could "hold" such a 
conversation. 
Hayles identifies the narrative voice of Eliot's next novel, The Mill on the Floss, 
as feminine because it participates in Gilligan's "female ethic of care . . . and a 
habitual plea for tolerance" (26). Though Hayles accepts Hardy's characterization 
of the Adam Bede narrator as masculine, Hayles s description of the female-ethic-
inspired narrative stance in The Mill describes the strategy in Adam Bede equally well: 
"The strategy is to invite judgment, then to forestall it by broadening the context 
so that we see the connection between our faults and those of the characters" (25). 
18. Ermarth {Realism and Consensus) argues persuasively that Eliot's narrator is 
"a protean figure . . . {who] shuttles between extremes of personalization and 
abstraction" (237). Accepting her point that the narrator can speak sometimes as 
"nobody . .  . a kind of generalized historical awareness hardly distinguishable 
from our own," I am concentrating—as did Ermarth in an earlier piece ("Method 
and Moral")—on the "personalized" aspect of Eliot's narrator and narratees. 
19. As Hardy has pointed out, Eliot's novels changed over the course of her 
career in their conception of the narratee: "In the earlier novels, George Eliot's 
narrator may imagine a reader below the reasonable level of expectation, flattering 
the sympathetic response by singling out an exemplary unexemplary reader in the 
manner of Sterne and Thackeray [i.e., distancing strategies], but in Middlemarch 
there is refusal to praise the average sympathetic reader" [i.e., a suspension even of 
engaging strategies] {Forms ofFeeling 155). 
20. Anderson demonstrates at length that Blackwood was the "reader" Eliot 
had in mind while composing chapter 17. Despite Knoepflmacher's dismissal of the 
idea as an "unlikely conjecture" ("George Eliot" 256), my reading of the chapter 
supports Anderson's thesis. 
21. In the 1940s and 1950s this disruption of the illusion was the primary 
critical objection to Eliot's novels. See Bennett and Van Ghent, for examples. 
Harvey disputes the critics' theoretical biases, but assumes that disruption of 
illusion is a problem which the defender of Eliot's art must justify {Art of George 
Eliot 66-68). 
22. Watson demonstrates Dinah's "authenticity" as a female Methodist 
preacher by comparing her language with that of Eliot's aunt, Mrs. Samuel Evans. 
23. See Lee for an analysis of the similar role memory plays in reading The 
Mill on the Floss. 
24. This is particularly true at the level of interpretation, as Holland and 
Bleich, among others, have shown. 
25. See Alexander's analysis of the relation of Eliot's realism to her didactic, 
humanistic goals. 
26. I take up this question in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
1. Genette explores the paratext in Seuils. 
2. One reviewer identified Trollope as the author of the anonymously pub­
lished Nina Balatka because he had "found the repeated use of some special phrase 
which had rested upon his ear too frequently when reading . . . other works of 
mine" {Autobiography 205). More recently, Davies has noted Trollopes stylistic 
habit of balancing two statements about a character on either side of a "but" or 
"still" (99). For an exhaustive analysis of Trollope's characteristic language and 
style, see Clark. 
3. Kendrick has tackled the question of Trollopes narrators' ambivalence 
toward the production of texts that can draw readers into an imaginative world but 
must simultaneously leave them outside (32). 
4. McMaster has outlined the basic parallels among the novel's subplots. 
5. See especially Wijesinha, who claims that Trollope presents "a more real­
istic as well as a more sympathetic portrayal of the woman of the day" than do 
Dickens, Thackeray, and Kingsley (21, 338). 
6. See Schlickes account of the element of "popular entertainment" in 
Dickens's career; see Worth's tracing of melodramatic influence upon the novels. 
7. Rose focuses on this aspect of Dickens's personality; see also Edgar 
Johnson. 
8. See Green's treatment of sermonic rhetoric in Hard Times. 
9. For a more complete analysis of the sections not narrated by Esther, see 
Hough (who details the style of the "other narrator" 52 — 59) and Hornback. 
Hornback locates the novel's "other portion" in the activity of the reader: "It is the 
portion that you and I, as Esther's 'unknown friend,' have to write" (195). For 
recent discussions of the effect of the double-narrative in the novel, see Daldry; 
Blain; Moseley; Frazee; and Kearns. 
10. The interventions made by the Fashionable Intelligence voice resemble 
those in the final chapter of Our Mutual Friend, the "Voice of Society." 
11. Horton has persuasively described Dickens's rhetoric of uncertainty from 
a reader-response perspective. 
12. The dates come from the "Chronology" in Ford and Monod's edition of 
Bleak House (883-884). 
13. For the standard argument about Esther's femininity (and sentimen­
tality), see Monod ("Esther Summerson") and Dunn. More recent feminist-inspired 
readings see Esther's position as a positive embodiment of Dickens s feminine ideal; 
see Kennedy and, especially, Senf. 
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CHAPTER 7 
1. Welter defines "The Cult of True Womanhood"; for recent discussions of 
domestic ideology, see Kelley (308) and Gallagher (The Industrial Reformation of 
English F iction 118, 148). 
2. The question is quoted anonymously by Taylor (220). 
3. Eckhardt quotes this sketch in her biography of Wright to illustrate the 
abuse the speaker often received as her celebrity increased (249—2 50). Even women 
who spoke for temperance or abolition with the explicit or implicit sanction of the 
church, such as Abby Kelley or the Grimke sisters, were subject to criticism. For 
details on the careers of the Grimkes, who began lecturing nine years after Wright, 
see Gerda Lerner. 
4. Beecher was not always successful in avoiding censure: she inevitably 
suffered consequences for stepping outside the domestic realm. As Gossett puts it, 
"In spite of her taking the position that women ought not to agitate publicly the 
questions of the day, Catharine was obliged to some extent to do this herself. . . . 
In spite of her efforts to state her ideas modestly and to work through influential 
men, Catharine herself was often written off as a busybody and as a querulous old 
maid" (48). See Beechers Essay on the Education of Female Teachers, Principles of 
Domestic Science, and The True Remedy for the Wrongs of Women for exposition of her 
views on women's proper sphere. For details of Beechers life against an informative 
backdrop of domestic ideology, see Sklar. 
5. Stowe s two tours and their reception have been detailed by Trautmann and 
Kirkham. Drawing on newspaper reviews and the Stowe family's correspondence, 
Kirkham traces the Midwestern tour. Trautmann's two articles report on that one 
and the previous tour of New England; his two essays, however, follow exactly the 
same outline and make precisely the same points, varying only in illustrative 
details. 
6. For details of women's activity in the socialist movement, see Taylor. 
Smith-Rosenberg describes female participation in revivalist activities (130); 
Sweet depicts women speaking in Methodist congregations (115). Even in Protes­
tant churches, however, women could face severe penalties for speaking "out of 
turn." The trial of Rhoda Bement, excommunicated from her Rochester, New 
York, Presbyterian congregation in 1843 f°r publicly criticizing her minister, 
illustrates the dangers. The historians who have recorded the case remark: "When 
women such as Abby Kelley, the Grimke sisters, and Rhoda Bement [all of them 
abolitionists] asserted their right to be heard and to act in public, they did violence 
to one of the most powerful traditions of their time. . . . However unarticulated or 
unconscious her acts, {Bement] stood for the right of women to be heard publicly, 
and thus ran athwart one of the strongest traditions of nineteenth-century society" 
(Altschuler and Saltzgaber 57, 18). 
Some women nevertheless continued to participate in what Smith-Rosenberg 
calls "disorderly conduct." Hewitt provides a critical summary of historians' as­
sumptions about the rise of female activism and its relation to the women's rights 
218 
Notes to Pages 166—183 
movement (1-39). See Nestor (8-11 ) for a brief and specific survey of English 
women's collective activity in publishing and social reform; see Kanner for more 
detailed documentation and bibliographic references. For accounts of American 
women's efforts at mid-century, see especially Smith-Rosenberg (109—164), Ryan 
(83-98, 105-144), and Conway. 
7. See Basch for a discussion of limitations on women's professional options 
(103-109). 
8. Nestor (3) and Robert A. Colby (10) are among the critics who cite this 
passage from Mulock Craik's "To Novelists—and a Novelist," Macmillans Maga­
zine, (April 1861): 442. 
9. Kelley specifies that the female novelists she studies (the "literary domes­
tics") "were women of the home who simultaneously came to assume the male roles 
of public figure, economic provider, and creator of culture" (111). 
10. See, for instance, Kelley, Douglas, Basch, and Newton. According to 
Newton, even Gaskells novels of protest reveal an implicit endorsement of the cult 
of true womanhood: in North and South Newton perceives an "acceptance of the 
ideology of woman's sphere" (165), which she attributes to Gaskells "conservative 
relation to ideology" (168). In the novels of Burney, Austen, Charlotte Bronte, and 
Eliot, Newton sees a substitution of female "ability" for the dominant model of 
feminine "influence": "These novels delineate a line of covert, ambivalent, but 
finally radical resistance to the ideology of their day" (10). Gilbert and Gubar argue 
for a similar line of covert resistance in women's literature. 
11. Blackwell was responding to explicit textual hints of masculinity in the 
narrative interventions in Scenes. Two of the specifically gendered self-references 
that the narrator of Scenes makes occur in "Janets Repentance," where he recalls 
himself as a little boy, misbehaving in church, making his little sister cry by 
imitating a preacher's "yoaring" at her (292), and wearing coattails for the first time 
(256). 
12. Dickens claimed that he immediately recognized a feminine eye for 
domestic detail in Scenes: " 'If the tale were not by a woman,' he wrote, 'I believe no 
man ever before had the art of making himself, mentally, as like a woman, since the 
world began" (Edgar Johnson 483). Stowe wrote to Eliot in 1869 that she had first 
read Eliot's work "supposing you man," but that she had based her final conviction 
that Eliot was a woman on "internal evidence": "No, my sister, there are things 
about us no man can know and consequently no man can write" (Kelley 252). 
13. Peterson argues that evangelicalism was partly responsible for this em­
phasis on moral teaching in nineteenth-century novels (11). 
14. See my "Letters and Novels 'One Woman Wrote to Another': George 
Eliot's Responses to Elizabeth Gaskell," Victorian Newsletter 70 (1986): 8 -14  . 
15. See Vance for a recent history of this connection in Victorian literature 
and religious attitudes. 
16. According to Buell, divinity school lectures on the art of preaching were 
increasingly common in America during the first half of the nineteenth century; 
they usually centered on strictly rhetorical or oratorical topics (172). 
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17. Muscular Christians were not the only Victorian group to fetishize the 
"healthy body"; see Haley. 
18. Beecher's emphasis on extemporaneous sermonizing set him apart from 
the mainstream of Unitarian and Congregationalist preachers, whose sermons were 
usually more polished literary constructions; see Buell (179). 
19. The ministers belief that he is a mouthpiece for the voice of God survives 
in fundamentalist sects, particularly in the tradition of orally composed sermons 
called "American spiritualist preaching," where the "preacher is only lending Him 
his mouth and lips and tongue" (Rosenberg 9). 
CHAPTER 8 
1. Sandy Petrey adapts J. L. Austins theory of speech acts to develop a subtle 
approach to the problem of referentiality in realist fiction. Petrey s work exemplifies 
the way in which speech-act theorists can approach literary language without 
trying to differentiate it from language in general; it does not take up the refer­
entiality of the reader-figure in realist texts. 
2. A case in point: Boris Gasparov, modeling "The Narrative Text as an Act 
of Communication," proposes numerous formulas for "the connotative parame­
ters" of narrative texts at a very high level of abstraction. His structures describe 
texts as utterances, or messages encoded by a sender; the only observation he makes 
about the receiver is that a sender's "attitude toward the addressee may either be 
'familiar' (as is appropriate in 'practical discourse') or 'neutral' (as in 'official dis­
course')" (248). The literary narrative text "belongs to the neutral type. This 
feature results from the nonspecific and nondirect character of the addressee, by 
virtue of which familiar appellation is rendered impossible" (249). Gasparov fo­
cuses throughout on the encoding of the message, not its decoding, as though a 
literary act of communication in fact involved only an utterance, independent of 
a receiver. 
3. Tompkins's tone, as usual, suggests that she is exaggerating. Her hyper­
bole not only amplifies her point, but also excludes from her narrative of modern 
criticism any movements which have—for instance—taken seriously the work of 
G. B. ShaworBertoltBrecht. Still, the phenomenon she describes certainly exists; 
moreover, it has extended beyond theories of literature to inspire theories of 
reading. Louise Rosenblatt, for example, has proposed a "Transactional Theory" 
that shifts the emphasis from dividing up literary and nonliterary texts to distin­
guishing between literary and nonliterary reading. For Rosenblatt, the "poem" is a 
function of a reader's interaction with a text: a reader produces a poem through 
"aesthetic" reading, in which "the reader's attention is centered directly on what he 
is living through during his relationship with that particular text" (24). "Efferent" 
reading, by contrast, is what a reader does to glean information. Appealing and 
effective as the theory is for describing readerly activity in encounters with lyric 
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poetry, it stops short of accounting for texts that are to be read simultaneously from 
aesthetic and efferent perspectives, such as the didactic novel or the roman a these. 
4. Until recently, structuralist narratology has eschewed thematic interpreta­
tion of the texts it describes, and as a result has participated in perpetuating the 
boundaries between text and world. Lately narratologists have been calling for 
more attention to external context as being essential to describing narrative, as well 
as to interpreting it. See Prince, "Narrative Pragmatics, Message, and Point" and 
Lanser, "Toward a Feminist Narratology." 
5. For documentation of nineteenth-century reviewers' disapproval of 
"preachy" authorial address, see Stang (for British examples) and Baym {Novels, 
Readers, and Reviewers, for American examples). 
6. Jakobson concurs with Benvenistes analysis and employs the term 
"shifter" in his further elucidation of deixis (132). 
7. I depart here from speech-act theories that propose universally applicable 
formulas for the truth status of literary discourse. Barbara Hernstein Smith and 
Richard Ohmann treat fictional discourse as a pretense of uttering real statements, 
whereas Mary Louise Pratt approaches fictive discourse as a real narration of fictive 
statements. According to Smith, "The essential fictiveness of novels . .  . is not to 
be discovered in the unreality of characters, objects, and events alluded to, but 
in the unreality of the alluding themselves. . .  . In a novel or tale, it is the act 
of reporting events, the act of describing persons and referring to places that is fic­
tive" (29). 
For Pratt, on the other hand, the "natural narrative" or real-life narrative 
situation and the situation of literary narration are exactly the same: both are real 
instances of articulating a "narrative display text," regardless of the "truth" of the 
events and circumstances they express. Pratt insists that literary and nonliterary 
discourse should be subjected to the same kind of linguistic analysis, since "fictive 
or 'imitation' speech acts are readily found in almost any realm of discourse, and our 
ability to produce and interpret them must be viewed as part of our normal 
linguistic and cognitive competence, not as some special by-product of it" or as 
'"poetic deviance'" (200). 
Different kinds of novels, I think, make different kinds of claims; even among 
realist novels, actual narrative practices diverge. The distancing narrator, by con­
tinually drawing attention to the novel's textuality, points to the fictiveness of his 
utterance, supporting Smith's claim; the engaging narrator strains against that 
convention, however, by insisting upon the reality of the narrative situation, the 
communication between "I" and "you." Novels with engaging narrators provide 
strong supporting evidence, therefore, for Pratts hypothesis. 
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